The Story of Bhutanese Refugees

What kind of information does this website offer?

2010-07-31T12:57:00.004+09:00

Dear Reader,

You are here because you either heard about Bhutan or the so-called Bhutanese Refugees. With the recent resettlement program offered by countries led by the USA, the so-called Bhutanese Refugees have reached many foreign lands from where they have sped up their smearing campaign against Bhutan using falsified information and lies. We, the people of Bhutan, no doubt sympathize with the plight of these people, but the lies and false information spread by these people may come to be believed as the 'truth' unless we offer the other side of the story too to the world. This website was born to meet this need and as such, we provide here links to many well-researched articles written by reliable scholars and journalists. In the end, truth must be told, and it must be the truth that should prevail.

While we the peace-loving people of Bhutan sit comfortably at home in the Himalayas, oblivious to what is happening around the world, the so-called Bhutanese refugees resettled in countries around the world are actively spreading false information about Bhutan. They continue telling the world media that Bhutan is a despotic kingdom which has committed "ethnic cleansing" and is continuing to discriminate ethnic Nepalese. And they write that they were in Bhutan from the time of the Zhabdrung Ngawang Namgyel (1594 - 1651) - the founder of the modern Bhutanese State.

These claims of Nepalese being in Bhutan at the time of Zhabdrung are far from the truth. Except for a few Newari craftsmen who came to build statues in some monasteries, no big group of Nepalese came to Bhutan during the time of Zhabdrung. These Newari craftsmen often left after the projects were completed, or even if they did, they did not settle in the south where most of the recent immigrants settled. Even if we were to agree that these craftsmen did settle in the south, how would a few Newari craftsmen multiply into so many Nepalese (over 150,000) in a few decades?

According to historical records left by British Officials Charles Bell and John Claude White, the first time Nepalese were spotted in Bhutan was around 1904 and 1905. Those few groups of Nepalese who were initially brought into southern Bhutan legally as labourers were known as 'Tangyas'. The 'Tangyas' and even those who followed them were granted citizenship by an Act of the National Assembly in 1958. So these people are genuine citizens of Bhutan. But the problem arose because many illegal immigrants seeped into Bhutan through the porous international border until as late as the early 1980s.

Having just started modern economic development in 1961, Bhutan lacked the resources as well as manpower to effectively administer, control and manage immigration across the porous border in the 1960s, 70s and early 80s. This was being taken full advantage of by the illegal immigrants. To take stock of this unchecked illegal iratmmigration going on in the south, the Citizenship Act of 1985 was passed. It granted Bhutanese citizenship to all Nepalese immigrants, resident in Bhutan before 31 December 1958 in keeping with the spirit of the resolution of 1958. Any immigrant who came after this date were to be considered illegal and sent back to their original place.

Following this, a census was carried out and when many illegal immigrants caught, some refugee-leaders-to-be made a big political agitation with their support base in the neighbouring Nepali dominated areas of Kalimpong and Darjeeling. And that is how the southern Bhutan problem of the 1990s started.

This coincided with the time when they had their own big plan too. According to a journalist, "Leaving Bhutan in droves was Stage I of the Plan. Coming back to Bhutan in force of numbers and on their terms was supposed to be Stage II.

Many of the refugees-to-be wholeheartedly supported this plan. The concept of a Greater Nepal featured prominently in the delusions of the Nepalese diaspora those days, encouraged no doubt by the successes of the Gorkhaland movement in Darjeeling and Kalimpong. Many of them relished the idea of Bhutan going the Sikkim way. Kanak M. Dixit, a prominent editor from Nepal even wrote a cover page article on Bhutan revealingly titled “House of Cards” that seemed to foresee imminent collapse in Bhutan (Kanak Mani Dixit: House of cards: fearing for Bhutan. Himal Vol.7 No 4, July/August 1994.). Such sentiments had to be carefully hidden however, and not surprisingly were heatedly denounced as some Bhutan Government's bogey.

Despite the fact that their leaders had a big role to play in leading Nepalese out from Bhutan to Nepal for their 'big plan', the refugees keep claiming that they were forcefully evicted by the Bhutanese military. In this age of information, such lies can do great harm to Bhutan if we do not take measures to tell our side of the stories too. There is a risk that even our own people (especially the younger generation) would be misinformed.

Every country has its own immigration laws. Bhutan was only trying to implement its immigration laws. All countries deport illegal immigrants. Bhutan only wanted the illegal immigrants to go back to where they came from. In that respect, Bhutan did not do anything wrong. The need for Security Clearance also exists even in developed countries for the security of the country.

People are naturally attracted to peaceful places with economic opportunities. This is the reason why many people from poor and chaotic countries are trying to go to the US. In South Asia, without doubt, Bhutan is the best country to live in. So, it is only natural that it will attract illegal immigrants from the crowded surrounding areas. And it indeed did. And if we are not careful, more illegal immigrants will come in the future too.

To make the matter worse, Bhutan's population is too small to absorb any large number of immigrants. We have the real risk of becoming a minority in our own land. Remember that there are around 30 million Nepalese in Nepal and over 10 million ethnic Nepalese settled in Indian states bordering Bhutan. Compare this with just around 0.6 million of us in Bhutan. We are like just a drop in the ocean. For our culture's continuity and country's future survival, we have to understand this fact and never take things for granted. This does not mean that we have to discriminate against Bhutanese of Nepalese origin. Not at all. We have to respect them and treat them like you would treat any other Bhutanese (This is happening now as any visitor to Bhutan would testify), but we just have to be aware of our country's problems from a global perspective whether it is to find solutions to existing problems or to forge ahead with the vision of Gross National Happiness.

Please enjoy browsing through the articles and papers in the website from the menu on the right pane of this website.

Truly yours,

Pelden Drukpa.

A Lhotshampa's View on the Problem

2010-07-31T12:47:00.000+09:00

Posted By: Che on bhutantimes.com on 10 Oct. 2010

Don't get me wrong.
I am a half breed. My parents come from north and south and meet in west. As a kid, it has always made me curious why those people left? who i really am?

and trust me, i have done too many studies over this matter, because, i was curious why they left?
as i have seen in forums and blogs, i just can't point out which one side is bad. But i do believe that what the refugees, did, were bad. Why should one go against the dress code? why should one murder one's own relatives? why should one rape their own people?
as i read, i come to know that not everybody was Bhutanese, didn't have that written document saying that they were in the nation in 50s? so that makes them, a bunch of people who came and stayed in our country for around say, 40 years. So after 40 years, they expect that the nation stoop at them?

i have talked this to many people, and am not bluffing, but the youths of during those days, were really harassed by both the parties, both anti nationals and armies. i can understand why armies did that, they had to maintain peace, so one can't have written on his forehead that he is not against the government. but i am still curious why those anti-nationals butchered their own kind?

and today, they get to get settled in third countries, and yet they don't want to? i mean, where is their heads still? still in their assholes? as far as i read the blogs, we are facing too much of criticisms because of them. and if they really had the sense of belonging to the nation, then why did all of them run away? in a mass? and that too, to nepal? they always thought that they were from nepal, so that affection took them to nepal. the sense of belongingness was not towards bhutan, but towards nepal.
and i read in few blogs too, that lhotsampas are being harassed in bhutan. to all those people, i say, harass my ass! i am half breed, i have a lhotsampa surname, i crack jokes regarding the culture differences, and i am not harassed here in bhutan. in fact, i am really happy here. i got scholarship from bhutan, if there was really discrimintaion, i won't have been gone for the scholarship. i even posted a topic in forum, regarding the education system. i see blogs now and then, and it just strikes me, they were all bunch of retards, they wanted to have things their way, that is why, they left. we were in southern belts too, we didn't leave:

and on that note, i talked with my grand father, he said, he had to hide in maize field for weeks, because he was scared that, people would kill him. and his crime for the anti nationals were, he didn't want to burn the national dress. a
and today, you still want to come back?
to do what? we have moved on, and moved on very far. forget about other regions of bhutan, i think they won't be welcomed by their own relatives itself. bunch of liars!

i say that, because i had few frens from nepal, and they told me regarding the conditions of refugees. even nepal people don't want them there. better pack your shits and go to western world, for i don't know what other lhotsamps would say, but i, one among the lhotsamps, i say, you are not welcome here in my home. you will be treated as intruder if you come. and i hope that, other lhotsamps share the same view.

Nepalese immigration threatens even India

2010-07-31T12:40:00.002+09:00

Even a country as large as India feels threatened by Nepalese immigration into its North-eastern states. Their recent clamour for 'Gorkhaland' bears testimony to the Nepalese's tendency for creating troubles in all places they settle in. Please read the following article by SUNANDA K DATTA-RAY, Pioneer, 12 August 2011.

Title: Challenge of Gorkhaland
Written by SUNANDA K DATTA-RAY, Pioneer, 12 August 2011

The possibility of new Nepalese-majority States doesn’t concern West Bengal alone. It concerns India from Assam to Uttarakhand.

Bounded by Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and China, Gorkhaland will be India’s second Nepalese-majority State. If migration across the 500-mile open border — which the 1950 India-Nepal Treaty permits and even encourages — continues, it may not be the last. The prospect explains Rajiv Gandhi’s refusal in 1986 to countenance citizenship for post-1950 immigrants.

Even Darjeeling’s sitting MP tempers pleasure over the recent tripartite agreement with circumspection. “The challenge is to understand: ‘what hereafter’ and to address that,” Mr Jaswant Singh warns. Since Ms Mamata Banerjee denies that the tripartite agreement will lead to Statehood, she may not realise there is a challenge to understand and address.

It may soon become mandatory to speak only of ‘Gorkha’, so let me be ethnically accurate rather than politically correct while it is still possible and say that the challenge is of appreciating Nepalese history and ethnography and its impact on India all along the Himalayas, not just in West Bengal. Some Nepalese readers have taken umbrage at my article “Step towards Gorkhaland” published in these columns on July 29. They probably feel the economic implications of migration are demeaning. Hence they insist they didn’t come from anywhere but have always been Indian.

Always is a big word and a huge concept. How long does one have to live in a terrain to be regarded as indigenous, a reader asked. The answer can’t be measured in years or even generations. The Burdwan zamindari family have lived in Bengal for 500 years and don’t speak a word of Punjabi. But apart from exceptional love matches, all their spouses come from Punjab. In the US, Ralph Ellison, the Black American author of Invisible Man, nursed no memory, individual or folk, of his African forebears. His consciousness had been shaped in the crucible of the American Dream.

As the Rastafarian movement or the Black American girl flirting with Nigerian attire in A Raisin in the Sun demonstrated, belonging is a state of mind. I have seen German-origin Soviet families squatting for days on airport floors with their boxes and bedding like refugees at Sealdah station waiting for flights to “return” to a Germany some had never seen. I also know ethnic Germans who despite Germanic names and appearance, regard themselves and are regarded by others as entirely Russian.

With passports of convenience readily available, legal citizenship is only a small part of identity. Nor is identity constricted by boundaries which is why many Nagas seek union with their fellow tribesmen in Myanmar. Friends of Dorjee Khandu, the late Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh, say he was loyally Indian to the core but completely Tibetan in lifestyle. A Malaysian bumiputera (son of the soil) is born Malay and Muslim, but Malayali settlers in dhoti and angavastram are also accorded bumiputera status. The Burdwans suggest that choice takes precedence over history and ethnicity.

Readers who deny that the British brought in Nepalese labour are right only to the extent that migration existed before Sikkim ceded Darjeeling to the East India Company. But it’s fanciful to claim (as one reader did) that the Nepalese came in the 1600s. Many of Darjeeling’s 1,900 inhabitants in 1850 (2,200 in 1869) were the original Lepchas and Bhutiyas.

Leo Rose, Lopita Nath and other scholars regard the Treaty of Sugauli and establishment of recruitment centres at Ghoom and Gorakhpur as the start. The 1950 Treaty additionally encouraged immigration. The Nepalese share of Darjeeling’s population rose from 54 per cent in 1901 to 58.4 per cent in 1971. Reportedly, it increased by 700 per cent during 1951-2001.

A vigorous community’s eastward push reduced Lepchas and Bhutiyas to minorities in their own homeland. Ethnic strife erupted throughout the North-East but especially in Meghalaya. Darjeeling suffered grievously. The most dramatic impact was in Sikkim which had only 2,500 Lepchas, 1,500 Bhutiyas and 1,000 Tsongs in 1873. A century later, the Nepalese, then three-quarters of the population, played a decisive part in changing the status of a Tibetan-Buddhist kingdom with which they could not relate. A Sikkim-Nepalese politician even demanded a Nepalese Hindu king to balance the Bhutiya Buddhist Chogyal! Bhutan began to be wary of non-Drukpa settlers after the Sikkim agitation in which many Darjeeling Nepalese participated. There were also allegations of Darjeeling Nepalese agitators in Bhutan.

Bhutan began recruiting Nepalese labourers (tangyas) in 1900, allowing them to stay on as tenant farmers with Bhutanese nationality. This changed when Bhutan’s planned growth, empty land and porous borders attracted waves of illegal migrants. The evictions, refugee camps in Nepal, militant organisations, terrorist activity and assisted migration to North America and Europe are another story.

Just as Drukpa officials felt absorption would be easier if the Nepalese were called Southern Bhutanese or Lhotshampas, Subhas Ghising dubbed them Gorkha. Prem Poddar claims in Gorkhas Imagined that “the word ‘Gorkha’ (or the neologism ‘Gorkhaness’) as a self-descriptive term ... has gained currency as a marker of difference for Nepalis living in India … While this counters the irredentism of a Greater Nepal thesis, it cannot completely exorcise the spectres or temptations of an ethnic absolutism for diasporic subjects.” Ghising’s overtures to Nepal’s King Birendra and Prince Gyanendra and periodic unpublicised trips to Nepal may have aggravated those fears. It was recalled then that the All-India Gurkha League’s founding constitution referred to Nepal as the “motherland”.

Several readers argue that Bengalis are equally foreign because they are really Bangladeshis. True, many people in Calcutta and West Bengal have roots in East Bengal (there was no Bangladesh then) just as many Tamils in Chennai come from villages in Tanjore and other districts. The metropole always attracts manpower, and internal migration in undivided Bengal followed this pattern. The movement since 1947 falls into two categories. The first is a staggered and delayed (because of political factors including the 1950 Nehru-Liaquat Ali Pact) counterpart of the exchange of population that happened all at once in Punjab. The second is the illegal influx of Muslims from East Pakistan and later Bangladesh, often abetted by elements in West Bengal. Undeniably, they should be tracked down and deported but neither group can be compared to the millions of Nepalese who have over the decades migrated to and made India their home.

The possibility of new Nepalese-majority States doesn’t concern West Bengal alone. It concerns India from Assam to Uttarakhand. The situation is without global parallel.

How Nepalese Helped Topple Sikkim

2010-07-30T17:34:00.004+09:00

Original Title: The Pain of Losing a Nation
(Courtesy: Sudheer Sharma)

This is the story of how Sikkim lost its independence. Please read on.

On the northern corner of West Bengal state of India , there is a hill station-- Kalimpong, which once hosted celebrities from all over the world. The hill town, where most of the settlers are of Nepali origin, no longer retains its old charm. But until a few weeks ago the last prime minister of a country—that has lost its independence—used to live here. Kazi Lhendup Dorji, who died on 28 July this year at the ripe old age of 103, had played a pivotal role in the merger of Sikkim into India .

Dorji is seen as a ‘traitor’ in the contemporary history. He lived, and died, with the same ignominy. “Everybody accuses me of selling the country. Even if it is true, should I alone be blamed?” he asked me, when I met him in Kalimpong in November 1996. But the allegation of ‘betrayal’ towards one’s own motherland was so powerful that Dorji could no more lead an active political life. He spent his solitary life at the ‘Chakung House’ in Kalimpong for several decades. Few people chose to remember Kazi when he passed away nor took pain to recall his life and times.

So much so that the Kazi was ignored even by Delhi . “I went out of my way to ensure the merger of Sikkim into India but after the work was done, the Indians just ignored me,” Kazi told me during an interview for Jana Astha weekly, nearly 11 years ago. “Earlier, I used to be given a ‘Red Carpet’ welcome. Now I have to wait for weeks even to meet second grade leaders.”

When I visited Kalimpong for the second time in 2000, Lhendup’s anger towards Delhi had reached new heights. At one time, he was received warmly by Indian leaders including Jawaharlal Nehru and Mrs Indira Gandhi. But later he became a political actor whose utility had been finished and thrown away into the dustbin.

The origin of crisis

After India got independence in 1947, the Sikkim State Congress, which was established as per the advice of Nehru, launched anti-King movement. Sikkim managed to overcome the crisis then but after Indira Gandhi became Prime Minister of India, the tiny Himalayan kingdom found itself in a crisis from which it could never escape. The anti-King movement, launched by the Sikkim National Congress (SNC) under the leadership of Lhendup Dorji in 1973, led to the demise of a sovereign nation.

India openly supported the movement against King (Chogyal) Palden Thondup Namgyal. The then ADC to the King, Captain Sonam Yongda, claimed that soldiers of Indian Army in civil dress used to take part in the protests. Some of the protesters were brought from Darjeeling and the surrounding areas. The number of Sikkimese who took part in the protest was quite small. But that was enough.

Lhendup’s protest movement depended mainly on Indian financial assistance. The money was made available through Intelligence Bureau (IB). “The people from IB used to visit me twice or thrice a year. An IB agent, Tejpal Sen, used to handover money to me personally,” Dorji had told me in a recorded interview.

In fact, the main actor behind the “ Mission Sikkim ” was India ’s external intelligence agency, RAW (Research and Analysis Wing). Set up in 1968, RAW was able to disintegrate Pakistan (and form Bangladesh ) within three years. The annexation of Sikkim was their other ‘historic’ success. The strategists of RAW didn’t want to repeat a Bhutan in Sikkim . Bhutan managed to acquire the membership of the United Nations in 1968. So, they launched a movement under the leadership of Lhendup, which is described at great length by Ashok Raina in his book Inside

RAW: The Story of India’s Secret Service.

Raina writes that New Delhi had taken the decision to annex Sikkim in 1971, and that the RAW used the next two years to create the right conditions within Sikkim to make that happen. The key here was to use the predominantly-Hindu Sikkimese of Nepali origin who complained of discrimination from the Buddhist king and the elite to rise up. “What we felt then was that the Chogyal was unjust to us,” said CD Rai, editor of Gangtok Times and ex-minister. “We thought it may be better to be Indian than to be oppressed by the king.”

Lhendup—who belonged to the Kazi family—had a historic enmity with Sikkim ’s ruling Chogyals. He said he wanted to pressurise the King through public protests but lamented that the King never came forward for reconciliation.

Under pressure from Delhi , the Sikkimese King was forced to hold tripartite talks with SNC and India . The talks not only curtailed royal powers, it also turned Sikkim into an Indian ‘protectorate.’ In the elections held in 1974, Lhendup’s SNC got overwhelming majority in the parliament. The government and the king saw each other as enemies. Ultimately, the cabinet meeting, on 27th March 1975 , decided to abolish monarchy. The Sikkimese parliament endorsed it and decided to hold a referendum on the future of monarchy. Four days later, the outcome of the poll in 57 stations across the country was: ‘Abolition of the monarchy.’

In an interview, then Agriculture Minister of Sikkim KC Pradhan recalled that the referendum was nothing but a charade. “Indian soldiers rigged the polls by pointing rifles at the hapless voters,” he said. Immediately after the referendum, Kazi Lhendup moved a motion in the parliament proposing that Sikkim be annexed to India . The 32-member parliament, which had 31 members from Lhendup’s SNC—passed the motion without a blink. Needless to say that the entire episode was being orchestrated by India . The then Indian envoy to Sikkim (known as ‘political officer’) BS Das wrote in his book The Sikkim Saga, Sikkim ’s merger was necessary for Indian national interest. And we worked to that end. Maybe if the Chogyal had been smarter, and played his cards better, it wouldn’t have turned out the way it did.”

But Chogyal didn’t play his cards well. When Sikkim was undergoing turmoil, the Chogyal visited Kathmandu in 1974 to attend the coronation ceremony of King Birendra. According to insiders, King Birendra, Chinese deputy premier Chen Li Yan and Pakistan ’s envoy advised Chogyal not to return to Sikkim . “They narrated a ‘master plan’ to save Sikkim from Indian hands but the King didn’t accept,” said Captain Yongda. “It was because the King couldn’t think even in his dreams that India could use force to annex Sikkim .”

A ‘double game’

In fact, India was playing a ‘double game.’ On one hand, it was supporting Lhendup in whatever way possible against the King. On the other hand, it was assuring the king that monarchy would survive in Sikkim . The Chogyal was also an honorary Major General of the Indian Army. He never thought that his ‘own army’ would act against him. It was only an illusion.

The Chogyal of Sikkim was in his palace on the morning of 6 April 1975 when the roar of army trucks climbing the steep streets of Gangtok brought him running to the window. There were Indian soldiers everywhere, they had surrounded the palace, and short rapid bursts of machine gun fire could be heard. Basanta Kumar Chhetri, a 19-year-old guard at the palace’s main gate, was struck by a bullet and killed—the first casualty of the takeover. The 5,000-strong Indian force didn’t take more than 30 minutes to subdue the palace guards who numbered only 243. By 12:45 pm it was all over, Sikkim ceased to exist as an independent kingdom.

The Chogyal also lost the second opportunity. The Sikkim Guards had the capacity to stop the Indian Army for two hours. If the Chogyal had informed Beijing and Islamabad about the Indian invasion from the transmitter set up at his palace, both the countries had assured him—during the Kathmandu meeting—that they would instruct their security forces to open fire along the borders with India . Chinese army could even travel to Gangtok to rescue the Chogyal.

Captured palace guards, hands raised high, were packed into trucks and taken away, singing: “Dela sil, li gi, gang changka chibso” (May my country keep blooming like a flower). But by then, the Indian tri-colour had replaced the Sikkimese flag at the palace where the 12th king of the Namgyal dynasty was held prisoner. “The Chogyal was a great believer in India . He had huge respect for Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. Not in his wildest dreams did he think India would ever gobble up his kingdom,” recalls Captain Sonam Yongda, the Chogyal’s aide-de-camp. Nehru himself had told journalist Kuldip Nayar in 1960: “Taking a small country like Sikkim by force would be like shooting a fly with a rifle.” Ironically it was Nehru’s daughter Indira Gandhi who cited “national interest” to make Sikkim the 22nd state of the Indian union.

During a meeting, former Chief Minister of Sikkim BB Gurung told me that the King and Lhendup were just fighting a proxy war. “The real battle was between an American and a Belgian lady.” If that was true, the real victor was the third lady—Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

Two Foreign Ladies

Chogyal Palden met the 24-year-old New Yorker, Hope Cook, in Darjeeling in 1963 and married her. For Cook, this was a dream come true: to become the queen of an independent kingdom in Shangri-la. She started taking the message of Sikkimese independence to the youth, and the allegations started flying thick and fast that she was a CIA agent. These were the coldest years of the Cold War, and there was a tendency in India to see a “foreign hand” behind everything so it was not unusual for the American queen to be labelled a CIA agent. However, as Hope Cook’s relations with Delhi deteriorated, so did her marriage with the Chogyal. In 1973, she took her two children and went back to New York . She hasn’t returned to Sikkim since.

Then there was Elisa-Maria, daughter of a Belgian father and German mother who left her Scottish husband in Burma and married Kazi Lhendup Dorji in Delhi in 1957. The two couldn’t have been more different. Elisa-Maria wanted to be Sikkim ’s First Lady, but Hope Cook stood in the way. “She didn’t just want to be the wife of an Indian chief minister; she wanted to be the wife of the prime minister of an independent Sikkim .” With that kind of an ambition, it was not surprising that with annexation, neither Hope Cook nor Elisa-Maria got what they wanted.

Meanwhile, in New Delhi Indira Gandhi was going from strength to strength, and India was flexing its muscles. The 1971 Bangladesh war and the atomic test in 1974 gave Delhi the confidence to take care of Sikkim once and for all. Indira Gandhi was concerned that Sikkim may show independent tendencies and become a UN member like Bhutan did in 1971, and she also didn’t take kindly to the three Himalayan kingdoms, Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal, getting too cosy with each other.

When the Indian troops moved in there was general jubilation on the streets of Gangtok. It was in fact in faraway Kathmandu that there were reverberations. Beijing expressed grave concern. But in the absence of popular protests against the Indian move, there was only muted reaction at the United Nations in New York . It was only later that there were contrary opinions within India —(Former Indian Prime Minister) Morarji Desai said in 1978 that the merger was a mistake. Even Sikkimese political leaders who fought for the merger said it was a blunder and worked to roll it back. But by then, it was already too late.

Lhendup Dorji became the first chief minister of the Indian state of Sikkim and retained the post until 1979. The Indian government conferred on him ‘Padma Bhusan’ in 2002 and he was also awarded the ‘Sikkim Ratna’ by the state government in 2004.
Despite such “rewards,” Lhendup and his wife Elisa spent their last years in Kalimpong repenting their past deeds. After the death of his wife in 1990, Lhendup was forced to lead a solitary life. He neither had any children nor relatives to take care of him. He cut himself off from his own people to avoid their wrath and hatred.

In the elections held in 1979, Lhendup’s SNC failed to bag even a single seat in the Sikkim ’s legislature. This effectively brought to an end to his political career. At one time, when he had gone to file his nomination, his name was missing from the electoral roll. In his resolve to dethrone the Chogyal dynasty that had 400-year-old history in Sikkim , Lhendup ended up delivering his motherland into the lap of India . In return, all he got was a life haunted from the shadow of the past and an ignominious death.

(This writing was originally posted at www.nepalnews.com)

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Kazi Lhendup Dorjee Khangsarpa: 1st democratic CM of Sikkim

Posted on May 11, 2011 by iSikkim
By Rajen Upadhyaya

The political upheavals of 1940s precipitated into protest movement of 1973 that finally led to the merger of Sikkim into India in 1975. 1919 up to 1947 is referred as Gandhian era in the Modern Indian History. Similarly, the period between 1945 up to 1975 can be regarded as Kazian era in the Democratic History of Sikkim. It was during this period that the late L.D. Kazi single handedly guided the democratic movement of Sikkim till its merger.

Kazi Lhendup Dorjee Khangsarpa was born at Pakyong, East Sikkim in the ancient and noble Khangsarpa family in 1904. As a pious Buddhist he entered the Rumtek monastery at the age of 6 years. His uncle Tshurfuk Lama Rabden Dorjee was the then Head Lama of the famous Rumtek Monastry and young Lhendup became his disciple.

Sidkeyong Namgyal, the then Maharaja of Sikkim, while once on a visit to the Rumtek liked the young monk Lhendup and took him to Gangtok. The Maharaja put him in a Tibetan School. At the age of 16 Kazi Lhendup returned to Rumtek monastery and underwent strict training of Lamaism for another two years. Thereafter he succeeded as the Head Lama of Rumtek Monastery and its estates on the retirement of Lama Ugen Tenzing. Kazi Lhendup remained as Head Lama at Rumtek monastery for 8 years, and then left the monastery to work with his brother Kazi Phag Tshering, who founded the Young Mens’ Buddhist Association at Darjeeling. The two Kazi brothers founded a large number of schools in West Sikkim and were instrumental in bringing about a number of social and other reforms.

The 40’s of the 20th century witnessed a heralding change world wide. A person with the feeling of service to mankind, Kazi Lhendup founded a Political Organization known as Rajya Praja Mandal at his native place at Chakhung in West Sikkim. In 1947 the amalgamation of the three petty political organizations of Sikkim Rajya Praja Mandal, Rajya Praja Sammelan and Praja Sudhar Samaj took place. On 7th December 1947 they held a joint meeting at today’s Palzor Stadium (then Polo Ground) and decided to form a compact body to combat lawless feudalism. The huge gathering of 7th December 1947 led to the birth of first ever political Party of Sikkim known as Sikkim State Congress. Tashi Tshering also popularly known as Tashi Babu of Gangtok was the elected President of Sikkim State Congress.

In 1953, Kazi Lhendup Dorjee Khangsarpa (people of his native place fondly called him Kancha Kazi) became the President of Sikkim State Congress and held that post till 1958. During his President ship he led a delegation to Delhi in 1954 to call on the Prime Minister of India, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. The Sikkimese had been fighting for political and economic reforms and these were discussed by the delegation with Pandit Nehru, who was deeply impressed by the sincerity of Kazi Lhendup Dorjee. The Indian Prime Minister promised to give assistance for the progress and economic welfare of the Sikkimese populace and assured Government of India’s support towards political reform in Sikkim.

After the foundation of the Sikkim State Congress (which was a pro-peasant party) the pro feudalists founded another political party in 1948 to curb the rising tide of democratic ideas. The new political party was known as Sikkim National Party and it was basically patronized by the palace. The Sikkim State Congress had branded this party as the “party of palace”.

Kazi Lhendup Dorjee realized the futility of the communal approach in the political scenario of Sikkim. Welfare of the people being close to his heart, he decided to form another party, called the Sikkim National Congress in 1960. His main approach was to form a non-communal party which could give the Sikkimese peace, prosperity and progress. Contesting on this platform his party secured 8 seats out of 18 in the third General Elections of Sikkim in 1963. Kazi Lhendup Dorjee formed the opposition in the Sikkim Council and tried to bring about a feeling of communal harmony.

In the General Election of 1970, Kazi Lhendup Dorjee was appointed as an Executive Councillor and was allotted the portfolio of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry and Transport Authority. As Sikkim was an agricultural country, Kazi tried to bring reforms to reform the economic conditions of the farmers. He was however, removed from the Executive Councillor in 1972.

In personal life, Late Kazi Lhendup Dorjee Khangsarpa had his second wife from Belgium. Her name was Kazini Eliza Maria (also known as Kazini Sahiba of Chakhung) who played a vital role in guiding and assisting Kazi Lhendup Dorjee Khangsarpa in his day to day affairs. She was an influential woman who used to do most of the paper works of the party of Kazi from their cozy bungalow at Kalimpong.

The General Election of 1973, the last general election of independent Sikkim, based on the notorious parity formulae, did not satisfy the Sikkim National Congress. This led to an agitation in April 1973 which ultimately led to the merger of two influential political parties of Sikkim the Janata Congress and Sikkim National Congress giving birth to Sikkim Congress.

In the elections of 1974, Sikkim Congress secured 31 out of 32 seats in the Sikkim Assembly and formed its government based on principles of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. Kazi became the first elected Chief Minister. The Sikkim Congress delegates used to attend the annual session of the Indian National Congress. After the merger of Sikkim in India in 1975, the political party of Kazi Lhendup Dorjee Khangsarpa was also merged with the Indian National Congress at Kamagatamaru Nagar in Chandigarh.

Personally Kazi Lhendup Dorjee Khangsarpa and Kazini Eliza Maria lost everything — perhaps not really everything — because the people of Sikkim still remember him with fondness. The father of democracy in Sikkim was not even allowed to enter Sikkim when he lost election in 1979. The memorable Kazi expired on July 29, 2007.

Kazi did not live for personal gains. He lived for the people of Sikkim. “By merging Sikkim with India, Kazi Lendhup Dorji Khansarpa of Chakung brought new prosperity to the people of Sikkim, restored their rights and gave India a jewel in the crown studded with the silvery Kanchenjunga”. (M. K Dhar, If not for Him Sikkim would not be a part of India)

Real reason why refugees left Bhutan - (must read)

2010-07-29T22:27:00.006+09:00

"Against a tide of international criticism in the 1990s the government of Bhutan maintained that the mass exodus of Nepalese from southern Bhutan was not a result of government or military pressure on citizens, but was a result of the refugees’ own secret little plan. Leaving Bhutan in droves was Stage I of the Plan. Coming back to Bhutan in force of numbers and on their terms was supposed to be Stage II.

Many of the refugees-to-be wholeheartedly supported this plan. The concept of a Greater Nepal featured prominently in the delusions of the Nepalese diaspora those days, encouraged no doubt by the successes of the Gorkhaland movement in Darjeeling and Kalimpong. Many of them relished the idea of Bhutan going the Sikkim way. Kanak M. Dixit, a prominent editor from Nepal even wrote a cover page article on Bhutan revealingly titled “House of Cards” that seemed to foresee imminent collapse in Bhutan (Kanak Mani Dixit: House of cards: fearing for Bhutan. Himal Vol.7 No 4, July/August 1994.). Such sentiments had to be carefully hidden however and not surprisingly were heatedly denounced as some RGOB bogey."

Please read below to find out more.

Title: Abraham Abraham and the Refugee Refugees

Published Date: 2007/8/31 3:27:16
By : bhutantimes.com Editorial

The tragedy of the so-called Bhutanese refugee crisis seems to be repeating itself. Those who have failed to understand the true nature of the tragedy now have another chance. Hopefully they won’t miss the irony either. Against a tide of international criticism in the 1990s the government of Bhutan maintained that the mass exodus of Nepalese from southern Bhutan was not a result of government or military pressure on citizens, but was a result of the refugees’ own secret little plan. Leaving Bhutan in droves was Stage I of the Plan. Coming back to Bhutan in force of numbers and on their terms was supposed to be Stage II.

Many of the refugees-to-be wholeheartedly supported this plan. The concept of a Greater Nepal featured prominently in the delusions of the Nepalese diaspora those days, encouraged no doubt by the successes of the Gorkhaland movement in Darjeeling and Kalimpong. Many of them relished the idea of Bhutan going the Sikkim way. Kanak M. Dixit, a prominent editor from Nepal even wrote a cover page article on Bhutan revealingly titled “House of Cards” that seemed to foresee imminent collapse in Bhutan (Kanak Mani Dixit: House of cards: fearing for Bhutan. Himal Vol.7 No 4, July/August 1994.). Such sentiments had to be carefully hidden however and not surprisingly were heatedly denounced as some RGOB bogey.

Not all refugees were so excited by this delusion and many had to be coerced through threats and intimidation to cooperate. There was a militant wing among the refugees that offered to shorten by 6 inches anybody who did not cooperate. Translated bluntly, this was an offer of a beheading. Since the refugees were shrewdly trying to craft a picture of a persecuted minority, this fact too had to be denied. The refugee leaders cleverly deflected the blame for the exodus on a ‘despotic kingdom’ dabbling in the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of a ‘peaceful minority’. Now which self-respecting headline reader could resist buzzwords as catchy as these?

Having successfully created the critical mass of refugees and successfully set up their camps in Nepal (which incidentally was made possible only after a Long March and a standoff with the Nepalese police over the Mechi bridge), the plan began to stumble. The refugee leaders had never reckoned with Bhutanese bureaucratic obduracy and for 16 years Stage II has been in limbo. They’ve had to struggle to keep people focused on why they left Bhutan and what the next step was. Sadly for them, international sympathy for their humanitarian situation did not translate into international belief that the refugees were all Bhutanese citizens.

Finding lessons for Bhutan from the happenings in India and Nepal has been a habit among the Nepalese leaders in Bhutan. Their agitations in Bhutan in 1952 and 1990 following the successes of the uprisings against the British in India and against the monarchy in Nepal respectively bear this out. So it was no surprise that in the successes of the Maoists of Nepal the refugee leaders found inspiration and they promptly created their very own Maoist group. Unfortunately in their excitement they forgot about the US’ penchant for overreacting to anything communist or even the colour red. Not surprisingly the US became unduly alarmed by this and decided enough was enough and offered to clear the camps with a sweeping offer of resettlement in the USA.* Most of the refugees jumped at the offer as they saw it for what it was – an opportunity of a life time.

In this happy solution however the refugee leaders have found despair. Who will they lead is the main question. What will become of them as leaders? These hard questions have triggered the return of their hidden true nature and despite the risk of losing their hard earned image of peaceful refugees, they have once again resumed their old role of ‘guiding’ the people. According to them, the US offer is simply no good. No doubt being six inches shorter has something to do with it. Reports from Nepal describe a rapidly worsening situation as the Bhutan Communist Party and the Bhutan Tigers’ Front intensified their ‘campaign’ against third-country resettlement.

Such is the level of fear and intimidation that has gripped the refugee camps that dozens of families have fled the camps for their safety. Many refugees now find safety in the surrounding villages.

If there is one thing that is worse than becoming a refugee, it is for a refugee to have to seek refuge FROM a refugee camp. Abraham Abraham, the Country Representative of the UNHCR camps in Nepal must answer up to this incredible failure.
And it is high time that he and the UNHCR organization acknowledge the sinister role played by the refugee leaders in the creation of the refugee tragedy.

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*This is but one possible explanation for the generous US offer.

The link to the original article can be found here: https://www.bhutantimes.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=113

How the refugees left Bhutan

2010-07-29T16:27:00.001+09:00

"The Samtse Dzongda informed the people’s representatives that since he took office inSamtse in 1992, about 400 Lhotshampas from his Dzongkhag had emigrated and left forNepal despite all efforts to dissuade them from leaving. After registering themselves inthe refugee camps in eastern Nepal, some of these people have been coming back tocarry out terrorist activities in the Dzongkhag. He also informed the Assembly that over　20 Indian journalists and 14 Western journalists have visited Samtse Dzongkhag to seethe true situation for themselves. Members of international organisations and nongovernmentalorganisations, and officials from foreign embassies have also visited　Samtse. They have all seen and studied the situation and know the true facts, including　whether people have been forcefully evicted or not.

For instance, in May 1994, 269　persons from Dorokha Dungkhag came to Samtse and insisted on emigrating to Nepal　despite every effort by all of us in the Dzongkhag Headquarters to persuade them to　withdraw their applications, he said. Even after reading to them a Kasho sent by His　Majesty the King appealing to them not to leave and exempting all rural taxes for three　years to all those who withdrew their applications, only 32 persons accepted His　Majesty’s Kasho and stayed back. All the others left for Nepal. Journalists and NGO　members who have met these people and interviewed other emigrants and their neighbours know whether they were forced to leave or left of their own free will."

Please read below to find out more:

Title: Outside agencies providing assistance to the ngolops should be given clearinformation and true facts about the ngolops

Excerpted from: TRANSLATION OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE 73RD SESSION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF BHUTAN HELD
FROM10TH AUGUST TO 2ND SEPTEMBER, 1995.

The people’s representatives of Lhuntsi Dzongkhag and the representative of Khibisa,Lajab and Tshangkha gewogs in Dagana Dzongkhag pointed out that in the past fewyears people from the southern Dzongkhags had emigrated and left the country despiterepeated appeals made by the government not to leave. These people even ignored thepersonal appeals made to them by His Majesty the King through his Kashos and whenhe visited the southern Dzongkhags to meet the emigrants and asked them not to leavethe country. They even threatened local authorities and other villagers who tried todiscourage them from emigrating and left for Nepal after taking Kidu Soilra.

Lhotshampa civil servants who have stolen government funds also absconded to Nepalwhile other Lhotshampas had left after terrorising and robbing the villagers. After going　to Nepal, these people have registered themselves as refugees by claiming to have beenforcefully evicted and making other false allegations against the Royal Government.

The people’s representatives said that they are shocked that these people have beengiven refugee status by international organizations and that their cause is beingsupported by the Nepalese government. If they had been forcefully evicted they wouldhave stayed across the border in India. Why go all the way to Nepal? Many of thesepeople who are registered in the refugee camps in Nepal have been sneaking back intothe country to carry out terrorist acts such as murder, rape, armed robbery anddestruction of development facilities. Such terrorist acts by the ngolops have been goingon for several years now. The people’s representatives asked the government to clearlyinform all the foreign agencies providing assistance to the ngolops about the seriouscrimes being constantly committed by these people. They said that the Nepalesegovernment and international organisations like the UNHCR should reconsider theirposition on this issue on the basis of the true facts.

The Home Minister acknowledged that there was much substance to the points raised bythe people’s representatives of Lhuntsi and Dagana Dzongkhags. Despite all the effortsmade by the government to dissuade them, most of the Lhotshampas who had applied toemigrate had left the country for Nepal. Many of these people have since been comingback to carry out terrorist raids inside Bhutan, he said. Giving a summary of the terroristactivities perpetrated uptil August, 1995, the Home Minister informed the NationalAssembly that the ngolops had committed 68 confirmed murders and 960 cases ofdacoity and armed robbery. They had burnt down or destroyed 66 private houses,hijacked 62 vehicles and destroyed another 36. They had also physically attacked andinjured 664 Bhutanese nationals and carried out 65 ambushes and attacks on the securityforces and government officials. The Home Minister also informed the members that112 terrorists had been apprehended and handed over to the police by the villagevolunteers in the southern Dzongkhags.

The Home Minister said that the terrorists and ngolops are persons who have stolengovernment funds, have incurred large loans and debts or were involved in criminalactivities while they were in Bhutan. The reason why all those who leave Bhutan gostraight to Nepal is because the ngolop leaders have been telling them to come to therefugee camps where they will receive free food and housing, free education for theirchildren, free health facilities and even free kerosene oil and soap, he said. They are alsoprovided free transport from Bhutan to the camps in eastern Nepal. All it takes for them　to be accepted in the camps in Jhapa, is to be of Nepalese origin and to declare they areBhutanese refugees. As a result of this, many unemployed and destitute ethnicNepalese from Nepal and the nearby areas have congregated in the camps in easternNepal claiming to be Bhutanese refugees. Among this group of people claiming to beBhutanese refugees are many labourers brought from Nepal and the neighbouring areasby the Nepalese Baidars to work in Bhutan on development projects and who have sincereturned. The Home Minister agreed that it is indeed very important to apprise alloutside agencies helping the ngolops about these facts.

The Home Minister informed the members that several non-governmental organisations,some UN agencies and a few countries are involved in giving assistance to the people inthe refugee camps in eastern Nepal. Some of them are extending assistance out ofgenuine humanitarian concern while some are doing so to proselytise their own faith,and some others for political reasons. All of them are now aware that there are people inthe refugee camps in Nepal who are not really Bhutanese, he said. The Nepalesegovernment is also aware of this fact. However, the Nepalese government and theconcerned organisations continue to extend their support because they find it difficult towithdraw after being involved in establishing and running the camps over the last fouryears. The Home Minister assured the people’s representatives that the Royal Government has been making every effort to keep the agencies and organisations involved in the refugee camps properly informed about the true facts regarding thengolops and their activities.

The people’s representatives of Lhuntsi and Dagana Dzongkhags said that while theycould understand the position of the concerned organisations if the people in the campshad been forced to leave Bhutan, they are utterly shocked that people who refused toremain in the country when His Majesty the King himself had repeatedly appealed tothem not to leave have been given refugee status and are receiving assistance from theseorganisations and the Nepalese government. They once again emphasised the need toproperly apprise these agencies and the Nepalese government about the true factsregarding the ngolops.

The Samtse Dzongda informed the people’s representatives that since he took office inSamtse in 1992, about 400 Lhotshampas from his Dzongkhag had emigrated and left forNepal despite all efforts to dissuade them from leaving. After registering themselves inthe refugee camps in eastern Nepal, some of these people have been coming back tocarry out terrorist activities in the Dzongkhag. He also informed the Assembly that over　20 Indian journalists and 14 Western journalists have visited Samtse Dzongkhag to seethe true situation for themselves. Members of international organisations and nongovernmentalorganisations, and officials from foreign embassies have also visited　Samtse. They have all seen and studied the situation and know the true facts, including　whether people have been forcefully evicted or not.

For instance, in May 1994, 269　persons from Dorokha Dungkhag came to Samtse and insisted on emigrating to Nepal　despite every effort by all of us in the Dzongkhag Headquarters to persuade them to　withdraw their applications, he said. Even after reading to them a Kasho sent by His　Majesty the King appealing to them not to leave and exempting all rural taxes for three　years to all those who withdrew their applications, only 32 persons accepted His　Majesty’s Kasho and stayed back. All the others left for Nepal. Journalists and NGO　members who have met these people and interviewed other emigrants and their neighbours know whether they were forced to leave or left of their own free will.

He agreed with the people’s representatives that it is indeed shocking to see the Nepalesegovernment and the concerned outside agencies according refugee status and givingassistance to people who have emigrated from the country despite every effort topersuade them to stay back, especially when many of these very people have beencoming back to carry out terrorist activities inside Bhutan.

The representative of the Bhutan Chamber of Commerce and Industry reminded theNational Assembly that in October, 1991, Prime Minister G.P. Koirala of Nepal had clearly stated in a BBC interview that in 1952 he had helped to organise the first attemptby the Lhotshampas to rise against the Royal Government of Bhutan which had giventhem shelter and Kidu when they came to the country without any possessions to theirnames. It is very significant also, he said, that the relatives of some of the ngolop leaders today were involved in this attempt organised by the former Prime Minister of Nepal.

Persons carrying out ngolop activities as well as those who have been taking Kidu Soilra and emigrating have all been going straight to Nepal because they are beinggiven full support and encouraged to come there. It is important that these facts areexplained clearly to all those who are extending assistance to the ngolops, he said. Speaking on the issue, the Foreign Minister assured the people’s representatives that thecountries and international organisations and agencies giving assistance to the people inthe refugee camps in Nepal have been kept informed about the true facts regarding thengolops.

He said that one of the main reasons why some of the organisations areextending assistance to the people in the camps is to proselytise and convert as many ofthem as possible in return for free handouts of food and clothing, free education andhealth facilities, and other incentives. He informed the members that more than 3,000people in the camps have already been converted to Christianity. Some of theorganisations and countries involved in giving assistance to the people in the camps aredoing so for political reasons and others because all the people in the camps are ethnicNepalese, he said.

The Samdrupjongkhar Dzongda recalled that in February 1992, His Majesty the Kingtoured all the villages in Bhangtar, Daifam and Samrang by foot to meet with theLhotshampas who had applied to emigrate and appealed to them to stay back. Whilethese people assured His Majesty that they would not leave, the moment His Majestyreturned to Thimphu they all insisted on emigrating and pressed for their applications tobe processed without delay. Members of the media and foreign organisations who havevisited southern Bhutan are fully aware of the true facts since they have carried out theirown study of the situation and have also observed the emigration procedures and seenall relevant records and documents. Since some international organisations andcountries are giving assistance to these people who have left Bhutan on the basis of theirfalse allegations against the Royal Government, it is necessary to make them understandthat there are really no grounds at all for treating these people as refugees, he said.

The National Assembly resolved that the Royal Government must make every effort toclearly brief the international agencies and countries extending assistance to the peoplein the refugee camps in Nepal about the ngolops and their true motives and activities.The National Assembly also resolved that when the Nepal-Bhutan talks are held, theNepalese government must also be clearly briefed about the above views and concernsexpressed by the people’s representatives.

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The complete text (155 pages) of TRANSLATION OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE 73RD SESSION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF BHUTAN HELDFROM10TH AUGUST TO 2ND SEPTEMBER, 1995 can be found on this link: http://www.nab.gov.bt/downloads/1673rd%20Session.pdf

How the camps got established

2010-07-26T13:22:00.001+09:00

To answer this question, let me quote from an article by Alexander Casella:

“That events took another turn was due to an odd set of circumstances, namely the failure of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN refugee agency, to properly address the Kurdish crisis in northern Iraq in 1991.

In the wake of the first Gulf War in 1991, the US government encouraged the Kurds in northern Iraq to revolt against Saddam Hussein. When, however, Saddam turned against the Kurds, Washington did not come to their help and the result was a massive population displacement which saw hundreds of thousands of Kurds seek refuge in areas in northern Iraq not under Saddam's control, while others sought refuge in Iran and Turkey.

The exodus caught the then-high commissioner for refugees, Madame Sadako Ogata, completely unprepared and exposed her to a wave of criticism both from Western governments and the non-governmental organization community.

However, with no further crises in sight but an unemployed emergency unit at hand, the UNHCR bureaucracy became a solution in search of a problem. That problem suddenly emerged in 1992, when the government of Nepal asked the UNHCR to take charge of the group expelled from Bhutan on the grounds that these were "refugees", that is, foreign nationals who had fled persecution in their country of origin.

But Ogata did not run a tight shop and spurred by the urge to be perceived as active, the UNHCR opened seven camps without undertaking even a semblance of a survey of the arrivals. Over subsequent years, as the UNHCR kept on pouring money into the camps, Bhutan and Nepal embarked on a series of protracted and fruitless discussions as to how to deal with the group.

While Bhutan acknowledged that among the camp population there might be a few bona-fide Bhutanese citizens whom they could accept back, they where wary of exposing themselves to a massive return. Conversely, the Nepali authorities, already embroiled in a major internal crisis, were insisting on the wholesale return of the group. By then, the camps had become hotbeds of opposition to the Bhutanese government and were in part controlled by various Marxist groups, including some of Maoist extraction.”

For full article, click here.

Refugee Issue: Bhutanese perspective vs. Nepali Perspective

2010-07-26T02:58:00.007+09:00

At the heart of the ongoing refugee problem lie the two different perspectives of Nepal and Bhutan. Each side is steadfast in its belief. And each side, especially the Nepali side, is trying hard to convince the world to believe its version of the story. Let’s compare the differing perspectives one by one.

1. When did the people of Nepalese origin come to Bhutan?

The two sides tell quite different stories. Nepalese are all out to rewrite the history of Bhutan to show that their ancestors settled in Bhutan much earlier than they actually did. But historical facts, recorded much earlier than the current regime in Bhutan came into being, do not lie.

According to the paper “Bhutan: A kingdom besieged”, “The first sightings of Nepalese in the southern foothills are reported by Charles Bell in 1904 followed closely by John Claude White in 1905. All Bhutanese records confirm that no Nepalese settled in any part of Bhutan until then.
…The claim that the Nepalese had a role in safeguarding the sovereignty of the country, is clearly baseless since they did not enter southern Bhutan or any part of the duars area of West Bengal or Assam until long after the Sinchula Treaty with the British was signed. This is corroborated by Eden's report which states that his Nepalese porters, "were unwilling to enter Bhutan, the inhabitants of which were not looked upon with favour ... there the coolies left in considerable numbers being afraid to cross the frontier" (Teesta Bridge). Arthur Foning, a Kalimpong Lepcha, writes that this bore testimony to how effectively the Bhutanese territorial interests were guarded.”

However, most of the Nepalese came much later after the first five year plan of Bhutan was initiated in 1961. “Once the 5-year development programmes began to yield results, government effort to control immigration was thwarted by the earlier settlers who colluded with their ethnic kith and kin to prevent detection, falsify records and facilitate infiltration. Free education, free health services, employment opportunities, highly subsidized agriculture inputs, generous rural credit schemes, the security of a politically stable country were the main inducements that led to the influx of Nepalese immigrants in the 1960's and 1970's. In addition to the new arrivals, those who had come in legally as labourers for the many development schemes also began to infiltrate into the villages.”

2. Is Bhutan really a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic country as the Nepalese claim?

Nepal Govt. and Bhutanese refugees assert that Bhutan is a “multi-cultural and multi-ethnic” country. And they try to play the old colonists’ trick of “divide-and-rule” by trying to play Sharchops against the Ngalungs.

But so far it has failed. Why?

Because Bhutan really isn’t multicultural or multi-ethnic per se, though we do have different linguistic groups. Bhutanese people in different regions speak different languages (or sometimes closely related dialects), but they look physically quite the same, and their beliefs, customs, festivals, and religious faiths are almost same and uniform throughout. So, excluding the Nepalese, Bhutanese form a cohesive homogenous society.

Now, since we have Lhotshampas who are genuine Bhutanese, Bhutan may be said to be bi-cultural or bi-ethnic country, but not really multi-cultural or multi-ethnic as the Nepali Govt. and the Bhutanese refugees like to believe.

The following is an official statement found on the website of the Foreign Ministry of Nepal:
“Bhutan is a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic country. Sarchops, Ngalumgs and Lhostsampas are the three main ethnic groups. Bhutan has a significant number of people of Nepalese origin, particularly in the southern part of the country. The Nepalese of southern Bhutan are called Lhotshampas.”

Yet, we are not against multiculturalism per se. What we are against is how it is interpreted as Ruth Lea, Director of the Centre for Policy Studies in the UK says:

“ There are two ways in which people interpret multiculturalism.

The first one is the more common way and that is every culture has the right to exist and there is no over-arching thread that holds them together.

That is the multiculturalism we think is so destructive because there's no thread to hold society together. It is that multiculturalism that Trevor Phillips has condemned and, of course, we are totally supportive.

There is another way to define multiculturalism which I would call diversity where people have their own cultural beliefs and they happily coexist - but there is a common thread of Britishness or whatever you want to call it to hold society together." (Source: http://www.bbc.com/)

3. How many people in the refugee camps are actually genuine Bhutanese?

UNHCR confirms around 100,000 refugees in the camps. While the refugee leaders and Nepali Govt. assert that all of them are Bhutanese, Bhutanese in Bhutan believe that many of them are not really refugees from Bhutan.

The Joint Verification Team (JVT) of Bhutan and Nepal presented the following results to the fourteenth meeting of the Ministerial Joint Committee (MJC) in Kathmandu in May 2003 on the verification of the residents of Khudunabari camp:
------------------------------------------------------------------
Category -----------No. of people ------Percentage
--------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Bonafide Bhutanese ----293------ -------2.5 %
(2) Emigrants -------------8,595------------70.5%
(3) Non-Bhutanese --------2,948------------24.2%
(4) Criminals---------------347--------------2.8%
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Total ---------------------12,183 ------------100
---------------------------------------------------------------------
(Note: Emigrants, the largest group, are those Bhutanese nationals who had signed forms for voluntary emigration despite Bhutan Govt. and the King's advice to stay back. Most of them did so either due to fear of terrorizing members from groups like Bhutan People's Party, or for the hope of promised triumphant return to take over of Bhutan - that was an unhidden political agenda of the refugee leaders and it is still is their hope.)

The figures above may be taken only as an indicative figure and not as representative of the whole refugee population. This is because Khudunabari camp is one of the smaller camps established much later.

According the foreign minister’s report to the 82nd National Assembly in 2004, “It was only in July, 1993, that proper screening procedures for people claiming to be Bhutanese refugees were introduced. Until then the screening of such people were given to the people in the camps who were themselves claiming to be refugees. Once proper screening procedures were introduced there was a dramatic drop in the entry of people into the camps.”

Conclusion:

The refugee issue is a festering problem for Bhutan. It is one we cannot avoid indefinitely. Now that we have elected govt. in place, it will be even harder to find leaders who are willing to tackle the problem squarely because of the risks of losing the votes of Southern Bhutanese.

However, this is a problem in which all of us have a stake in. It is important for us to understand the different perspectives the two sides have. Until these fundamental differences in the perspectives are not settled, the refugee issue may be difficult to solve.

Non-discrimination of ngolops' relatives in civil service

2010-07-25T16:58:00.002+09:00

"The Deputy Minister (of Royal Civil Service Commission) said that while he shared the concerns of the people, the Royal Government has always followed one policy for all Bhutanese and in keeping with this policy, the induction, training and promotions of civil servants by the RCSC has been based purely on merit.

Despite the ngolop problem in southern Bhutan, and the considerable risk and embarrassment to the Royal Government over the past five years on account of Lhotshampa civil servants absconding, the RCSC has, on the command of His Majesty the King, not resorted to any discriminatory measures against the Lhotshampas. Out of 11,793 Bhutanese in the civil service today, 3,179 are from southern Bhutan, he said.

Since 1990, 1,061 Lhotshampas have been inducted into the civil service and 784 Lhotshampa civil servants have been promoted by the Ministries and the RCSC. 441 Lhotshampas have been sent abroad for training out of which 59 are students sent to study in professional fields. On the other hand, the Deputy Minister said, 465 Lhotshampa civil servants have absconded during the same period, many of them with large amounts of government funds and assets, and hundreds have resigned to join the ngolops."

Excerpted from: TRANSLATION OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE 73RD SESSION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF BHUTAN HELD FROM10TH AUGUST TO 2ND SEPTEMBER, 1995.

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The complete (155 pages) of the TRANSLATION OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND RESOLUTIONS can be found on this link: http://www.nab.gov.bt/downloads/1673rd%20Session.pdf

5 reasons why not to believe Michael Hutt

2010-07-22T00:24:00.010+09:00

Michael Hutt writes seemingly scholarly articles on the Bhutanese refugee issue now and then. But his views are completely biased because of his long connection with Nepal, Nepalese and Nepali language, while he has not done any field research inside Bhutan.

According to his official biography at his university's website, "Michael Hutt is Professor of Nepali and Himalayan Studies at School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). He completed a BA in South Asian Studies (Hindi) in 1980 and a Ph.D. on the history of the Nepali language and its literature in 1984, both at SOAS."

Here are 5 big reasons why anyone should not take Michael Hutt's articles at face value:

1. He has not done any research inside Bhutan. So his knowledge of Bhutan is superficial. Probably he has not even been to Bhutan.

2. He has long connection with Nepal and Nepalese. In fact, his whole adult life has been about Nepal - studying about Nepal at university and now working about Nepal. His professional life revolves around studying Nepali language and Nepali culture. He has done his Ph.D. on Nepali language, and now as a professor, he has mainly Nepalese Ph.D. students in his lab. So, he is deeply sympathetic of the Nepalese people everywhere. His views on the Bhutanese refugee issue are naturally biased.

3. He twists facts and figures to suit his twisted views on Bhutan. This is totally unbecoming of a scholar. No doubt that he is not highly regarded among his peers.

4. He quotes literature very selectively, only making references to those studies which conveniently suit his point of view. It is not becoming of a scholarly study to do so. All studies on the subject should be referenced for reaching a balanced conclusion.

5. Other researchers have pointed out that his articles contain factual errors.

Bhutanese writers and researchers out there, I urge you to expose some of Mr. Hutt's lies and set the record straight. We, Bhutanese are a reserved lot by nature. But, in this age of information, remaining silent could be suicidal.

Some articles he has published about Bhutan:

Here is one of the latest in a series of articles bitter on Bhutan he has published:
1. http://www.newstatesman.com/asia/2008/01/bhutan-party-elections

And here are some more:

2. http://himalaya.socanth.cam.ac.uk/collections/journals/pdsa/pdf/pdsa_01_01_05.pdf

3. It seems he has even written a book about Bhutanese refugee issue without conducting any field research inside Bhutan:
http://www.amazon.com/Unbecoming-Citizens-Culture-Nationhood-Refugees/dp/0195662059

4. This website is also probably supported by him. Most materials there quote his works:
http://www.bhutaneserefugees.com/

The following is excerpted from his official biography at http://www.soas.ac.uk/staff/staff31153.php:

Michael Hutt is Professor of Nepali and Himalayan Studies at SOAS. He completed a BA in South Asian Studies (Hindi) in 1980 and a Ph.D. on the history of the Nepali language and its literature in 1984, both at SOAS. In 1987 he returned to SOAS as a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow, and has been engaged in teaching and research relating to Nepal here ever since. He was Head of the South Asia Department from 1995-9, and has served as both Associate Dean (2002-4) and Dean (2004-10) of the Faculty of Languages and Cultures.

The study of modern and contemporary Nepali literature is Hutt's home ground, and he is well known as a translator. However, he has also published on Nepali politics, Nepali art and architecture, censorship in the Nepali print media, and the Bhutanese refugee issue. His latest completed work is a book length biographical study of the Nepali poet Bhupi Sherchan, which will appear in 2010 or 2011. New articles on the abolition of the Shah monarchy and on the selection of Nepal's new national anthem are forthcoming. In 2010 he will begin a major new research project on the construction of public meaning in Nepal.

His publications include Himalayan Voices: an Introduction to Modern Nepali Literature (1991), Nepal in the Nineties: Versions of the Past, Visions of the Future (1994), Modern Literary Nepali: an Introductory Reader (1997), Unbecoming Citizens: Culture, Nationhood, and the Flight of Refugees from Bhutan (2003) and Himalayan People's War: Nepal's Maoist Rebellion (2004).

The last Ministerial Joint Committee(MJC) Meeting

2010-07-21T23:48:00.005+09:00

The 15th MJC meeting between Bhutan and Nepal held in October 2003, was described as a major breakthrough in finding a lasting solution to the refugee issue. However, the decisions could not be followed through because of the attack on Bhutanese of officials of the Joint Verification Team (JVT) at Khudanbari Camp on 22 December, 2003. No such meetings have been held again between Bhutan and Nepal since then as of this writing (21 July 2010), though leaders of both the countries have expressed interest in resuming the stalled talks.

Read the following news report of the optimism raised by the last MJC Meeting.

Title: 15th MJC meeting agree on a number of issues

Posted on: October 23, 2003.
Published by: Kuensel.

The 15th ministerial joint committee (MJC) meeting between Nepal and Bhutan on the refugee issue concluded yesterday in Thimphu.

Described as a ‘historic’ and major breakthrough, the meeting ended on a happy note with both the sides agreeing on a number of issues.

It was agreed that the appeals submitted by the people in Category 3 would be reviewed by the joint verification team (JVT) by the end of January 2004. People falling under Category 3 are non-Bhutanese who are claiming to be Bhutanese

It was also agreed that people falling under category 4 (people who have committed crimes against the people and country of Bhutan) would be allowed to return and given a chance to prove their innocence in a court of law. Their family members will not be prosecuted on their return to Bhutan.

It was also agreed that people in category one (people who claim they were forcefully evicted from the country), two (people who emigrated on their own free will), and four who have applied to return to Bhutan will be repatriated as ‘per the harmonized position on these categories.’ Those people in Category 2 who do not want to return to Bhutan will be allowed to apply for the Nepali citizenship.

The terms and procedures for repatriation, reapplication and application for Bhutan and Nepal will be as prescribed by laws of the two countries.

The 15th MJC has agreed to implement the outcome of the meeting with the JVT deciding to meet in Damak, Jhapa, in the last week of November this year.

The MJC has also selected Sanischare as the next camp for verification and directed the JVT to explore ways and means of expediting the verification process in the remaining camps.
Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuk said that the meeting came to a fruitful conclusion and that it was a major step forward for both the countries.

The Nepalese foreign minister said that the MJC meeting was the ‘end of talk and the beginning of action.’

By Kinley Y Dorji
kins@kuensel.com.bt

Original article can be reached here: http://www.kuenselonline.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=3399

Attack on Bhutanese JVT in 2003

2010-07-21T23:10:00.002+09:00

Breaking news on the attack on Bhutanese JVT officials reported by Kuensel in Bhutan in 2003:

Title: Bhutanese JVT officials attacked in Jhapa

December 23, 2003 - The members of the Joint Verification Team from Bhutan arrived in Phuentsholing in partially damaged vehicles today after a mob attack in Damak, eastern Nepal, during which several members were injured. The Bhutanese foreign ministry described the incident as an "unprovoked act of violence against the officials who were only carrying out the directives of the MJC". "It is even more disturbing because the entire episode was not spontaneous but pre-meditated," according to a statement from the ministry. "The events that took place were well planned and well orchestrated, enabled by other residents of the camp who should never have been there."

The JVT was following instructions of the 15th ministerial joint committee held in Thimphu in October and had begun its work in December, 2003. "The MJC had agreed that the Bhutanese verification team and Nepalese verification team would brief the people on the terms, procedures and facilities applicable in Bhutan and Nepal respectively," according to the press release.

The press release also stated that the Bhutanese team had begun briefing the camp residents of Sector A in Khudunabari camp in a semi permanent bamboo hall. "The MJC considered it important to brief the camp residents for transparency and to enable them to make informed choices in exercising their voluntary option to return to Bhutan or stay in Nepal," according to the statement. "Despite the agreement that only Sector A residents were to be present, the JVT members were surprised to note that the hall was surrounded by the entire residents of the camp."

During the briefing the camp residents reportedly began to abuse the Bhutanese officials and then surrounded them and attacked them. The camp residents broke down the wall and started beating the Bhutanese members of the verification team. One Bhutanese official collapsed on the floor after being struck on the head while the other members were battered with blows and stones, according to the press release.

The camp residents were then reported to have attempted to trap the officials inside the hall and set it on fire. The Bhutanese officials were pelted with stones from all sides. They were abused and stoned until they reached their vehicles which were also damaged by the crowd.
Three or four armed policemen who were present did not intervene, according to the press release.

"Under the terms of reference of the JVT the host country is required to provide full security arrangements," stated the press release. "However, despite requests made by the Bhutanese officials and the risks foreseen by the Nepalese members of the JVT, there were no proper security arrangements and, on the occasion, only one policeman in plain clothes accompanied the Bhutanese members."

The violence broke out on the grounds that the terms and conditions were unacceptable, terms that were already known to the camp residents because copies had already been given to them, the press release stated.

"It is most unfortunate that this should have happened as we approached the last phase of the process leading to a durable solution to the problem of the people in the camps," said the Bhutanese foreign minister, Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuk. "Given the serious injuries sustained by our officials and the extreme mental shock and trauma that they have been subjected to, they are no longer in a position to continue their work. Further, they and their families in Bhutan are understandably worried over the serious risk to their lives."

The original news can be reached at this link: http://www.kuenselonline.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=3572

The following is another update that appeared 4 days after the initial report.

Title: Bhutanese officials attacked by mob in Jhapa

UPDATE December 27, 2003 - Back in Thimphu after a traumatic experience, the Bhutanese members of the Joint Verification Team (JVT) working to verify the people in the camps in eastern Nepal look back on what they all believe was a pre-meditated attack by a large and vicious mob of people.

The team leader, Dasho Sonam Tenzing, explained that, on December 22, the JVT officials from both countries had met in Damak and gone to the camp, about 90 minutes drive from their residence. There were eight Bhutanese nationals including three drivers.

The two teams briefed the people on the terms and conditions for them to remain in Nepal and apply for Nepalese citizenship or to choose to be repatriated to Bhutan. While the violence broke out reportedly on the grounds that the terms and conditions were unacceptable the agreed terms and conditions were not new, said Dasho Sonam Tenzing. “We had already given them in writing to the Nepali government and in fact the Nepali team was carrying it. As agreed by the two governments, both sides were supposed to clarify and explain all doubts that the people might have.”

“The briefing was meant only for those people who were in sector A so we had requested that the briefing would focus only on the people of sector A and also that we would like to do the briefing near the huts belonging to the sector A people,” he said. “But they had arranged a hall made of bamboo which was transparent. The Sector A people were inside the hall, cramped and sitting down. The rest of the people from the camp, about 12,000, were all outside.”
Another official hurt in the attack

Dasho Sonam Tenzing said that, after the briefing all the elders stood up and left the hall. Those waiting outside came in and everyone started abusing the Bhutanese officials. Then they attacked them. “The NVT (Nepali Verification Team) had already left the scene, leaving us there on our own,” he said. “The assault went on for about 30-40 minutes. We tried to go out of the hut but they did not allow us. They were shouting that we shouldn’t be let out and that we should be burned alive. However, we pushed our way through, receiving many blows and stones. Our ghos were torn. We managed to run out of the hut but, outside, we were hit with bamboo sticks and stones.”

One of the team members was knocked unconscious in the hall and was carried out. Another received a head injury after being hit with a stone. Another was hit on his forehead and was badly hurt on his right knee. The Bhutanese officials were continuously attacked all the way to the vehicles that were parked about 75 metres away from the hut. “We ran and got inside the vehicles but they broke the windows and stones landed inside the vehicles. Twelve of these big stones are still with us.”

The Bhutanese foreign ministry described the incident as an “unprovoked act of violence against the officials who were only carrying out the directives of the MJC”. “It is even more disturbing because the entire episode was not spontaneous but pre-meditated,” according to a statement from the ministry. “The events that took place were well planned and well orchestrated, enabled by other residents of the camp who should never have been there.”

The JVT, on the instructions of the 15th ministerial joint committee held in Thimphu in October, had begun its work in December, 2003. “The MJC considered it important to brief the camp residents for transparency and to enable them to make informed choices in exercising their voluntary option to return to Bhutan or stay in Nepal,” according to the statement.

“Under the terms of reference of the JVT the host country is required to provide full security arrangements,” stated the press release. “However, despite requests made by the Bhutanese officials and the risks foreseen by the Nepalese members of the JVT, there were no proper security arrangements on the occasion.”

“I want to make it clear, that it was a pre-meditated attack by the people in the camps,” said Dasho Sonam Tenzing. “I know this because the briefing was not done in seclusion as we had requested, all the elderly people got out before the violence, and the NVT literally abandoned us.”

Dasho Sonam Tenzing pointed out that the terms and conditions read out by the Nepali team was beyond the agreement but the Bhutanese team could not fully understand it because it was in difficult Nepali. “We did not object because they have a right to explain it their way. Our mandate was to explain our terms and conditions. Each country is supposed to make its own position clear to the people. The people have to understand, they have to make their own choice.”

“We were completely shocked,” he added. “We were there to implement the last stage of the agreement. We were there to facilitate the repatriation and re-application and to resolve the problem so we thought it would go smoothly. But we were taken completely off guard by this brutal attack.”

Sonam Tshong of the foreign ministry, who was knocked unconscious in the hall, said that the atmosphere in the hall was terrifying, with even the women shouting abuses and attacking the Bhutanese officials. “They were out to kill us,” he said. The people were reportedly shouting “these bhoteys must be killed… today they should not be allowed to escape.”

Another member of the team said that security was completely inadequate. “We reminded them time and again about security but it was not arranged,” he said. “We only had one person in civil clothes accompanying us. There were four or five security personnel but they were nowhere in the scene during the attack. They came only after it was all over.”

“It is most unfortunate that this should have happened as we approached the last phase of the process leading to a durable solution to the problem of the people in the camps,” said the Bhutanese foreign minister, Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuk. “Given the serious injuries sustained by our officials and the extreme mental shock and trauma that they have been subjected to, they are no longer in a position to continue their work. Further, they and their families in Bhutan are understandably worried over the serious risk to their lives.”

By Kinley Dorji & Karma Choden

Original news at this link: http://www.kuenselonline.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=3589

Minister's report about JVT attack to 82nd National Assembly

2010-07-21T22:30:00.005+09:00

"At Khudunabari camp, on December 22, (year 2003), the Bhutanese officials, having already expressed their security concerns in writing to their Nepalese counterparts, began their briefing. About half an hour into the briefing they were attacked by the people in the make-shift hut, joined by most of the 12,000 people outside who also stormed in.

One Bhutanese official collapsed on the floor after he was struck on the head. The crowd punched and stoned the Bhutanese officials and beat them with bamboo sticks. After three officials were injured and the Bhutanese vehicles damaged, they managed to escape to the Lifeline Hospital in Damak town. In the early hours of December 23 the Bhutanese officials left Damak on the instructions of the royal government which had arranged an Indian security escort from the Nepal border to Phuentsholing. "

- Excerpted from Kuensel (10 July 2004).

In the 82nd National Assembly session held in July 2004, Foreign Minister Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuk made a detailed report on the attack on the Bhutanese members of the Joint Verification Team (JVT) at Khudanbari camp on 22 December 2003. Here are some excerpts from the Kuensel news report titled "Assembly calls for proper investigation into JVT attack and action against perpetrators" published on 10 July 2004:

He (Foreign Minister) traced the origins of the camps to January, 1991, when the first group of people claiming to be refugees were allowed to enter Nepal. Bhutan’s attempts to prevent the establishment of camps and facilities that might attract the poor masses in the region were ignored.

It was only in July, 1993, that proper screening procedures for people claiming to be Bhutanese refugees were introduced. Until then the screening of such people were given to the people in the camps who were themselves claiming to be refugees. Once proper screening procedures were introduced there was a dramatic drop in the entry of people into the camps.

He then explained the bilateral process as the two governments met in July, 1993, and established the ministerial joint committee (MJC) that had, over the years, achieved several significant steps towards a durable solution to the problem

The MJC had categorised the people and harmonised the positions of the two governments on each category, established the joint verification team (JVT), and agreed that the solution would be found within the framework of the laws in the two countries.

The JVT started work at Khudunabari camp in March, 2001, and the results of its work was confirmed during the 15th MJC held in Thimphu in October, 2003. Among several significant decisions taken by the MJC, it was agreed that the repatriation of those found eligible would begin in February, 2004.

Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuk said that the attack on the Bhutanese members of the JVT took place when the JVT returned to Nepal for the final assignments mandated by the MJC. At Khudunabari camp, on December 22, the Bhutanese officials, having already expressed their security concerns in writing to their Nepalese counterparts, began their briefing. About half an hour into the briefing they were attacked by the people in the make-shift hut, joined by most of the 12,000 people outside who also stormed in.

One Bhutanese official collapsed on the floor after he was struck on the head. The crowd punched and stoned the Bhutanese officials and beat them with bamboo sticks. After three officials were injured and the Bhutanese vehicles damaged, they managed to escape to the Lifeline Hospital in Damak town. In the early hours of December 23 the Bhutanese officials left Damak on the instructions of the royal government which had arranged an Indian security escort from the Nepal border to Phuentsholing.

“What happened on December 22 was a failure of the Nepalese government to honour its responsibility towards the safety and security of the Bhutanese officials,” said the foreign minister. “But we are proud of the courage, dedication, and dignity with which our officials conducted themselves and appreciate the understanding with which their family members endured the constant worry over their safety.”

Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuck submitted to the Assembly a detailed report of the actions taken by the government after the incident.
The government was, at that time, pre-occupied with the military operations. On being informed of the attack the foreign ministry issued a press release and the foreign minister called his counterpart on the same day to express his regret over the incident and to explain the withdrawal of the Bhutanese officials. The government had raised the issue with the Nepalese leaders during the 12th SAARC summit in January and the two foreign ministers met again at the BIMST-EC meeting in Thailand in February.

The foreign minister said that he had conveyed to his Nepalese counterpart that the December 22 incident was very serious as the Bhutanese members of the JVT could have been killed. The Bhutanese people were shocked and angered by the incident and could not understand the violent behaviour of the people in the camp when the process had reached the last stage and could only be of benefit to them. He expressed his conviction that the incident was pre-planned and premeditated and not provoked as it had been alleged by groups in Nepal with vested interests. The terms and conditions read out at the camp were not new because copies had been handed over to them as far back as June.

Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuk said that he had expressed his surprise and regret that an enquiry, that should have been a normal step, had not been initiated. He requested the Nepalese government to conduct a thorough enquiry into the incident, to punish the perpetrators, and to put in place safety and security measures before resuming work.

“The last time our officials had been lucky to escape with their lives but the same cannot be taken for granted in the future,” he said. Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuk said that the Nepalese foreign minister had expressed his regret over the incident and also his doubts whether an investigation would be of any use. While there was no communication from Nepal for the next two months the Nepalese media had described the incident as a “minor scuffle” and the international community raised concerns about the stalled bilateral process.

“We have always maintained that we are committed to the bilateral process and the agreements reached during the 15th MJC meeting are a clear confirmation of our seriousness in seeking a lasting solution to the problem,” he said. “If our officials had not been attacked the repatriation would have started in February. We said that, if the international community was interested in helping the resumption of the talks, they should ask Nepal to act on our request to investigate the incident, to take action against the perpetrators, and put in place adequate security measures.”

The Nepalese foreign minister had called on April 5 to propose a ministerial meeting preceded by a meeting of senior officials. Bhutan’s foreign minister responded on April 12. “I made it clear that, given the seriousness of the incident and the strong public concern in Bhutan I would not be in a position to propose a resumption of the process without the Nepalese government investigating the incident, initiating legal action against the perpetrators, and putting in place adequate security measures,” the minister informed the Assembly.

Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuk said that the Bhutanese embassy in New Delhi had received on May 12 the “Report of investigation of the incident at Khudunabari camp on December 22, 2003”, forwarded by the Nepalese foreign minister. But the report contained a number of factual inaccuracies and fell far short of Bhutan’s requests. “The report states that no individuals could be identified as being responsible for the incident, it alleges that the attack was provoked by the Bhutanese officials, and also calls on the royal government to further relax the terms and conditions,” said Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuk. “It seems to be the conclusion of the investigation report that beating up the Bhutanese officials should lead to further relaxation of Bhutan’s terms and conditions under its citizenship laws.”

Bhutanese members of the JVT, meanwhile, had expressed their dismay at the callous attitude of the Nepalese government. Apart from the fact that the terms and conditions had long been known to the camp people who had not complained about them in the past, there had been many tactics to intimidate the Bhutanese officials. They were harassed at the market, they were threatened at night, even with decapitation, and there had been aggressive strikes in front of the office of the Bhutanese verification team.

The foreign minister said that, despite the severe shortcomings and inaccuracies in the report, the royal government had indicated to the Nepalese government that, in the interest of moving the bilateral process forward, the report could be considered positively if Nepal deleted the unacceptable reference to the relaxation of the terms and conditions pertaining to the citizenship laws. The two governments had not only respected each other’s terms and conditions in the past, the investigation was meant to identify and take action against the perpetrators so the issue was out of context. It also sent the negative message that the attack and beating of Bhutanese officials would lead to further relaxation of the terms and conditions of the Citizenship Acts.

Nepal’s foreign minister had said that he understood Bhutan’s view but would need to consult his government. Meanwhile the government changed and he said that the response would have to be given by the new government. The foreign minister said that the government was still waiting for a reply from Nepal and was now seriously concerned about the political and security situation in Nepal.

Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuk informed the Assembly that there were other developments that might have serious implications on Bhutan’s security. A Bhutan Gorkha Liberation Front and a Bhutan Communist Party had been formed, the latter with links to the Maoists in Nepal. The Maoists were recruiting people from the camps and some of them had even taken part in attacks in Nepal. More than 2,000 of them had moved into India and could be close to the Indo-Bhutan border. These people posed a serious threat to Bhutan’s security.

“On our part the royal government will abide by all the agreements we have reached with Nepal to find a lasting and durable solution to the issue of the people in the camps,” said Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuk. “This includes our commitment to take back all those people in the camps who have been found to be genuine Bhutanese refugees. In carrying out the discussions and agreements with Nepal we will, as in the past, continue to be guided by our national laws, the
Citizenship Acts, and the resolutions of the National Assembly.”

Many chimis expressed their views and concerns after the foreign minister’s report. They submitted that the Nepalese government’s first report was completely unacceptable. It was not possible that the Nepalese government could not identify and take legal action against the criminals in Khudunabari camp.

On the related developments, including the movement of people outside the camps, several chimis said that it was time for Bhutan to be aware of the implications and take necessary measures to ensure that Bhutan does not face Maoist problems as in Nepal.

The Speaker of the National Assembly, Dasho Ugen Dorje, noted that the Assembly had witnessed an outpouring of anger and indignation from the chimis over the assault on the Bhutanese members of the joint verification team and it was clearly a priority issue for the Assembly. The foreign minister had submitted a detailed and clear explanation of the actions taken by the government.

The National Assembly of Bhutan recorded its appreciation and commendation to the ministerial joint committee and the Bhutanese JVT members for their dedication in discharging their work and their loyalty to their nation.

While the relations between Bhutan and Nepal had greatly improved and the bilateral process had made significant achievements in 15 rounds of talks since 1993, the process had stalled at a critical stage, just before repatriation could take place. The next step was not clear because of the instability of the Nepalese government and its preoccupation with the Maoist problem. Under the circumstances it was vital that the two governments thoroughly discuss the issue and make sure that the necessary measures were taken to prevent such an incident from ever occurring again. This must be finalised before the bilateral process resumed.

The Speaker also noted that the government should continue to strictly adhere to the resolutions of the National Assembly, the Citizenship Acts of Bhutan, and the laws of the land.

--------------------------------
Reproduced Courtesy of Kuensel.
--------------------------------

The complete news report can be found at the following link.

http://www.kuenselonline.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=4263

Why do Nepalese always criticise Bhutan?

2010-07-21T00:47:00.004+09:00

Why do Nepalese always criticise Bhutan? Really, this is a fact. If there is something positive happening in Bhutan, Nepalese media try to overlook it, or downplay it. On the other hand, they take the slightest hint of problem to bash Bhutan. So, this has led Nepalese in Nepal to have a really poor image of Bhutan and Bhutanese in recent years.

On the other hand, Bhutanese media are much more accommodating of Nepal. For instance, very positve coverage was given to Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal and his wife when they visited Bhutan during the SAARC summit this year (2010).

The following article may give you insight into this problem. Please read on.

Title: Bhutanese reform, Nepalese criticism

By: Karma Phuntsho,
12 October 2006 (Published on OpenDemocracy.net)

The introduction of democracy in the small Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan is a positive political development. Nepalese critics should give it fair consideration, says Karma Phuntsho.

About the author: Karma Phuntsho earned a doctorate in Buddhist studies at Oxford University and is research associate in the department of social anthropology, Cambridge University.

An outsider to the Himalayan region might expect the kingdoms of Nepal and Bhutan to be akin, neighbourly and cordial, but such images belong to the fanciful realm of Shangri-La. The two nations are rarely on good terms. Differences between Bhutan and Nepal may begin in their socio-cultural roots - primarily a Himalayan Buddhist culture in the case of Bhutan and an Indic-Hindu one for Nepal - but their seemingly divergent paths in the more recent history of modernisation and development have taken them further apart.

In the process, Nepal has generally continued to view Bhutan as a closed medieval autocracy. For most Bhutanese, ancient Nepal is a sacred site of pilgrimage, but they rarely refer to modern Nepal. When they do, it is with a mixture of pity and contempt, depicting Nepal as a nation beleaguered by wayward modernisation and endless political strife. To many Bhutanese, Nepal is an example to avoid.

Nepalese writers have exacerbated the acrimony. Their reports of Bhutan, both from within Nepal and abroad, have been mainly critical. Dharma Adhikari's openDemocracy article "Bhutan's democratic puzzle" (20 June 2006) is a case in point.

A primary target of Nepalese criticism of Bhutan has been the monarch, who is loved and revered by most of his people. Many even deify Jigme Singye Wangchuck as a bodhisattva king, who is born to lead the country through the turmoil of our time. Nepalese writers, by contrast, generally portray him as a narcissistic potentate whom his people fear and who persecutes his adversaries ruthlessly.

Both Bhutanese deification and Nepalese demonisation take the perception of the monarchy to harmful extremes. The truth, and a useful understanding, lies somewhere in between. King Jigme is certainly the most powerful figure in Bhutan, but he lives a simple life and keeps in close contact with his people. He is a benign monarch, put to serious test by the challenges of our age, including western cultural invasion, the southern Bhutanese immigration and refugee problem, and the Indian rebels.

Nepalese writers also routinely paint a picture of Bhutan as a nation torn by factionalism. The ruling Ngalong (Dzongkha-speaking westerners) in Bhutan, these writers argue, hold power and continually suppress the other groups of Lhotshampas (Nepali-speaking southerners) and Sharchopas (Tsanglha-speaking easterners). There was a conflict in the late 1980s between the Nepali-speaking southerners and the non-Nepali northerners, who are loosely called Drukpas (athough this term should refer to all Bhutanese). Its aftermath looms large even today.

However, among the Drukpas there never was any stark political divide between the Sharchopa and Ngalong groups. The highly diverse, variable and interwoven ethnic and linguistic composition of northern Bhutan defies such simple bifurcation. For the last two decades, almost half the ministers were from the eastern districts of Bhutan. Many prominent posts in government are occupied by easterners and they make up about half of Bhutan's population.

Nepalese writers often assume that Bhutan's royal family line belongs to the "ruling" Ngalong group that is counterposed to the Sharchopa. The Wangchuck dynasty is mainly of a stock from the central districts of Kurtoe and Bumthang, which traditionally fall under the domain of eastern Bhutan. Power has been concentrated in the hands of the central Bhutanese ever since the great-great-grandfather of the present king. Power was never solely in Ngalong hands.
Similarly, the leading Drukpa dissident, Rongthong Kuenley Dorji, is often identified as a Sharchopa, in order to fuel the fictional Ngalong-Sharchopa conflict. Rongthong Kuenley is not a Sharchopa, or a native Tsanglha speaker. He comes from Kheng, a cultural and linguistic group distinct from both Ngalong and Sharchopa.

The refugee issue

One visible effect of ill-informed criticism of Bhutan is the widening rift between Bhutan and Nepal, and the subsequent stalemate that this entails for the refugees issue. Nepalese media have continually insisted that all 100,000 refugees languishing in the camps in eastern Nepal are citizens expelled from Bhutan in a campaign of "ethnic cleansing" which began in the late 1980s. They assert that Bhutan is solely responsible and should repatriate the refugees en masse. However, the refugee problem is far from straightforward.

The refugee crisis, the Bhutanese argue, is a consequence of demography. The Himalayan foothills region stretching from Nepal through the Darjeeling hills and Sikkim to Bhutan was populated by roaming groups, mostly ethnic Nepalese, seeking greener pastures.

When Bhutan opened its door to the outside world in the 1960s, thousands of these migrants entered Bhutan as labourers on various developments projects. Bhutan's low population density, fertile farmlands, free social services and sustained economic growth undoubtedly made the kingdom an attractive destination. For this reason, Bhutan has insisted that the refugee problem is largely a problem of illegal immigration and that Bhutan is being made the victim of its own success.

The initial number of refugees in 1991, when conflict erupted in Bhutan, was about 2,500, reaching 6,000 at the end of that year. When the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) set up camps in eastern Nepal - with poor screening and an attractive allowance - thousands of people are said to have flocked there, claiming to be refugees from Bhutan. Numbers soared to almost 100,000 by 2000. The figure given at the end of 2005 was 117,647, with almost a quarter of that number born in exile. The birthrate among refugees was twice as high as among the local Nepalese population.

In an attempt to resolve the crisis, the governments of Nepal and Bhutan had held fifteen rounds of bilateral talks by 2003, the most significant achievement of the negotiations being the formation of the Joint Verification Team. The verification of 12,183 residents of Khudunabari camp by the JVT revealed that only 293 were forcefully evicted from Bhutan, 8,595 emigrated voluntarily and 347 fled after criminal activities. The remainder (2,948, i.e., almost a quarter of the total) had no links to Bhutan. When the result was announced, the JVT team came under missile attack from the frustrated crowd, leading to the existing stalemate.

To effectively address the refugee crisis, the geopolitical situation in the region when the crisis began around 1990 must also be considered. Nepal was then exuberant and tumultuous with its new-found democracy, having stripped then King Birendra of power; Sikkim had Nar Bahadur Bhandari at its helm; and the Darjeeling hills were being turned into an autonomous Gorkhaland by Subhash Ghising. The fervour of Nepali dominion and nationalism was at its peak.

The "pro-democracy" and "‘human rights" movements within Bhutan, led by ethnically Nepalese individuals such as Tek Nath Rizal happened around this time. Moreover, the demonstrations organised by his Bhutan People's Party were never just non-violent protests by patriotic citizens. Most dissidents were seen by the authorities in the capital, Thimphu, to be more loyal to the Nepalese power abroad than to Bhutan's royal government. As the demonstrations of 1990 turned violent, Thimphu considered the movement an armed rebellion seeking to overthrow the ruling regime.

In such circumstances, the threat to Bhutan of Nepalese cultural expansion and demographic takeover was as serious as it could be. Bhutan dreaded facing the same fate as the erstwhile Buddhist kingdom of Sikkim, which by then was fully controlled by Hindu Nepalese.
The demonstrations and the conflict between the protestors - later branded by Thimphu as anti-nationals and terrorists - and the Bhutanese military, resulted in many deaths, tortures and displacements, and much destruction of property. For its part, the Bhutanese government has admitted excesses by its security forces in the course of the crackdown. But it was never a simple case of "ethnic cleansing" or a state-sponsored persecution of a non-compliant minority, as media outside Bhutan generally portray the situation. It was a sordid "ethnic conflict", and even the Drukpas in the north and southern Bhutanese who were loyal to the regime had to bear the brunt of it.

For over a decade and a half now, the refugee crisis has dragged on, desperate as ever, with an increasingly restless youth population, diminishing local sympathy, donor fatigue and no solution in sight. The refugee leaders have lost direction and the community is split by seven political parties. Yet the Nepalese and international media only blame Bhutan for the delay in finding a solution. In reality, however, the negotiations and the process of verification seems to have been obstructed more by Nepal's political instability than by Bhutan's reluctance. Doubts are being cast over whether Nepal is genuinely committed to ending the crisis.

Bhutan, however apprehensive it may seem in resolving the issue, knows that a permanent solution of the refugee problem is in its best interest. Whether or not Bhutan likes it, the people in the camps go under Bhutanese names. To say the least, the refugee issue is an embarrassment for a nation which champions the cause of Gross National Happiness. Bhutan, therefore, has good reasons to find a solution - as long as it is not pushed too hard from outside.

The Nepalese view of Bhutan is filtered almost entirely through the refugee issue. Everything else in Bhutan is measured against it. Hence, Nepalese writers also have begun to question the process of democracy in Bhutan and the draft constitution that is in circulation. Dharma Adhikari, in his openDemocracy article, cites doubts about the king's sincerity, noting arguments that the monarch "hopes to use the constitution to circumvent a simmering upheaval and delay a truly representative democracy". He further remarks that Bhutan's democratisation at best portends a two-party oligarchy.

Needless to say, many questions can be asked about the royal intention and the eventual outcome of the current process of democratisation in Bhutan. But there is no struggle for power between the palace and the people, as Adhikari claims. His is a reiteration of ill-founded perceptions of Bhutan blurred by incidents in Nepal itself, where a despotic king clung to power up to the last minute. The situation is reversed in Bhutan. Notwithstanding the apprehension and misgivings about democracy among the majority of his people, King Jigme Singye Wangchuck stands firm on ushering in democracy by 2008.

Bhutan's political evolution from an absolute monarchy to parliamentary democracy is proving, so far, to be one of the most unique and smooth processes of democratisation in our times. The king should be given due credit for his initiatives.

The introduction of democracy will be good for Bhutan and the region, although it will not be a panacea for all of the country's problems. It will not necessarily resolve the refugee problem, but most likely will create favourable circumstances for its solution.
A reconciliatory approach

The refugee crisis is primarily a humanitarian crisis, not a human-rights problem. Hence, its solution is a shared international responsibility. Bhutan, which has already made considerable concessions in the bilateral negotiations, should not be held solely responsible. A viable and perhaps the most realistic solution, as the UNHCR representative in Nepal suggests, would be repatriation to Bhutan for some and resettlement in Nepal and third countries for others.
Campaigns by refugees as well as by Nepalese have sought to force Bhutan into a settlement through international pressure. But the country, recently listed, variously, as the eighth- and thirteenth-happiest nation on earth, is enjoying peace, stability and economic development. It is unlikely to bow to pressure or intimidation.

India, Bhutan's closest ally, has considered the refugee issue a bilateral problem between Bhutan and Nepal, and has stayed out of the dispute. If India ever were to become involved, there is no guarantee that it would propose a solution favourable to the refugees. And involvement by a regional power in sub-regional disputes may only give rise to unforeseen complications.

If a solution were "found" through coercion and aggression, harmony would remain elusive. If any refugees were to be repatriated and resettled successfully in Bhutan, the first place they must find is in the hearts of the people. It is time for the people of both Nepal and Bhutan to set aside the politics of mudslinging and vitriolic reports and work towards a neighbourly amity.

Reproduced courtesy of Dr. Karma Phuntsho and OpenDemocracy.

Original article can be reached by clicking here.

Is Bhutan a victim of Nepalese population explosion?

2010-07-21T00:39:00.002+09:00

According to the following article published by none other than New York Times, "The last of the once-isolated Himalayan Buddhist kingdoms is fighting for survival, victim of a South Asian population explosion that is changing demography on the roof of the world. "

Please read on to find out more.

Title: BHUTAN STRUGGLES TO STOP MILITANTS

By BARBARA CROSSETTE,
Published: April 14, 1991, (New York Times)

THIMPHU, Bhutan— The last of the once-isolated Himalayan Buddhist kingdoms is fighting for survival, victim of a South Asian population explosion that is changing demography on the roof of the world.

Over the last six months, a campaign of violence and terror by small bands of ethnic Nepalese guerrillas in southern Bhutan, most of them Hindus based in India, has shattered the peace of this small mountainous nation.

The militants' campaign is couched in the language of democracy and minority rights, but the goal of the movement is free access to the underpopulated forests and valleys of Bhutan for those of Nepalese origin.

While there are about 600,000 Bhutanese, there are 32 million people of Nepalese extraction in overpopulated Nepal and India. Many prefer to be called Gurkhas, and they are heirs of a warrior clan who dream of a Gurkhaland stretching across the Himalayan foothills. The King Is a Modern Man

Bhutan, now ruled by a modernizing King, Jigme Singye Wangchuck, had for 1,300 years of independence been the land of the Bhutia people, a group similar to Tibetans in language, culture and religion. Bhutanese say that over the last decade, illegal immigration across an unprotectable border with India has reduced the northern Bhutias to a fast-dwindling majority that is now about 60 percent.

"If this continues, we are done for," Foreign Minister Dawa Tsering said.
Bhutan's predicament raises questions about the rights of small, distinctive cultures to protect themselves by closing borders and introducing regulations on national dress and language.
The Bhutanese see that as the other side of the more common separatist demand heard from Eastern Europe to Kashmir.

Half a century ago, Bhutan was not alone among the Himalayan Buddhist states. There was Tibet, where Buddhist teachers known as lamas dominated society and often government. There was Sikkim and Ladakh.

Tibet, crushed by Beijing in 1959 and absorbed into China as a region, is being remade by Han Chinese. Ladakh and Sikkim have been absorbed by India. In the forefront of Bhutanese concern is the fate of the Sikkimese, against whose ruler New Delhi plotted until he was finally overthrown in 1975 with the help of disaffected subjects, most of them also ethnic Nepalese.

The King has personally taken charge of Bhutan's national defense and efforts to counter rebel assertions of human-rights abuses. He says he is prepared to abdicate if he cannot end the insurrection peacefully.

"I have little to lose when what is at stake is the survival of the Bhutanese people," he said in an interview at Tashichleo Dzong, the monastery-fortress that is the center of religion and Government in Bhutan. Symbol of Bhutanese Culture

The 35-year-old ruler had just returned from the south, where dozens of Government properties have been blown up or burned, bridges destroyed, and buses and trucks hijacked.
At least 38 policemen or soldiers have been killed or wounded, the King said, and 168 people kidnapped for ransoms as high as $30,000.

Because the King is the symbol of Bhutan's culture, the Nepalese make monarchy the focus of their movement, along with the regulations imposed on all Bhutanese citizens in 1988 requiring the wearing of national dress.

The King, dressed in an embroidered silk kho, the national costume, said tiny, landlocked Bhutan is neither an economic nor military power, "so the only factor we can fall back on, the only factor which can strengthen Bhutan's sovereignty and security is our identity, our different identity. We are really the last bastion of Himalayan Buddhism."

Bhutan's per-capita income shot up to nearly $400 last year, higher than in India, Nepal and Bangladesh.

"We have free education and health care, and plenty of land," the King said, adding: "The whole of Bhutan has become fertile ground for economic refugees. It has become the promised land."
The nearby Indian hill stations of Darjeeling and Kalimpong are controlled by Gurkha movements, the largest of which is the Gurkha National Liberation Front. Leaders of Bhutanese movements, including the Bhutanese People's Party and the Bhutanese Students' Union, operate from that region. To those people, the ethnic Bhutias are the regional minority.

The militants have benefited from the backing of political parties to the left of the Communists in the Indian state of West Bengal and in Nepal.

Reproduced courtesy of New York Times.

Please click here to go to the original article.

Did Bhutan mass-shoot demonstrators?

2010-07-21T00:27:00.002+09:00

In 1990, when the southern Bhutan problem was at its peak, a news report by Kyodo News Agency reported that Bhutanese armed forces had engaged in mass-shooting of the demonstrators. However, as the following news report says, as well as the UNHCR report confirms, it was soon recognized to be a false report spread by the demonstrators or their sympathizers across the border.

The following news reported in New York Times in October 1990 says, "In the last week of September, sympathizers of the movement in Katmandu, the capital of Nepal, were able to have unconfirmed accounts of mass shootings transmitted by two international news agencies, Kyodo and Agence France-Presse. Both have subsequently transmitted denials. "

"Both accounts, saying respectively that 327 or 200 people had died in southern Bhutan between Sept. 20 and 25, were untrue, according to Bhutanese diplomats here and officials in the capital, Thimphu, backed by Indian newspaper reports from Bhutan and the Indian state of West Bengal. "

Please read the following news to know more.

Title: India-Based Groups Seek to Disrupt Bhutan

By BARBARA CROSSETTE,

Special to The New York Times
Published: October 7, 1990Twitter

Mail Print NEW DELHI, Oct. 6— The small Buddhist kingdom of Bhutan has become the target of a well-organized campaign, based in India, to stir up violent opposition to the country's moves to protect itself and its culture from illegal immigration.

Waged largely on behalf of Nepali and Indian citizens denied the right to settle in the small kingdom, where standards of living are relatively high and business opportunities plentiful, the militant campaign has been appealing to international human-rights groups to recognize it as a ''pro democracy'' movement.

In the last two months, reports from several recently formed Indian-based groups with names like the Bhutan People's Party or the Forum for Human Rights in Bhutan have asserted that mass arrests, torture and the suppression of minority rights are occurring under King Jigme Singye Wangchuck of Bhutan.

In August, the Hong Kong-based Asian Students Association held a news conference here to publicize the accusations and call for demonstrations. None of the student leaders speaking at the conference had visited Bhutan.

In the last week of September, sympathizers of the movement in Katmandu, the capital of Nepal, were able to have unconfirmed accounts of mass shootings transmitted by two international news agencies, Kyodo and Agence France-Presse. Both have subsequently transmitted denials.

Both accounts, saying respectively that 327 or 200 people had died in southern Bhutan between Sept. 20 and 25, were untrue, according to Bhutanese diplomats here and officials in the capital, Thimphu, backed by Indian newspaper reports from Bhutan and the Indian state of West Bengal.

What happened in Bhutan in September, Bhutanese and others say, was that several thousand armed militants crossed into the country from India and tried to foment an uprising among Bhutanese of Nepali descent.
Bhutanese officials say that 2 people were killed and more than 400 were arrested. All but 36 were subsequently pardoned by King Jigme.
Sunanda K. Datta Ray, editor of The Statesman of Calcutta, who has been leading a journalistic effort to set the record straight on what is happening in Bhutan, calls the new campaign a ''propaganda war against Bhutan.''
Mr. Datta Ray, writing in articles and editorials, has drawn a parallel with the externally generated movement that destabilized the kingdom of Sikkim in the early 1970's, leading to its seizure and incorporation by India. The Bhutanese believe themselves to be the guardians of the last Himalayan Buddhist kingdom, squeezed between China and overpopulated India.
''No question of democratic dissent lies at the heart of the turbulence,'' an editorial in The Statesman said on Sept. 26. ''The truth of the matter is that a large number of ethnic Nepalese who are not bonafide citizens of Bhutan have gathered on the kingdom's borders in an attempt to force an entry. Putting it bluntly, they are economic refugees spoiling for a showdown to win the world's sympathy.''
Sonam Tobden Rabgye, First Secretary of the Bhutanese Embassy in New Delhi, said in an interview Monday that the roots of the militancy go back to 1988, when Bhutan decided to take a census of its population and to begin enforcing a ''Bhutanese way of life,'' including national dress, architectural styles and languages.

Reproduced courtesy of The New York Times.

The original article can be reached by clicking here.

UNHCR regrets setting up camps in Nepal?

2010-07-20T23:51:00.005+09:00

Did the UNHCR miscalculate in opening the camps in Nepal?

According to the following article, it seems so. It says:

"In 1996, a senior UNHCR official on a visit to Bhutan acknowledged that the UNHCR should never have opened the camps in the first place, with the extenuating explanation that the decision to do so derived from plain stupidity rather than evil intent. But Japanese Ogata was not one to acknowledge her mistakes, and though she visited Bhutan in November 2000, she remained impervious to any recommendations to close the camps."

Please read on to find out more.

Title: Nepal Finally Waves Away Refugees

UPDATE : 15 December 2009

After dragging on for close to 18 years - often in almost farcical fashion - at an estimated cost of some US$350 million, resolution of the Bhutan refugee crisis is at hand.

By Alexander Casella

This month, the first batch of 25,000 refugees left camps in seven United Nations-supervised camps in eastern Nepal, and the vast majority of the 86,000 remaining have signed up for resettlement in the West; most of them are heading for the United States.
The origin of the crisis, which has exposed bureaucratic bungling and nationalist fervor at their worst, lies not so much in Bhutan as in Sikkim, which provided a foreshadow of what could have been the fate of Bhutan.

With porous borders and a weak state apparatus, the diminutive kingdom of Sikkim had become a destination of choice for a creeping ongoing uncontrolled immigration from nearby Nepal.
As the Nepalese slowly increased in number they also brought with them the political factionalism and dissent that plagued their country of origin. By 1975, the local Sikimese Bhutia had become a minority in their own country and the level of political unrest had become such that New Delhi had to step in and annex Sikkim.

The lesson was not lost on the Bhutanese, who were also exposed to similar immigration pressure from Nepal and where government circles had come to the conclusion - a view shared by many Western specialist of the region - that Bhutan was destined for extinction if decisive measures were not taken to bring to a stop what had become a process of creeping demographic encroachment.

Thus, by the early 1980s, the government of Bhutan started to tighten rules regarding immigration. Likewise, residency requirements regarding the acquisition of citizenship, though still relatively liberal in comparison to those of many Western countries, were made more stringent. Admittance to government service was also restricted to nationals and the use of the national language, Dzongkha, was made mandatory for official business.

These measures were increasingly badly received by the immigrant community and with unrest spreading in southern Bhutan, where most of the newcomers had congregated, the authorities decided to resort to a more radical solution - the wholesale expulsion of immigrants. Thus, between the end of 1990 and 1992, some 100,000 illegal immigrants were expelled from Bhutan.

While there was considerable debate as regards the precise composition of the group, the fact that some 70,000 moved to Nepal, which had no common border with Bhutan as it is separated by a strip of land that is part of India, made a compelling case for them being of Nepali origin. As for the remaining 30,000, they moved to India, where they joined the some four million strong Nepalese community.

While the expulsions were at times brutal, for the half million indigenous inhabitants of Bhutan what was at stake was the cultural survival of the last Tantric Buddhist kingdom in the Himalayas.

Had events been permitted to run their course, the 70,000 who arrived in Nepal would have faded away and the impact of their arrival in a country of some 28.5 million inhabitants which, for all practical purposes was their own, would have passed unnoticed. That events took another turn was due to an odd set of circumstances, namely the failure of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN refugee agency, to properly address the Kurdish crisis in northern Iraq in 1991.

To mitigate censure for her failure, Ogata created, within the UNHCR bureaucracy, a so-called Emergency Response Unit allegedly responsible for ensuring that the refugee agency be capable of responding at short notice to a sudden refugee crisis anywhere in the world.
However, with no further crises in sight but an unemployed emergency unit at hand, the UNHCR bureaucracy became a solution in search of a problem. That problem suddenly emerged in 1992, when the government of Nepal asked the UNHCR to take charge of the group expelled from Bhutan on the grounds that these were "refugees", that is, foreign nationals who had fled persecution in their country of origin.

Normally, the UNHCR, before intervening, would have undertaken a survey of the caseload to determine exactly their nationality and reasons for departure. Had this been undertaken, the inescapable conclusion would have been that the overwhelming majority were actually Nepalese and hence, by the fact that they were in their own country, did not qualifying for refugee status.
But Ogata did not run a tight shop and spurred by the urge to be perceived as active, the UNHCR opened seven camps without undertaking even a semblance of a survey of the arrivals. Over subsequent years, as the UNHCR kept on pouring money into the camps, Bhutan and Nepal embarked on a series of protracted and fruitless discussions as to how to deal with the group.

In 1996, a senior UNHCR official on a visit to Bhutan acknowledged that the UNHCR should never have opened the camps in the first place, with the extenuating explanation that the decision to do so derived from plain stupidity rather than evil intent. But Japanese Ogata was not one to acknowledge her mistakes, and though she visited Bhutan in November 2000, she remained impervious to any recommendations to close the camps.

By the time Ogata left the UNHCR in December 2000, the situation in the camps had undergone a thorough Palestinization and with Nepal dead-set against local integration schemes, no solution appeared in sight other than the prospect of an unending financing for the camps.
Within the UNHCR, it was not a situation with which the hardcore bureaucracy found fault. With the agency's existence justified by the existence of refugees, the incentive was in opening camps rather than closing them and the more refugees to care for so much the better. And when the beneficiaries were not exactly "refugees", the temptation to stretch the rules and thus increase the number of the organization's constituents proved irresistible.

It was only in 2004, with the nomination of a new director for Asia, that the UNHCR started to reconsider the issue. With neither repatriation nor local settlement in the cards, resettlement appeared as the only viable option. Thus, by 2006, following a Canadian initiative, the so-called "Core Group" of countries which had monitored the problem and that included Australia, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and the US, decided that they would all offer resettlement slots to the camp population. With the US ready to accept up to 70 000 and a resettlement rhythm of some 20,000 a year, it was estimated that in four to five years the problem could be solved and the camps closed.

The announcement of the resettlement scheme provoked a major outcry throughout the camps. Fearful of losing their captive constituencies, the various political factions active in the camps, such as the Bhutan Communist Party, the Bhutan Peoples' Party and the Democratic Socialists, supported by exiled movements, launched a massive campaign against resettlement. Riots erupted and in May 2007 three camp inhabitants who had volunteered for resettlement were killed. As for the Nepal government, for whom the camps represented a source of income, it was only after severe pressure from the "Core Group" that it agreed to deliver exit permits to those who had been accepted for resettlement.

While the resettlement selection process proved laborious for most of the camp inhabitants, the opportunity to move to a developed country finally proved irresistible. Thus, this December, the UNHCR announced that 25,000 refugees had signed up for resettlement in the West. The Nepal office of the UNHCR said the US had so far accepted the largest number, 22,060, followed by Australia (1,006), Canada (892), Norway (316), Denmark (305), New Zealand (299) and the Netherlands (122).

With the trend towards resettlement now irreversible, it is only a matter of time before the Bhutan "refugee" issue is brought to its final conclusion.

Article reproduced Courtesy of: Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd.

Please click here to go to the original article.

UNHCR's stand on Bhutanese refugees

2010-07-20T23:39:00.005+09:00

The following paper published on the UNHCR homepage http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a6c08.html probably shows the stand taken by the UNHCR. In most cases, it seems to strike a middle ground between the claims of the refugees and that of the Bhutanese Government; but sometimes it seems to favour the refugees which may be expected as UNHCR needs to justify its decision to help set up the camps in the first place.

Title : The Exodus of Ethnic Nepalis from Southern Bhutan
Publisher
WRITENET
Country
Bhutan
Publication Date
1 April 1995

Cite as
WRITENET, The Exodus of Ethnic Nepalis from Southern Bhutan, 1 April 1995, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a6c08.html [accessed 20 July 2010]

The Exodus of Ethnic Nepalis from Southern Bhutan

1. INTRODUCTION
In 1988, citing concerns about the possibility of a rapidly increasing illegal immigrant population, the Bhutanese authorities began to carry out a census in southern Bhutan to determine citizenship. Shortly after the census began, the Government also introduced a series of measures ostensibly designed to integrate ethnic Nepalis more fully into Bhutanese society. As a result, a series of demonstrations, unprecedented in the country's history, took place in southern districts of Bhutan in September 1990 as thousands of ethnic Nepalis protested about the census and the Government's so-called 'Bhutanization' policies. The Government's response to the demonstrations was reportedly swift and harsh, and the months that followed saw widespread arbitrary arrests, ill-treatment and torture, followed by an exodus from the country of thousands of ethnic Nepalis from southern Bhutan.[1]
2. OVERVIEW OF THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Bhutan is a monarchy, with sovereign power vested in the King. The present King, Jigme Singye Wangchuck (who ascended to the throne in 1972 at the age of 16 and was formally crowned two years later[2]2) is the fourth king of the Wangchuck dynasty in Bhutan. The country has no written constitution.
2.1 The National Assembly
A partially elected National Assembly was established in 1953. It usually meets once or twice a year for a two-week period, although since the problems in the south began it has only met annually, if at all. The last meeting of the National Assembly, its 72nd session, was held in July 1993. As of the time of writing there was no indication of when the 73rd session would take place.
The number of National Assembly members fluctuates around 150. There are usually between 105 and 110 members elected by limited franchise, 12 appointed from the monastic establishment, and the remainder, about 35, are high-level government officials appointed by the King.[3] In the 1991 elections the body consisted of 154 members: 105 indirectly elected representatives, 39 representatives of the Government and 10 representatives of the monastic establishment.[4] Members of the National Assembly serve three-year terms (recently changed from five-year terms), although members can, and often do, serve one or more consecutive terms.[5]
The main functions of the National Assembly are to enact laws, approve senior government appointments, and advise the King on matters of national importance. It also provides a forum for presenting grievances and rectifying cases of maladministration. The King is not in a position to formally veto legislation, but he may return bills to the Assembly for further consideration. The members occasionally have rejected the King's recommendations or delayed their implementation, but in practice the King retains sufficient influence to ensure approval of legislation he considers essential or the withdrawal of proposals he opposes. Government officials may be questioned by the Assembly, and ministers may be forced to resign by a two-thirds majority vote of no confidence.[6]
Representation in the National Assembly of Nepali speaking southern Bhutanese is low. In 1990 the National Assembly is reported to have had just sixteen southern Bhutanese members.[7] In an interview in October 1990 in the Indian newspaper, Sunday, the King conceded that there was insufficient representation of southern Bhutanese in the National Assembly and that the ethnic composition needed to be changed in order to better reflect the ethnic composition of the country,[8] although no such changes appear to have been made to date.
2.2 The Royal Advisory Council and the Council of Ministers
The official functions of the Royal Advisory Council (RAC) are to advise the King on all matters of national importance, to promote the welfare of the people and the country's national interests, to develop good relations between the Government and the people and to ensure that the laws and resolutions passed by the National Assembly are implemented.[9]
Since its establishment in 1965 there have been between eight and ten members in the Royal Advisory Council, and membership currently stands at ten. Of these, six are elected from the National Assembly, two are representatives of the Buddhist clergy and two are appointees of the King. Two of the six National Assembly members are members from southern districts.[10]
Three years after the formation of the RAC the Council of Ministers was established. Presided over by the King, the Council is made up of ministers, deputy ministers (who since 1978 have been appointed by the King) and all members of the RAC.[11]
2.3 Local Administration
Local administration is organized into 20 districts each headed by a district chief appointed by the King and directly responsible to the Ministry of Home Affairs.[12] In 1981, District Development Committees (DDCs) were established as part of a decentralization programme. There are currently twenty such DDCs in the country, encompassing a total of some 560 elected members.[13]
All districts are divided administratively into blocks, which in turn are made up of several villages. Block Development Committees (BDCs) were established in 1991 in all the 196 blocks of villages in the country to promote further decentralization. The 196 BDCs have a total of 2,589 elected members.[14]
Prior to National Assembly sessions, meetings take place at block level, where heads of households are entitled to put forward issues of concern. Issues that cannot be addressed at block level are passed on for discussion at the district level by the DDCs. Issues deemed by these committees to be of national importance are then forwarded for inclusion in the National Assembly agenda.[15]
2.4 International and Domestic Instruments
Bhutan is not a state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide; the Convention on Statutory Limitations of War Crimes; the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, nor the Geneva Conventions, and has not signed the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.[16]
The country is, however, a state party to the 1979 Convention on Discrimination Against Women; the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.[17]
Criminal cases and a variety of civil matters are adjudicated under a 17th century legal code, revised in 1959. Judges are responsible for all aspects of a case, including investigation, filing of charges, prosecution and judgment. The legal system does not provide for jury trials or the right to a court appointed defence counsel. It has no provision for lawyers or solicitors, although it does allow for the appointment of a jabmi (a person well versed in law) if the defendant so desires.[18]
Minor offenses are adjudicated by village headmen and appeals can be made to the district court.[19] More serious cases are dealt with in district courts, of which there are 20, presided over by a magistrate appointed by the King and aided by assistants.[20] There is one high court in the capital, Thimphu. This consists of the chief justice and seven other judges, out of whom three are from southern Bhutan.[21] The high court serves both as a court of appeal against district court decisions and as a special court for matters involving state security. Proceedings are brought before the high court by the Public Prosecutor's office which comes under the Ministry of Home Affairs.[22] There is no law school in Bhutan and during its visit to Bhutan in October 1994 the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention found that none of the judges has a law degree.[23] After appeal to the high court a final appeal may be made to the King.[24]
2.4.1 The Nationality Law of Bhutan, 1958
In 1958 the King granted Bhutanese citizenship to Nepali settlers living in Bhutan by virtue of the Nationality Law of Bhutan, enacted that year.
Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the 1958 Nationality Law set out the conditions for obtaining Bhutanese citizenship, as follows:
3. Any person can become a Bhutanese national:
a) If his/her father is a Bhutanese National and is a resident of the Kingdom of Bhutan; or
b) If any person is born within or outside Bhutan after the commencement of this law provided the previous father is a Bhutanese National at the time of his/her birth.
4 (1) If any foreigner who has reached the age of majority and is otherwise eligible, presents a petition to an official appointed by His Majesty and takes an oath of loyalty according to the rules laid down by the Government to the satisfaction of the concerned official, he may be enrolled as a Bhutanese National, provided that:
a) The person is a resident of the Kingdom of Bhutan for more than ten years; and
b) Owns agricultural land within the Kingdom.
4 (2) If a woman, married to a Bhutanese National, submits a petition and takes the oath of loyalty as stated above to the satisfaction of the concerned official, and provided that she has reached the age of majority and is otherwise eligible, her name may be enrolled as a Bhutanese National.
4 (3) If any person has been deprived of his Bhutanese Nationality or has renounced his Bhutanese Nationality or forfeited his Bhutanese Nationality, the person cannot become a Bhutanese National again unless His Majesty the Druk Gyalpo grants approval to do so.
5 (1) If any foreigner submits petition to His Majesty the Druk Gyalpo according to rules described in the above sections, and provided the person has reached the age of majority and is otherwise eligible, and has performed satisfactorily in Government service for at least five years and has been residing in the Kingdom of Bhutan for at least 10 years, he may receive a Bhutanese Nationality Certificate. Once the certificate is received, such a person has to take the oath of loyalty according to the rules laid down by the Government and from that day onwards, his name will be enrolled as a Bhutanese National.
5 (2) Any foreigner who has reached the age of majority and is otherwise eligible, can receive a Nationality Certificate provided that in the opinion of His Majesty the Druk Gyalpo his conduct and his performance as a Government servant is satisfactory.[25]
Under the law a person shall forfeit their Bhutanese nationality if s/he: becomes a national of a foreign country and lives in that country (Article 6 (a)); has renounced Bhutanese nationality and settled in a foreign country (Article 6 (b)); claims to be a citizen of a foreign country or pledges an oath of loyalty to that country (Article 6 (c)); is registered as a Bhutanese national but has left his agricultural land or has stopped residing in Bhutan (Article 6 (d)); being a bonafide national has stopped residing in the country or fails to observe the laws of the Kingdom (Article 6(e)).[26]
Citizenship is liable to cancellation if it is found to have been obtained under false pretences (Article 7(1)); for engaging in activities against the King or for speaking against the King or the people of Bhutan (Article 7(2)(a)); for assisting the enemy in times of war (Article 7(2)(b)); or if, within a five-year period from being made a Bhutanese National, a person is imprisoned in any country for more than one year (Article 7(2)(c)).[27]
The granting of citizenship in 1958 was notified by royal proclamation. It was not, however, accompanied by any special certification process and there is little evidence that the enactment of the 1958 law made any real practical difference to the population.[28]
2.4.2 The Bhutan Citizenship Act, 1977
With the passing of the 1977 Citizenship Act, the basic principles of the 1958 Act remained unchanged but amendments to the 1958 Act made eligibility criteria more stringent.
Under the 1977 Act the length of unblemished service required before citizenship may be granted is increased to 15 years.[29] For persons not in Government service, citizenship may only be granted after twenty years of residency in Bhutan.[30]
The criteria for spouses of Bhutanese nationals to acquire citizenship are also tightened under the 1977 amendment and they are no longer automatically eligible for citizenship. Spouses who are not Bhutanese nationals are allowed to live in Bhutan, but citizenship has to be applied for.[31] The children of a Bhutanese father and a non-national mother are automatically granted citizenship,[32] but the children of a Bhutanese mother and a non-national father have to apply for citizenship.[33]
New criteria were introduced in the 1977 legislation, namely that all applicants should have some knowledge of both written and spoken Dzongkha, as well as some knowledge of the country's history.[34] This stipulation was especially difficult to meet for ethnic Nepalis in Southern Bhutan. Most ethnic Nepalis had very little contact with northern Bhutanese, and only a small minority of ethnic Nepalis would have any knowledge of the Dzongkha language, even though they may have lived in Bhutan all their lives.[35]
Citizenship can be revoked under the 1977 Act for involvement in activities against the King, speaking against the Government, or association with others involved in anti-government activities,[36] and for presenting false information when applying for citizenship.[37]
Two years after the 1977 Act came into force, the Government embarked upon a three-year census, carried out by district officials and village headmen, following which Citizenship Identity Cards began to be distributed. However, refugees report that distribution had still not been completed when the 1988 census got underway.[38]
2.4.3 The Bhutan Citizenship Act, 1985
The 1985 Citizenship Act tightened up still further the regulations on eligibility for the automatic granting of citizenship. Under this amendment, citizenship by birth is only available to persons whose parents are both Bhutanese citizens (Article 2). Those who have only one parent who is a Bhutanese citizen must apply for citizenship by naturalization. Additional requirements introduced in the 1985 Act are that applicants for citizenship must demonstrate proficiency (i.e. "some knowledge" as required in the 1977 Act is no longer sufficient) in speaking, writing and reading Dzongkha (Article 4 (d)) and good knowledge (rather than "some" as required in the 1977 Act) of the culture, customs, traditions and history of Bhutan (Article 4 (e)). Anyone who has been imprisoned for criminal offenses in Bhutan or elsewhere or has spoken or acted against the King, country and people of Bhutan is not eligible to apply for citizenship (Article 4(f) and (g)).[39]
The most contentious provision of the Act is the one which retroactively makes 1958 the cut- off year for determining citizenship and limits the granting of citizenship to those who can prove residence since before 31 December of that year (Article 3).
2.4.4 The Bhutan Marriage Act, 1980
The Bhutan Marriage Act of 1980 sets out a number of conditions concerning marriage between Bhutanese citizens and non-nationals.
In addition to establishing requirements such as that the non-national abide by traditional customs and government orders,[40] the marriage itself is only recognised as valid under Bhutanese law provided two people are present at the wedding to act as guarantors, one of whom must be a Bhutanese citizen.[41]
The Act provides strong disincentives to marriage to a foreigner above and beyond the restrictions on citizenship eligibility of non-national spouses provided for under the 1977 Citizenship Act. Under the 1980 Act, a Bhutanese citizen who marries a foreigner loses the right to government assistance in the form of land, seed, loans and livestock, as well as health benefits.[42] This stipulation was to prove especially disadvantageous in the predominantly ethnic Nepali populated south of the country where agriculture is the primary occupation. If an individual is in the service of the Government, promotion is denied from the day of marriage,[43] and removal from service is mandatory for Bhutanese citizens working in the national defence department or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who marry a non- national.[44] All government funding for education and training terminates upon marriage to a non-national and any expenses incurred up to the day of the marriage must be refunded.[45]
Ethnic Nepali refugees in Nepal contend that this act is discriminatory because of the disparate impact on ethnic Nepalis in southern Bhutan who, because of strict cultural and caste restrictions concerning marriage, commonly seek spouses outside of their home communities, often in Nepal and India. Refugees have also pointed to the unequal application of the act, citing cases of high ranking Drukpa officials who have foreign spouses but who appear to have been exempted from the penalties set out in the Act.[46]
3. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARDS ETHNIC NEPALIS IN SOUTHERN BHUTAN
3.1 Ethnicity and Population
The three main ethnic groups in Bhutan are the Ngalongs, the Sarchops and the ethnic Nepalis. The Ngalongs live mainly in the west of Bhutan and are the dominant political group, while the Sarchops are primarily located in the east. The ethnic Nepalis, known in Bhutan as Lhotshampas (meaning "southerners"), live primarily in the southern districts of Samchi, Dagana, Chirang, Sarbhang, Chhukha and Samdrup Jongkhar. Other ethnic groups include Khengs (often grouped together with the Sarchops), Adhivasi, Birmi, Brokpa, Doya, Lepcha, Tibetan and Toktop. Together, these latter groups are estimated to make up approximately 10 per cent of the population.[47]
The Ngalongs and the Sarchops are Buddhists and the two groups are together called Drukpas (in reference to the followers of the Drukpa Kagyu school of Tibetan Buddhism). Ngalongs and Sarchops speak closely related languages, although the language of the Ngalong, Dzongkha, is the national language. Only a minority of ethnic Nepalis are Buddhists, while the majority practise Hinduism.[48]
Population statistics for Bhutan are a source of considerable controversy and the accuracy of available population data is unclear. No reliable independent data is available and government figures have varied widely over the last fifteen years. In 1979, the Government estimated that the population of the country was 1.2 million. The estimate rose to 1.375 million in 1988, but in 1991 the figure was drastically reduced to 600,000.[49]
The ethnic breakdown of these figures is equally controversial and, although the three main ethnic groups are accepted as together comprising 85-90 per cent of the population, estimates of the percentage of the population represented by each of these groups varies considerably. As an example of the lack of clarity on this issue, Michael Hutt (who believes it is probable that none of the main ethnic groups is in a majority) points out that estimates of the Ngalong population vary from 10 to 28 per cent, the Sarchops from 30 to 40 per cent and the Nepalis from 25 to 52 per cent.[50]
Ethnic Nepalis began to settle in Bhutan in large numbers at the end of the 19th century, when the Dorji family was granted permission to settle immigrants in the south of the country in order to open up the land for cultivation. Most of the settlers were Nepali-speaking Hindus and by 1932 a British army officer is reported to have estimated that about 60,000 had settled in Samchi and Chirang districts in southwest Bhutan.[51]
According to the Government, ethnic Nepalis remained in these two districts until the early 1950s, when they began to occupy the areas of Sarbhang, Geylegphug and Samdrup Jongkhar.[52] The timing of the arrival of Nepalis in Bhutan since then is a highly contentious issue. Most of the refugees in camps in Nepal claim to have settled in the southern districts of Bhutan before 1958 or to trace their ancestry to those early settlers to derive claims of citizenship.[53] However, the government argues that large numbers of Nepalis came to Bhutan as a result of the development activities undertaken under the first Five Year Plan, launched in 1961. The Government suggests that they were brought in either to work on development projects and road construction, or entered as illegal immigrants attracted by better economic prospects in Bhutan. The Government stresses, however, that it was unaware of the scale of immigration until the 1988 census was carried out.[54]
Until the 1950s the Government appears to have paid little attention to developments in the south of the country. It was then that it began to introduce policies which granted ethnic Nepalis greater recognition and involvement in political and administrative life. Some observers suggest that the impetus for this may have come from political developments in neighbouring countries as well as the formation in Assam of the Bhutan State Congress by ethnic Nepalis in 1952.[55] Regardless of the Government's motives, however, the mid- to late-1950s saw a distinct change in the Government's policy towards ethnic Nepalis living in the south of the country, at the same time as the King began to bring Bhutan out of its isolation and to implement development policies. Not only were they for the first time granted citizenship, but ethnic Nepalis were also represented in the National Assembly.[56] In addition, ethnic Nepalis began to be admitted into the bureaucracy, the army and the police, and were made members of the cabinet and the judiciary.[57] Recognition was also given to the Nepali language, as well as to the festivals, customs, dress and traditions of ethnic Nepali southern Bhutanese.[58]
From the late 1970s there was another shift in the Government's approach which signalled a growing unease among the political leadership of Bhutan about the ethnic Nepali population in the south of the country. Legislation, such as the 1980 Marriage Act and the 1977 and 1985 amendments to the Citizenship Act, focused on deterring further immigration, while other policies became more integrationist, with the emphasis on encouraging ethnic Nepalis to adapt to northern Bhutanese practices. For example, in 1978 the National Assembly adopted a policy which provided for a payment of 5,000 ngultrum (Nu.) as an incentive for marriage between ethnic Nepalis and northern Bhutanese (this figure was increased in 1990 to Nu. 10,000, although the low take-up rate led to the policy being stopped the following year.)[59] And in the early 1980s ethnic Nepalis in government service began to be required to undergo training in driglam namzha (a code of values, dress and etiquette based on northern Bhutanese traditions), learn some Dzongkha, and wear the Ngalong dress when engaged in official duties.
Despite these efforts by the Government, by the late 1980s the ethnic Nepali population in southern Bhutan remained culturally distinct from the rest of society, and there was no indication that the Government's integrationist policies were achieving the desired effect. It was in this context that the Government initiated a census to determine citizenship, and to implement a series of more rigorous policies to integrate ethnic Nepalis into the northern Bhutanese culture.
3.2 The 1988 Census
The census of 1988 which was carried out only in the southern districts of Bhutan, used the criteria set out in the 1985 Citizenship Act to identify Bhutanese nationals. The census placed the population into one of seven categories:
F1 Genuine Bhutanese citizens.
F2 Returned migrants (people who left Bhutan and then returned).
F3 "Drop out" cases, i.e. people who were not around at the time of the census.[60]
F4 A non-national woman married to a Bhutanese man.
F5 A non-national man married to a Bhutanese woman.
F6 Adoption cases (children who have been legally adopted).
F7 Non-nationals, i.e. migrants and illegal settlers.
Although the way in which the census was conducted varied in different areas (some districts and villages are said not to have experienced the complications and harassment that others did) the census ran into controversy almost immediately.[61] Not only was there no clear indication given by census officials about the implications of being placed in any of the seven categories,[62] there were also consistent reports that the census was being carried out in an arbitrary fashion,[63] and that the standards being applied for proof of citizenship were unduly rigorous.[64]
In accordance with the 1985 Citizenship Act the census required ethnic Nepalis to provide documentary evidence of their residence in the country in 1958. The standards set for proving residence were extremely strict and in some areas no account appears to have been taken of the difficulties that the production of appropriate documentation would pose for a largely illiterate people in a country that has only recently adopted basic administrative procedures.[65] In some cases it has been suggested that appropriate documentation simply would not exist. It has also been pointed out, for example, that the Home Ministry did not exist until 1968, and that prior to this census records were held by village headmen who did not keep accurate and comprehensive records.[66] Although comprehensive systems for enumeration in the census records only date back to 1972, it was only in 1977 that proper documentation providing proof of payment of land taxes was instituted.[67] Furthermore, in some districts and villages no provision was made for village elders and headmen to vouch for people they knew to be citizens but who lacked the relevant paperwork, as had been permitted in the past.[68] Census teams are also said to have refused to accept as evidence of residence relevant documentation for the years prior to 1958.[69]
Even those ethnic Nepalis who were able to produce what they believed to be evidence of their eligibility to be granted F1 status were exempted under the very strict guidelines used by the census teams. Many ethnic Nepalis who possessed citizenship certificates issued by district officials under the provisions of the 1958 Nationality Law found these declared null and void unless they could produce documents proving at least residence, and often land ownership, prior to 1958.[70] Others who possessed the citizenship identity cards that had begun to be distributed following the previous census, were similarly classified as non- nationals or "illegal immigrants".[71] Many refugees have complained that when they provided relevant documentation it was frequently seized or confiscated by the census or other local officials.[72]
Even when people were able to supply the documentation required, refugees in Nepal complain that impossibly strict standards were set for their acceptance. For example, some said that documentation was rejected for minor spelling differences, or because middle names were spelled out on one document and were given simply as initials in another.[73]
Refugees report further that the results of the categorization were liable to change. In most cases families were advised orally of the decision, and despite being advised initially that their citizenship had been confirmed, in some cases they were subsequently told that they had been declared "illegal immigrants" or non-nationals.[74]
Despite the problems associated with the census, the Government has given no indication that it will be discontinued. In late October 1993 there were reports that the administration had begun evicting alleged non-nationals detected in Chhukha district, and it was announced that another census in Samchi district was to be carried out.[75] Three months earlier, the Home Minister estimated that the census would be continuing until at least 1998.[76]
3.3 "Bhutanization" Policies
There is no doubt that the census caused considerable anxiety among the ethnic Nepali population in southern Bhutan. But this was not the only concern of ethnic Nepalis in the late 1980s. The Government also introduced a series of policies as part of the promotion of the distinct national identity and the "One Nation, One People" theme of the sixth five-year plan, aimed at instilling a greater sense of unity among the population as a whole. Whether or not this was the true intention of the authorities, the policies have had a very different result. In practice, the measures which include the requirement that southern Bhutanese wear traditional northern Bhutanese dress, and the withdrawal of the Nepali language from school curriculums in the south, engendered a growing sense of anxiety, resentment and alienation among the ethnic Nepali population, culminating in unprecedented demonstrations in the south of the country in late 1990.[77]
In January 1989, the King issued a decree which required all citizens to observe driglam namzha, the traditional northern Bhutanese code of values, dress and etiquette. The most controversial element of this was the requirement that everyone wear the traditional costume of the Drukpa people (for men this means wearing the gho, a one-piece tunic, while women have to wear a kira, a one-piece dress) clothes commonly worn in the north, but seldom seen in the south of the country.[78]
The introduction of this requirement was regarded by ethnic Nepalis as a clear attack on their cultural identity. Resentment quickly grew as the policy was implemented. On-the-spot fines or imprisonment for a week were the penalties for failure to comply with the new dress code, and the police, who were permitted to keep 50 per cent of the fine as an incentive to enforce the policy, did so rigorously. The Government has since accepted that the policy was overzealously applied, and enforcement of the decree has since become lax, although it is still being observed during office hours in southern towns like Phuntsholing and Geylegphug.[79]
Concern among ethnic Nepalis about the threat to their cultural identity implied by the application of driglam namzha was heightened still further in February 1989 when the Nepali language was removed from the curriculum in schools in the south of the country.[80] The Director of Education claimed that the decision was taken on purely educational grounds, in response to a UNICEF report which suggested that the requirement for southern schoolchildren to study three languages -- Nepali, Dzongkha and English -- was hampering overall levels of achievement.[81] Nevertheless, the timing of the decision ensured that it was perceived as a further attack on ethnic Nepali southern Bhutanese culture.
4. RESPONSE BY THE ETHNIC NEPALIS
4.1 Petition to the King and Demonstrations
As the census went on and the "Bhutanization" programmes continued, unrest grew as a result of what was perceived by the population in the south as an attempt by the Government to oust ethnic Nepalis and impose an alien culture. The widespread anxiety about the census was formally voiced in a petition to the King, submitted in April 1988 by two southern Bhutanese members of the Royal Advisory Council, Tek Nath Rizal and B. P. Bhandari. The petition raised concerns about the way in which the census was being carried out and about the retroactive application of the 1985 Citizenship Act, and urged the intervention of the King to remedy the situation. Far from achieving the desired result, the petition was declared seditious and against Tsa-Wa-Sum (the three elements of King, Country and People). Tek Nath Rizal was briefly detained, and the census operation continued as before. (Tek Nath Rizal was sentenced to life imprisonment in November 1993. Three days after he was sentenced he was granted a pardon by the King. However, the pardon is conditional on the Governments of Bhutan and Nepal resolving the issue of ethnic Nepali southern Bhutanese refugees living in refugee camps in Nepal.)[82]
Disaffection among ethnic Nepalis also resulted in the politicization of at least a small sector of the ethnic Nepali population, and various political groups were formed, both in Bhutan and in Nepal, which set up discussion groups and circulated anti-government literature. One of the first of these was the Peoples Forum for Human Rights (PFHR), established in Nepal by Tek Nath Rizal and others in July 1989.[83]
By early 1990 discontent was widespread in the south of the country and the Government began to attribute criminal acts to people whom the Government labelled ngolops or "anti- nationals". Initially, their activities are reported to have centred on extortion and the stripping of people wearing northern Bhutanese dress. From mid-1990 the "anti-nationals", said by the Government to include members of the Bhutan People's Party (BPP), are alleged to have engaged in more serious crimes such as the murder and kidnapping of civilians, including census officers and other government officials.[84]
In September and October 1990, resentment of government policies erupted in a series of unprecedented public demonstrations throughout the south by thousands of ethnic Nepalis. The demonstrations, which in some districts continued for days, were reportedly organised by the BPP, together with the PFHR and the Students Union of Bhutan.[85] Although in the main peaceful, there were incidents involving material damage and violence, such as the destruction of census records and the stripping of local officials wearing ghos.[86] The Government responded by calling the protesters "anti-nationals" who were guilty of treason,[87] and banning the BPP, accusing it of responsibility for violent attacks on people and property.[88]
4.2 "Anti-National" Activities
Following the demonstrations there were increasing reports in the country's only newspaper, Kuensel, of criminal acts being committed in the south of the country, attributed to "anti- nationals". These ranged from murder, kidnapping and rape, to threats to local officials, harassment of teachers and students, and robbery and assaults on civilians. In addition, "anti- nationals" were blamed for attacks on property in the south of the country, including schools and private homes.[89]
It is generally accepted that a wide range of crimes have been committed in southern Bhutan since the beginning of the unrest.[90] In some cases so-called "anti-nationals" do appear to have been responsible for these acts. However, it is by no means clear that government opponents are to blame in all cases, and the Government's claim that "most of the terrorist raids are being carried out by terrorist groups sent from the refugee camps in Nepal"[91] is not substantiated. In fact, as the U.S. Department of State points out, it appears that a large number of the attacks the Government has identified as incidents of terrorism have in fact been the work of criminal gangs taking advantage of unsettled conditions on the Indo-Bhutan border.[92]
5. CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEMONSTRATIONS
5.1 Arbitrary Arrest, Ill-Treatment and Torture
In the aftermath of the demonstrations there were consistent reports of widespread human rights violations, including arbitrary arrest, ill-treatment and torture, being committed against ethnic Nepali southern Bhutanese. Anyone suspected of involvement in, or support of, "anti- national activity" was a target, as were the families of people thought to have been involved in protest of any kind. In some cases the violations were simply carried out in retaliation to the protests. In others, the violations, or the threat of such, appear to have been deliberately aimed at forcing ethnic Nepalis to leave the country.
Amnesty International reports that from late 1990 raids on the homes of Nepali speaking southern Bhutanese became common. During the raids families were questioned about their involvement in the September 1990 demonstrations and about their links with the BPP. Suspects were arrested. Those detained were held in poor conditions either at the district jail or local school (all schools in the south were closed following the demonstrations and many of them were converted into army barracks or detention centres) and kept for periods ranging from one week to 12 months without charge or trial. Upon release former prisoners report being warned against involvement in "anti-national" activity and threatened with rearrest. Others say that they were released only on condition that they leave the country.[93]
In some cases the Government is said to have arrested and ill-treated prominent figures in local communities to intimidate others into leaving the country so as to avoid a similar fate. For example, following the refusal in late 1991 by the inhabitants of Lamidara in Chirang district to leave the country, three respected community figures were arrested and tortured. Following this, some 500 households in Lamidara, almost the whole population, filled out emigration forms.[94]
Many of those detained were ill-treated and tortured and several prisoners are reported to have died in detention during 1991 as a result of ill-treatment or torture or due to receiving either inadequate medical treatment or no treatment at all for illnesses contracted during imprisonment.[95]
In a survey carried out in the refugee camps in Nepal between May and July 1993, 95 male torture victims confirmed that severe beating and kicking was the most common method of torture. Beatings were frequently carried out with bamboo canes or wooden sticks, but also with iron rods, electric wire, belts, whips, rifle butts, bayonets, roots of trees and thorn branches. The men also described being subjected to a variety of other torture techniques, as well as cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.[96]
From the evidence it appears that abuse by government forces peaked during the eighteen months following the September 1990 disturbances. Amnesty International points out that reports of gross human rights violations declined "significantly" from about mid-1992 onwards.[97] The findings of the survey appear to bear this out, with 86 of the 95 torture victims interviewed claiming to have been tortured during 1990 and 1991.[98]
Following the demonstrations another form of gross human rights abuse being perpetrated was rape. Amnesty International reports having received numerous allegations of rape of women by army personnel. Some of the victims are said to have died as a result of being raped.[99]
5.2 Other Human Rights Violations
For approximately eighteen months after the demonstrations ethnic Nepalis were at the greatest risk of gross physical abuse. Experience of such treatment, or the threat or fear of being subjected to it, was commonly cited by refugees who left the country during this period as the primary motivation for doing so. Since then, the level of serious physical abuse has declined significantly, although cases of torture and ill-treatment in police stations and prisons in the south continue to be reported.[100] The arrest of ethnic Nepalis also continues, albeit on a much smaller scale, but refugees state that many of those who are detained are released only after specifically agreeing to leave the country.[101] As of late 1993, in spite of the release in amnesties of over 1500 suspected government opponents, about 200 "anti-nationals" were still in detention pending trial on charges related to political unrest in southern Bhutan.[102] During their visit to Bhutan in October 1994 the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention visited Chemgang Central Jail which then held 148 prisoners. Of these 36 had been convicted under the National Security Act, 1992, 51 were charged with having committed offenses under the Act and the other 61 were awaiting commencement of proceedings against them under the Act.[103] The Working Group reported that in the course of its interviews at Chemgang Central Jail it found that in many instances people had been detained for years without having been charged and that persons who had been charged had not been brought before a judge for trial. In most instances those charged did not know when they might be tried.[104]
In the main, however, the methods of persecution of ethnic Nepalis have changed. Where previously they were at risk of arbitrary arrest, ill-treatment and torture, including rape, from about mid-1992 onwards ethnic Nepalis were increasingly coming under different forms of pressure to leave the country. Reasons for departure now more commonly cited include forcible eviction, the destruction of houses and harassment and intimidation by local authorities. This despite a royal decree issued in January 1992 making it a criminal offence to force any genuine citizens to leave the country, and reports that some district officials in the south have been prosecuted for intimidation and corruption.[105] The continuing denial of public services, increasing depopulation in the south of the country, and the wish to be reunited with family members who have already left the country are also reasons for departure given by refugees arriving in Nepal.
The census operation, which is continuing in southern Bhutan, is another reason why ethnic Nepalis are still leaving the country. Refugees interviewed by Amnesty International in November 1993 reported that the census continues to be carried out unfairly and improperly and described a variety of abuses associated with the census. These include the confiscation of citizenship identity cards and land tax receipts, and being threatened with imprisonment or a fine for failure to leave the country within days of a negative citizenship decision being made. The census also continues to be carried out arbitrarily. For example, one refugee reported being classified as a non-national simply because his parents and brother had left the country. In some cases people who were told that they were classified as genuine Bhutanese citizens have subsequently been deprived of citizenship on the basis of a decision by a local government official. In others, married couples have been forced to leave Bhutan after they were put in different categories by the census teams, even when one of them was confirmed as a Bhutanese citizen.[106] In 1993 there were also reports that additional administrative obstacles, such as alterations to the way in which land deeds are numbered, have been placed in the way of ethnic Nepalis seeking to provide proof of land ownership to the census teams.[107]
Another means by which ethnic Nepalis are being forced to leave the country, and a method cited by an increasing number of refugees during 1993, is the revocation of their citizenship under the provision of the 1985 Citizenship Act concerning citizens who have been "shown by act or speech to be disloyal in any manner whatsoever to the King, country, and people of Bhutan" (Article 6(c)).[108]
Refugees also report being coerced into signing so-called "voluntary migration forms", stating that they are selling their land and leaving the country of their own free will, under the threat of large fines or imprisonment if they failed to comply.[109] Many acknowledge that they did receive some compensation for their land, although others did not, but almost all stress that any money they received was well below the market value. More importantly, though, they all confirm that they felt they had no choice but to sign the forms. Occasionally, refugees report that they were videotaped signing the forms. One refugee said that after the camera was turned off officials made various "deductions" which left him with no money.[110] Another refugee, who was told during the census that he could not stay in the country because his brother had already left, said that a pistol was held against his back while he made a statement in front of the video saying he would not return to Bhutan.[111] Amnesty International reports that journalists and visitors to Bhutan have been shown videos of ethnic Nepalis signing the forms as proof that those involved left the country of their own volition.[112] Human rights organizations report that the practice of the forced signing of "voluntary migration forms" continues.[113]
There are also reports of ethnic Nepalis being forced by the authorities to leave Bhutan in retaliation for criminal activities perpetrated by others. In some instances interviewees described whole village blocks (a group of between three and six villages) of families, who were recognised as Bhutanese citizens, being nonetheless forced out en masse, apparently in retaliation for a robbery or an attack on a local government official attributed by the authorities to "anti-national" elements.[114]
On a day-to-day basis ethnic Nepalis are also liable to be subjected to lower level harassment, such as the repeated checking of documents. For example, during December 1993 there were reports of security forces visiting houses in Gaylegphug, Sarbhang district, at night and demanding to check identification documents.[115]
As the number of ethnic Nepalis who have left Bhutan has increased, so the depopulation of villages in the south of the country has become an increasingly serious problem for those who remain. Without community support, such as the joint maintenance of irrigation canals and assistance with sowing and harvesting, and the lack of common security against criminals, it can be extremely difficult for isolated households to survive on their own, with the result that in some cases they opt to leave and seek refuge in Nepal.[116]
Although depopulation is causing considerable hardship for ethnic Nepalis in southern Bhutan, the Government's response, through the settlement of northern Bhutanese in areas formerly inhabited by ethnic Nepalis, is a matter of some concern, and could have serious implications for any future repatriation programme. Resettlement does not yet appear to be happening on a large scale, but there is evidence that resettlement is already taking place in some parts of southern Bhutan, for example in Samdrup Jongkhar district. There have also been reports that land in Samdrup Jongkhar, Chirang and Samchi districts, left vacant by ethnic Nepalis who have sought refuge in Nepal, is being made available to northern Bhutanese at very low prices.[117] The statement by the Home Minister in the 1993 session of the National Assembly, when he confirmed that a nationwide survey of suitable land for resettlement of landless people was then in progress,[118] indicates that the Government plans to increase the rate of resettlement.
5.3 Denial of Public Services
A number of other government initiatives that discriminate against ethnic Nepali southern Bhutanese have created additional hardship for them since the 1990 demonstrations. Many of these are still in operation today.
One of the most controversial of these initiatives was the introduction of "No Objection Certificates" (NOCs), documents issued by the police which confirm that the bearer has no involvement in "anti-national activity". Following the unrest in the south of the country prompted by the census operation and the Government's "Bhutanization" policies, possession of an NOC became mandatory for ethnic Nepalis who wished to gain admission to schools, be eligible for scholarships to study outside Bhutan, get jobs in the civil service and places on training courses, as well as in order to obtain business and trading licenses and travel documents. Farmers also required an NOC in order to access their earnings from cash crops, the sale of which is government controlled.[119] Refugees report that it was virtually impossible for ethnic Nepali southern Bhutanese to obtain NOCs.[120]
The Government claims that, on command of the King, the NOC requirement for school admissions was dropped in 1992.[121] However the NOC is still reported to be required for ethnic Nepalis seeking government employment and training, or to travel abroad.[122] Ethnic Nepalis are also said to be denied the necessary documents to enable them to travel within the country, thereby denying them educational and employment opportunities.[123]
It is unclear to what extent public services in the south of the country, many of which were suspended in the wake of the 1990 demonstrations, have been restored as Government statistics on this are challenged by refugee groups. For example, as of mid-1993 the Government claimed that sixty-four schools had been reopened,[124] but refugee sources claim that only twenty-four schools were then in operation. According to these sources, of the twenty-four, nine are in parts of the south without ethnic Nepali populations, while admission to the remainder is said to be restricted to children of members of the security forces, government officials, etc.[125]
6. NEPAL-BHUTAN TALKS
Talks between the governments of Bhutan and Nepal on the refugee issue have been continuing since November 1992, although progress has been slow and the signs are that it has by and large been Nepal that has made the concessions necessary to keep the talks going. The first major breakthrough in the talks occurred in July 1993 when a joint statement was signed announcing the formation of a six-member Joint Ministerial Level Committee. The joint statement gave the Committee the mandate to "determine the different categories of people in the refugee camps who are claiming to have come from Bhutan" and "to arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement on each category, which will provide a basis for the resolution of the problem".[126] It took a further two months before the committee members were announced.
Progress since then has been disappointing. The first meeting of the Bhutan-Nepal Joint Ministerial Level Committee, headed by the home ministers from both countries, took place in Kathmandu in October 1993. At the meeting the two sides agreed that all the people in the refugee camps in Nepal would be grouped into one of four categories. Since then there have been three more joint ministerial meetings (in February, April and June 1994) but little concrete progress has been made. The Government of Bhutan has refused to agree to Nepal's proposal that an independent panel be set up to categorise the refugees, and instead a bilateral joint verification team is to be established. As yet, however, no agreement has been reached about the criteria that will be used to categorise the refugees, and the fifth meeting, scheduled for September 1994, was postponed because of general elections in Nepal held in November.
A sixth meeting of bilateral talks which was held in April 1995 concluded without an agreed date for the next meeting.
The four categories of refugees that have been agreed are:
1. Bonafide Bhutanese, if they have been evicted forcefully
2. Bhutanese who emigrated
3. Non-Bhutanese
4. Bhutanese who have committed criminal acts
Refugee groups and human rights organizations have expressed serious reservations about the agreement on categorization that has been reached between the two governments and about the methods that appear likely to be used to implement it.[127] If eligibility for return is based on Bhutanese citizenship laws (and the nature of the four categories clearly implies that this is so) this will certainly raise serious problems, not least because some of the provisions contained in Bhutan's citizenship laws conflict with international law. Therefore, if Bhutan's domestic laws are used to define eligibility, they are likely to result in people who are entitled under international law to return to their own country (for example, those who signed "voluntary migration forms" and so-called "anti-nationals", who would presumably be placed in category 2 and category 4, respectively) finding themselves denied citizenship and therefore the right to return. Clarification of the criteria to be used to classify refugees into the four groups must therefore be sought at the earliest opportunity.
Even as far as category 1 is concerned, there is no clarity about the criteria that will be used to determine who will be defined as belonging to this category. If the criteria are the same as those used during the census operation to define citizenship then all the problems associated with that will arise again. Indeed the difficulties will be compounded for refugees, many of whom have had what documentation they possessed confiscated prior to leaving the country.
Finally, if Bhutanese law is used to determine eligibility for return to Bhutan a crucial question that needs to be addressed is what will happen to ethnic Nepali southern Bhutanese who are denied the right to return and who will have no claim to nationality or right to live in any other country. There is thus a very real danger that the process as it now stands is likely to result in a large number of refugees being rendered stateless.
7. CONCLUSION
The slow pace of progress of the Nepal-Bhutan government talks means that there is still some way to go before an end to the refugee crisis will be in sight. However, the situation as it stands leaves considerable room for an unsatisfactory resolution to the crisis unless certain key issues are addressed.
First, as far as the refugees in Nepal are concerned, the priority must be to clarify the categorization process agreed by the Bhutan and Nepal governments before any screening of refugees begins, and to ensure that eligibility will be defined according to international law and not simply in accordance with Bhutanese domestic legislation. However, for as long as talks continue on a bilateral basis only, it is questionable whether this will be achieved. Bhutan seems to be under no great pressure, and is therefore in no great rush, to resolve the matter, while Nepal would no doubt like to see the refugee crisis resolved as soon as possible.
If a third party were introduced into the equation, there is a chance that further backsliding could be avoided and a fair and safe resolution to the crisis could be achieved. The Government of Nepal has, since talks with Bhutan on the matter began, indicated that it would seek India's good offices to resolve the issue in the event that Nepal and Bhutan were unable to resolve the matter bilaterally, and this was reiterated in October 1994 by the then- prime minister (of Nepal) Girija Prasad Koirala. Most observers argue that India holds the key to the solution of the crisis and that its considerable influence over both Bhutan and Nepal can be used to press for progress to be made. However, it does not appear that India is prepared to get involved, and indeed it has repeatedly stressed that it regards the issue as a bilateral one, to be sorted out by the governments of Bhutan and Nepal. A solution to the issue at hand may thus be to engage the involvement of either a third government to act as arbiter, or an independent third party to act as intermediary.
Even if this were to occur, and in the event that a determination process gets under way that accords with international law, the matter of the human rights situation in Bhutan still needs to be resolved. From the evidence of refugees arriving in the camps it is clear that the persecution of ethnic Nepalis by the Bhutanese authorities continues. Before any of the refugees are repatriated it seems imperative that the Government of Bhutan undertakes to end state-sanctioned persecution and to offer guarantees for the safety and security of returning refugees and of ethnic Nepalis who remain in the country. Before repatriation begins the problems associated with the on-going census operation should also be addressed, and there should be an immediate halt to continuing forcible eviction of ethnic Nepalis. The resettlement of northern Bhutanese in areas formerly inhabited by the refugees should also cease.
8. BIBLIOGRAPHY
AHURA (Association of Human Rights Activists, Bhutan).
Bhutan: A Shangri-la Without Human Rights. Jhapa [Nepal], June 1993
Amnesty International.
Bhutan: Human Rights Violations against the Nepali-speaking Population in the South. AI Index: ASA 14/04/92. London, December 1992
Amnesty International.
Bhutan: Appeal for the Release of Tek Nath Rizal. AI Index: ASA 14/02/94. London,
March 1994

Amnesty International.
Report 1994. London, 1994
Amnesty International.
Bhutan: Forcible Exile. AI Index: ASA 14/04/94. London, August 1994
Aziz-al Ahsan, Syed and Chakma, Bhumitra.
"Bhutan's Foreign Policy: Cautious Self-Assertion, Asian Survey, vol. XXXIII, no. 11 (November 1993)
Bhutan Department of Information.
Anti-National Activities in Southern Bhutan: An Update on the Terrorist Movement. Thimphu [Bhutan], 12 August 1992
Bhutan Ministry of Home Affairs.
The Southern Bhutan Problem: Threat to a Nation's Survival. Thimphu [Bhutan], May 1993
The Bhutan Review Monthly [Lalitpur, Nepal],
"Schools Reopened in Southern Bhutan?". May 1993
The Bhutan Review Monthly,
"Build-Up to the 73rd Session of the National Assembly". August 1994
The Bhutan Review Monthly,
"'Amnesty' to Prisoners". September 1994
Dhakal, D.N.S., and Strawn, C.
Bhutan: A Movement in Exile. Jaipur: Nirala Publications, 1994
Dubble, C.
Survey of Victims of Violence in the Bhutanese Refugee Camps in Eastern Nepal (May-July 1993). N.p., July 1993
Far East and Australasia 1994,
Europa Publications Ltd
HUROB (Human Rights Organization of Bhutan).
Annual Report 1992. Lalitpur [Nepal], 10 December 1992
HUROB.
Annual Report 1993. Lalitpur [Nepal], 10 December 1993
HUROB.
Letters to the author, 27 August 1994 and 5 October 1994
Hutt, M.
"Bhutan's Crisis of Identity" in The World Book Year Book. London. 1994
Hutt, M.
"Refugees from Shangri-la" in Index on Censorship, vol. 22, no. 4, (April 1993)
INHURED (International Institute for Human Rights Environment and Development).
Bhutan: An Iron Path to Democracy. Kathmandu, January 1992
INHURED.
Bhutanese Refugees: Destitutes without Destination. A Documentation of Human Rights Violations in the Kingdom of Bhutan. Kathmandu, February 1993
The Kathmandu Post.
"Bhutanese Refugees: One Year of Talks". 30 April 1994
Kuensel [Thimpu],
National Assembly Supplement, "The Proceedings and Resolutions of the 72nd Session of the National Assembly (8-30 July 1993), 7 August 1993
Parmanand.
The Politics of Bhutan: Retrospect and Prospect. Delhi: Pragati Publications, 1992
SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation).
The Bhutan Tragedy When Will It End?. Kathmandu, May 1992
Thronson, D. B.
Cultural Cleansing: A Distinct National Identity and the Refugees from Southern Bhutan. Kathmandu: INHURED, August 1993
UN Commission on Human Rights.
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. Visit to Bhutan (E/CN.4/1995/31/Add.3). Geneva, 16 December 1994
U.S. Department of State.
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993: Bhutan. Washington D.C., 1994 [electronic format].

The views expressed in the papers are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of UNHCR.

[1]Although the flow of refugees has diminished considerably since 1993, the slow but steady trickle of ethnic Nepalis into Nepal, and the testimonies they provide, are evidence that they continue to face persecution in Bhutan, albeit the methods have changed.
[2]Far East and Australasia 1994, Europa Publications Ltd, p. 134.
[3]D.N.S. Dhakal and C. Strawn, Bhutan: A Movement in Exile, (New Delhi, 1994), p. 88
[4]According to the Bhutanese newspaper, Kuensel, 28 September 1991, quoted in D.N.S. Dhakal and C. Strawn, Bhutan: A Movement in Exile, p. 88
[5]D.N.S. Dhakal and C. Strawn, Bhutan: A Movement in Exile, p. 93
[6]U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993, Bhutan. Washington D.C., 1994 [electronic format]
[7]M. Hutt, 'Refugees from Shangri-la' in Index on Censorship [London] (April 1994), p. 11
[8]Parmanand, The Politics of Bhutan: Retrospect and Prospect, (Delhi: Pragati Publications, 1992), pp. 60-61, citing Sunday [Calcutta], 'The People will Decide: King Jigme Singye Wangchuck on the future of Bhutan', 28 October 1990
[9]D.N.S. Dhakal and C. Strawn, Bhutan: A Movement in Exile, p. 99, citing Dorji, Rigzin. 1989. A Brief Religious, Cultural and Secular History of Bhutan. Asia Society Galleries: New York, p. 13
[10]D.N.S. Dhakal and C. Strawn, Bhutan: A Movement in Exile, p. 98
[11]D.N.S. Dhakal and C. Strawn, Bhutan: A Movement in Exile, p. 100 quoting Parmanand, p. 54
[12]UN Commission on Human Rights. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. Visit to Bhutan (E/CN.4/1995/31/Add.3). Geneva, 16 December 1994, paragraph 10
[13]Bhutan Ministry of Home Affairs, The Southern Bhutan Problem: Threat to a Nation's Survival, (Thimphu [Bhutan], May 1993), p. 20
[14]Ibid.
[15]Parmanand, The Politics of Bhutan: Retrospect and Prospect, p. 60
[16]UNHCR/CDR Legal Databases, April 1995
[17]UNHCR/CDR Legal Databases, April 1995
[18]U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993, Bhutan. Washington D.C., 1994 [electronic format]
[19]UN Commission on Human Rights. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. Visit to Bhutan (E/CN.4/1995/31/Add.3). Geneva, 16 December 1994, paragraph 14(a)
[20]Ibid, paragraph 14(b)
[21]Bhutan Department of Information, Anti-National Activities in Southern Bhutan: An Update on the Terrorist Movement, p. 43. These figures do not tally with those given in the report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention which states that the high court consists of six judges. See UN Commission on Human Rights. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. Visit to Bhutan (E/CN.4/1995/31/Add.3). Geneva, 16 December 1994, paragraph 14(c)
[22]UN Commission on Human Rights. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. Visit to Bhutan (E/CN.4/1995/31/Add.3). Geneva, 16 December 1994, paragraph 14(c)
[23]ibid., paragraph 27
[24]Ibid, paragraph 8
[25]The text of the Nationality Law of Bhutan, 1958, is reproduced from the text as it appears in Bhutan Ministry of Home Affairs. The Southern Bhutan Problem, Appendix Two. References are to numbered paragraphs (articles) in this text.
[26]Ibid.
[27]Ibid.
[28]D.B. Thronson, Cultural Cleansing: A Distinct National Identity and the Refugees from Southern Bhutan, (Kathmandu: INHURED International, August 1993), pp. 14-15
[29]The text of the Bhutan Citizenship Act, 1977, is reproduced from the text as it appears in Bhutan Ministry of Home Affairs. The Southern Bhutan Problem, Appendix Two. References are to numbered paragraphs within sections identified by letter combinations (KA, KHA etc.). Conditions Required for the Grant of Citizenship, KA 1".
[30]Conditions Required for the Grant of Citizenship, KA 2.
[31]Procedure for Acquisition of Citizenship, CHA 1 and 2.
[32]Procedure for Acquisition of Citizenship, CHA2.
[33]Procedure for Acquisition of Citizenship, CHA 1.
[34]Conditions Required for the Grant of Citizenship, KA 3.
[35]D.N.S. Dhakal and C. Strawn, Bhutan: A Movement in Exile, pp. 172-173
[36]Penalty for Violation of Rules, TA 1
[37]Penalty for Violation of Rules, TA2
[38]HUROB (Human Rights Organization of Bhutan), Annual Report 1992 (Lalitpur [Nepal], 10 December 1992), p. 2
[39]The text of the Bhutan Citizenship Act, 1985, is reproduced from the text as it appears in Bhutan Ministry of Home Affairs. The Southern Bhutan Problem, Appendix Two. References are to numbered sections (articles) in this text.
[40]The Bhutan Marriage Act, 1980, Kha 2-10. References in this section are to numbered paragraphs (Kha 2-1 etc.), of the text of the Act as reproduced in D.B. Thronson, Cultural Cleansing, Appendix 2. Thronson notes that this text is reproduced from SAARC, The Bhutan Tragedy. When Will It End? and is not an official translation by the Bhutanese Government.
[41]Ibid.,Kha 2-1
[42]Ibid.,Kha 2-7
[43]Ibid.,Kha 2-4, Kha 2-5
[44]Ibid.,Kha 2-6
[45]Ibid.,Kha 2-8
[46]INHURED (International Institute for Human Rights Environment and Development), Bhutan: An Iron Path to Democracy, (Kathmandu, January 1992), p. 9
[47]D.N.S. Dhakal and C. Strawn, Bhutan: A Movement in Exile, (New Delhi, 1994), pp. 44 and 49
[48]M. Hutt, 'Bhutan's Crisis of Identity', in The World Book Year Book, (London, 1994), pp. 65-66
[49]D.N.S. Dhakal and C. Strawn, Bhutan: A Movement in Exile, p. 48
[50]M.Hutt, 'Bhutan's Crisis of Identity', p. 66
[51]M. Hutt, 'Refugees from Shangri-la', p. 11
[52] Bhutan Ministry of Home Affairs. The Southern Bhutan Problem, p. 3
[53]D.B. Thronson, Cultural Cleansing: A distinct National Identity and the Refugees from Southern Bhutan, (Kathmandu: INHURED International, August 1993), p. 7
[54]Dawa Tsering, Bhutan's Foreign Minister, quoted in Himal, July/August 1994, p. 22
[55]Ibid.
[56]D.N.S. Dhakal and C. Strawn, Bhutan: A Movement in Exile, p. 143
[57]Ibid, p. 151, citing Sinha, 1991, p. 223
[58]Ibid, p. 152
[59]Syed Aziz-al Ahsan and Bhumitra Chakma, 'Bhutan's Foreign Policy: Cautious Self-Assertion', Asian Survey, vol. XXXIII, no. 11, (November 1993), p. 1050, citing Kuensel, National Assembly Supplement, 2 November 1991, pp. 9-11
[60] Amnesty International, Bhutan: Human Rights Violations Against the Nepali-Speaking Population in the South, According to Amnesty International, this category has been phased out and the people originally placed in this category have been allocated to others, London, December 1992, p. 6
[61]D.N.S. Dhakal and C. Strawn, Bhutan: A Movement in Exile, p. 193
[62]D.B. Thronson, Cultural Cleansing: A Distinct National Identity and the Refugees from Southern Bhutan, (Kathmandu: INHURED International, August 1993), p. 16
[63]D.N.S. Dhakal and C. Strawn, Bhutan: A Movement in Exile, pp. 193-194
[64] D.B.Thronson, Cultural Cleansing: A Distinct National Identity and the Refugees from Southern Bhutan, (Kathmandu: INHURED International, August 1993), p. 18
[65]D.N.S. Dhakal and C. Strawn, Bhutan: A Movement in Exile, pp. 192
[66]INHURED, Bhutan: An Iron Path to Democracy, p. 4
[67]SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), The Bhutan Tragedy. When Will It End?, p. 9
[68]D.N.S. Dhakal and C. Strawn, Bhutan: A Movement in Exile, p. 193
[69]SAARC, The Bhutan Tragedy. When Will It End?, p. 9
[70]M. Hutt, 'Refugees from Shangri-la, p. 10
[71]Amnesty International, Bhutan: Forcible Exile, London, August 1994, p. 7
[72]AHURA (Association of Human Rights Activists, Bhutan), Bhutan: A Shangri-la Without Human Rights. (Jhapa [Nepal], June 1993), p. 24, citing Petition to the King of Bhutan, 9 April 1988
[73]D.B. Thronson, Cultural Cleansing: A Distinct National Identity and the Refugees from Southern Bhutan, (Kathmandu: INHURED International, August 1993), p. 18
[74]Amnesty International, Bhutan: Forcible Exile, p. 7
[75]HUROB (Human Rights Organization of Bhutan), Annual Report 1993, (Lalitpur [Nepal], 10 December 1993), p. 9
[76]Kuensel [Thimpu], National Assembly Supplement, 'The Proceedings and Resolutions of the 72nd Session of the National Assembly (8-30 July 1993), 7 August 1993, p. 8
[77]M. Hutt, 'Bhutan's Crisis of Identity', p. 69
[78]D.B. Thronson, Cultural Cleansing: A Distinct National Identity and the Refugees from Southern Bhutan, (Kathmandu: INHURED International, August 1993), p. 20
[79]U.S Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993: Bhutan, Washington D.C., 1994 [electronic format]
[80]Ibid.
[81]M. Hutt, 'Refugees from Shangri-la', p. 10
[82]Amnesty International believes Tek Nath Rizal to be a prisoner of conscience held for the peaceful exercise of his right to freedom of expression and association. For further information see Amnesty International, Bhutan: Appeal for the Release of Tek Nath Rizal, London, March 1994
[83]The formation of the PFHR was followed in June 1990 by the establishment of the Bhutan People's Party (BPP) and, in February 1992, the Bhutan National Democratic Party (BNDP), which was led by former government officials. Both the BPP and the BNDP have been labelled by the Government as "anti-national organizations" aimed at achieving the political domination of the country by ethnic Nepalis, and they are not allowed to function in Bhutan. Both parties advocate a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary democracy and claim wide support in the south of the country. The most recently formed political party, the Druk National Congress, was founded in Nepal in June 1994. It is unusual in that its membership is made up of northern Bhutanese.
[84]Amnesty International, Bhutan: Human Rights Violations, pp. 10-11
[85]D.B. Thronson, Cultural Cleansing: A Distinct National Identity and the Refugees from Southern Bhutan, (Kathmandu: INHURED International, August 1993), p. 26
[86]M. Hutt, 'Refugees from Shangri-la', p. 12
[87]Ibid, p. 13
[88]U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993, Bhutan. Washington D.C., 1994 [electronic format]
[89]Amnesty International, Bhutan: Human Rights Violations, pp. 10-11
[90]A "Summary of Terrorist Activities" updated as of 17 October 1994, was given to the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention by the Government of Bhutan. See UN Commission on Human Rights. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. Visit to Bhutan (E/CN.4/1995/31/Add.3). Geneva, 16 December 1994, Annex 1
[91]Bhutan Ministry of Home Affairs, The Southern Bhutan Problem, p. 10
[92]U.S Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993, Bhutan, [electronic format]
[93]Amnesty International, Bhutan: Human Rights Violations, pp. 13-14
[94]D.N.S. Dhakal and C. Strawn, Bhutan: A Movement in Exile, p. 259
[95]Amnesty International, Bhutan: Human Rights Violations, p. 21
[96]C. Dubble, Survey of Victims of Violence in the Bhutanese Refugee Camps in Eastern Nepal (May-July 1993), (n.p., July 1993), pp. 7-12
[97]Amnesty International, Bhutan: Forcible Exile, p. 3
[98]C. Dubble, Survey of Victims of Violence, pp. 7-12
[99]Amnesty International, Bhutan: Human Rights Violations, p. 19
[100]Amnesty International, Report 1994, London, 1994, p. 74
[101]The Bhutan Review Monthly [Lalitpur, Nepal], '"Amnesty" to Prisoners', September 1994, p. 1
[102]U.S Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993: Bhutan, [electronic format].
[103]UN Commission on Human Rights. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. Visit to Bhutan (E/CN.4/1995/31/Add.3). Geneva, 16 December 1994, paragraph 20
[104]Ibid., paragraph 21
[105]M. Hutt, 'Refugees from Shangri-la', p. 14, citing Kuensel [Thimpu], 30 November 1992
[106]Amnesty International, Bhutan: Forcible Exile, pp. 9-11
[107]HUROB, Annual Report 1993, p. 9
[108]U.S Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993: Bhutan, [electronic format]
[109]Amnesty International, Bhutan: Forcible Exile, p. 3
[110]D.B. Thronson, Cultural Cleansing, p. 33
[111]Amnesty International, Bhutan: Forcible Exile, p. 15
[112] Ibid., p. 13
[113]Ibid., p. 15 and HUROB, Letter to the author, 27 August 1994
[114]Amnesty International, Bhutan: Forcible Exile, p. 7
[115]HUROB, Annual Report 1993, p. 9
[116]HUROB, Letter to the author, 27 August 1994
[117]HUROB, Letter to the author, 5 October 1994
[118]Kuensel [Thimpu, Bhutan], National Assembly Supplement, 7 August 1993, pp. 17-18
[119]HUROB, Annual Report 1992, p. 14
[120]D.B. Thronson, Cultural Cleansing, p. 24
[121]Kuensel [Thimpu, Bhutan], National Assembly Supplement, 7 August 1993, p. 7
[122]HUROB, Letter to author, 27 August, 1994
[123]The Bhutan Review Monthly [Lalitpur, Nepal], 'Build-Up to the 73rd Session of the National Assembly', August 1994, p. 4
[124]Kuensel [Thimpu, Bhutan], National Assembly Supplement, 7 August 1993, p. 7
[125]The Bhutan Review Monthly [Lalitpur, Nepal] 'Schools Reopened in Southern Bhutan?', p. 4
[126]The Kathmandu Post, 'Bhutanese Refugees: One Year of Talks', 30 April 1994
[127]
Topics: Nepalis, Ethnic persecution, Ethnic discrimination, Mass exodus,

Bhutan: A Kingdom Besieged

2010-07-20T01:58:00.008+09:00

Bhutan: A Kingdom Besieged

Source: Bhutannica

By Jigmi Y. Thinley

Introduction

The "hermit" kingdom has been forcibly shaken out of its cloister. The mystical charm of this tranquil Himalayan sanctuary has been eclipsed by a smog of gloom. Indeed, Bhutan has become a subject of interest to journalists, politicians, academics and the common man alike. While the opinions of scholars on Bhutan will be increasingly, sought and valued, even those who were earlier oblivious to the existence of Bhutan, appear to find in this country a cause to defend or challenge. Bhutan's aspiration to of becoming a mountain paradise of exemplary social harmony and economic prosperity had begun to materialize in a uniquely fertile setting. It is now an elusive dream. The country is engulfed in a crisis, and the very foundations of the last kingdom of ancient Mahayana Buddhism is being shaken.

The situation in the south is not a simple problem. Its causes are as complex and perplexing as the resultant shocking human drama that is unfolding before us. Its roots lie deep within the cultural, historical and political complexes of the indigenous inhabitants, the southern Bhutanese of Nepalese origin and the recent economic migrants from Nepal. It is clear that psychological disorientation, emotional trauma and a sense of insecurity pervades throughout the entire kingdom. Just who is the victim or villain is a valid question. The answer must be sought through a deeper understanding of the problem.

In trying to understand the situation, there is the danger of drawing hasty conclusions on the basis of values and standards which may not be entirely relevant to Bhutan. The problem as such, is at risk of being viewed out of context leading to possible inaccurate conclusions which could, in turn, strengthen one's misconceptions and biases. Yet another obstacle to obtaining the truth in such a case is the spontaneous reasoning that arises out of natural human compassion for those who appear to be innocent victims.

Any one who visits a refugee camp sees in the transparent shelters and living conditions, more than the plight of refugees, the harsh and cruel realities of life and death itself. He sees in it the immediacy of the inescapable "biological trap" of which Hemingway writes so eloquently. It becomes so clearly visible in a sea of humanity, where every man, woman and child is exposed and is there to reveal the cycle of life - of birth, sickness and death. Whether these have anything to do with their being refugees is often unwittingly ignored. But it is this reality that often shocks the visitor and blurs his mental and visual perceptions. He is moved to share an immediate sense of solidarity with the victims while assuming an uncompromising position against any party perceived or alleged to be the perpetrator. Thanks to television, this message is brought home more vividly and with sharper focus.

But the misery of life in a refugee camp can never be understated or denied. It is sad that anyone should suffer the deprivation and despair of a refugee. It is even more tragic that the refugee is often the victim of manipulation in a political struggle the outcome of which may give him no gain but the process of which gives him much suffering.

This paper aims to address the more enquiring mind. It attempts to offer an insight to the problem by facilitating a wider and deeper perspective of the socioeconomic and political aspects of its root causes. It identifies who are the southern Bhutanese and traces their first entry into Bhutan. It examines the various factors and compulsions which account for their departure from Nepal, and attempts to determine the reasons and causes that finally led to the return-migration of those detected to be illegal immigrants to their homeland alongwith a significant number of southern Bhutanese.

The paper is presented in eight sections. Each section deals with a major aspect of the southern Bhutanese problem. Beyond that, the paper examines the legitimacy of the demand for political change by the dissidents and delves into the question of whether there is a hidden agenda. It inquires whether the cause of the unrest could have originated beyond the boundaries of Bhutan and explains why the Bhutanese authorities never had any reason to suspect the uprising of September '90 by the southern citizens. The final section of the paper discusses Bhutan's perception of the problem and the future.

I. THE ORIGIN AND ADVENT OF THE NEPALESE

The Nepalese of southern Bhutan who are known as 'Lhotsampas' among the Bhutanese since the late 1980's originally migrated from Nepal. They include a large number of the ethnic groups of that country which, according to the first king of the united Nepalese nation, Prithvi Narayan Shah, comprised four varnas (caste divisions) and thirty-six jats (tribes/ cultures) during his reign (1743-1775). The problem in southern Bhutan has given cause for speculation on the actual date of entry and the role of the Nepalese in certain major historical events. Some discussion on this subject thus appears to be relevant. What then of the claim that the Nepalese arrived in Bhutan during the reign of the Shabdrung? No Nepalese appear to have even visited Bhutan during the reign of the lst Shabdrung. There is, however, evidence that since the temporal reign of the Deb Minjur Tenpa (1667-1680), Newari craftsmen who were renowned for their artistic skills in metal work were commissioned by Bhutan for execution of religious objects and casting of statues. The Tibetans too employed the Newaris for the same purpose and even minted their coins in Kathmandu long before the unification of Nepal. These artisans have no historical connection with the Nepali speaking people of southern Bhutan.

In attempting to establish a precise entry date of the first Nepalese to enter Bhutan, the reports of Ashly Eden (1863) and David F. Rennie (1864) are particularly illuminating. They, like their preceding compatriots who visited Bhutan, such as Turner, Bogle, etc. speak of the absence of any Nepalese settlements in the foothills. Eden takes special note of their absolute absence. He wrote that 'there were only two grass huts and three or four cattle sheds, few men and a few women, and this constituted the whole garrison and town of Sipchu' (Sibsoo Sub-Division under Samchi District), the site of the first Nepalese arrivals. Later Rennie, who was attached to the British forces also observed that Samchi consisted of 'twenty houses and a monastery' with some Mechis and Bengalese engaged in agriculture.

The first sightings of Nepalese in the southern foothills are reported by Charles Bell in 1904 followed closely by John Claude White in 1905. All Bhutanese records confirm that no Nepalese settled in any part of Bhutan until then. Therefore, since the most authentic source is the Kasho (letter) of authorization from Ugyen Wangchuck who was then the Tongsa Penlop, it is clear that the first and legal arrival of the Nepalese took place at the turn of this century, immediately or soon after the Kasho was issued.

The claim that the Nepalese had a role in safeguarding the sovereignty of the country, is clearly baseless since they did not enter southern Bhutan or any part of the duars area of West Bengal or Assam until long after the Sinchula Treaty with the British was signed. This is corroborated by Eden's report which states that his Nepalese porters, "were unwilling to enter Bhutan, the inhabitants of which were not looked upon with favour ... there the coolies left in considerable numbers being afraid to cross the frontier" (Teesta Bridge). Arthur Foning, a Kalimpong Lepcha, writes that this bore testimony to how effectively the Bhutanese territorial interests were guarded.

It can therefore, be stated emphatically that no Nepalese ever crossed beyond the Teesta river until after 1865, let alone penetrate into Bhutan by which time the boundaries of Bhutan had been redefined and withdrawn far beyond the Teesta river (Kalimpong sub-division) and the fortress of Dalimkot which is now in ruins.

II. THE CONTINUING PHENOMENON OF LARGE SCALE NEPALESE OUT-MIGRATION (EMIGRATION)

· Drawn by red blood are these boundaries
· like enclosures in, every field
· Wherever you look, drawn are the lines
· Like the pigeons encaged
· Men are closed in these traps.
o (Vijay Malla, Translated from Nepali by Michael Hutt)

The migratory habit of the Nepalese is a cultural trait common among the multiple ethnic cultures of Nepal. The theme of the poem (above) is an expression of the conscious or subconscious yearning of the typical Nepalese youth to break out of the cage in which he finds himself entrapped. To the people of this country, who have served and fought battles for foreign nations in many distant lands and who enjoy the facility of free movement across the Indian sub-continent's, the territorial boundaries are cruel barriers. But the boundary is a reality. It is a necessary evil that must be respected.

The disregard for international boundary and spread of the Nepalese cultural area has been the cause of increasing concern for the countries and the states of India to the west, east and south-east of Nepal. Yet if nothing, little appears to have been intended or achieved by the parent state to overcome the compelling circumstances that force the Nepalese to continue their trans-national migratory tradition in search of land and opportunities. This is frustrating the people in the affected areas. It is an established fact that the exodus of out-migration from Nepal in extremely large numbers is a continuing phenomenon which shows no sign of abating. The people of the fragile mountain cultures and economies are thus, seriously concerned. These areas include mainly Assam, the northeastern hill states of India, as well as Burma and Bhutan.
A study on the causes and compulsions for this phenomenon has revealed the following: 1. Political upheavals and economic deprivations: These appear to be the prime cause for the Nepalese to be constantly on the move either within or outside the country. While incessant wars and instability as well as the repressive conditions that prevailed under the Rana regime were valid reasons in the past, the inequalities of development and its failure to reach out to the vast rural populations under the difficult geophysical conditions, give little cause for the villager with the spirit of adventure to stay on. Urged by his free spirit, he thus ventures out to find greener pastures. By modern definition, he is labeled an "economic/migrant refugee".
The first major stimulus to the migratory trade of the Nepalese to venture beyond the boundaries of their country arose in the early 19th century. When Darjeeling was acquired by the East India Company, to build a sanitarium and a difficult road in the late 1830's the Nepalese were recruited in the absence of local labourers. Again, when the tea industry in Darjeeling reached the stage of commercial production in 1856, the Nepalese were the first choice for tea garden labourers. Against the large scale import of Nepalese who settled in the area, the indigenous Lepchas who comprised a small population, faded into an insignificant minority in their own homeland.

After the signing of the Sinchula Treaty of 1865 under which the Bhutanese ceded the Kalimpong sub-division alongwith the 18 duars, the hitherto forbidden land of the Lepchas lay open to the Nepalese. Soon the Lepchas were driven deeper and deeper into the forests while the aggressive, colonizing Nepalese took over the more fertile areas for conversion to permanent agricultural land. Even the forest succumbed to the heavy axe of the "intruders" and " the children of nature, like the birds of the sky" and their culture fell prey to those who are now masters of their homeland. With the destruction of their environment, the Lepchas had lost their habitat and source of sustenance. If not for the effort of certain missionaries, the fragile Lepcha culture and language may perhaps have been lost forever.

What the Lepchas were able to achieve by way of preserving their culture under almost 200 years of Bhutanese rule, they had lost within a few decades after the arrival of the Nepalese. Arthur Foning, a Kalimpong Lepcha in his book "Lepcha, My Vanishing Tribe" laments that "The British may have done this for our good but, as seen later, the result proved to be a complete disaster and a sort of a curse for us Rong-folk". Indeed, as he adds, "the process of disintegration started". The next victims were the "Lho-MonTsong-Sum" or the three races of the Bhutias, the Lepchas and the Limboos of Sikkim. Here again, their combined strength could not withstand the onslaught of the Nepalese agricultural colonialists. To speed up the process, certain Sikkimese noblemen conspired successfully with the Newari merchants and the British to overcome resistance which until 1875 had prevented their penetration. Within 16 years, the proud "Lho-Mon-Tsong-Sum" had become a minority in their own land.

After Sikkim and Kalimpong, the spread of the Nepalese continued across the Bengal Duars where tea gardens and townships were also being established and where they now form a major ethno-political group. It was natural that as they moved further east, Bhutan should fall in their path. However, the areas of southern Bhutan were initially only skimmed as a result of the assertion of strict measures to control entry of Nepalese except by authority of Kazi Ugyen Dorji in accordance with the "Kasho" of Tongsa Penlop.

2. Mercenary role: This tradition was established soon after the Anglo Nepal war of 1814-1816 during which the Nepalese proved their military prowess and gallantry in war. Independent India continues with the tradition while the British on their part, maintain a separate arrangement. This is, perhaps, the main influencing factor that has nurtured and sustained the migratory spirit. The fact that, until recently, the recruits came from the remotest villages had a profound impact on the migrant farmers. To this reason may be attributed the boldness, even in the simple villager to leave the safety of the village threshold and cross the national boundary to traverse fearlessly and settle in difficult and strange lands often against strong local resistance.
On the subject of the Nepalese martial characteristics, it may be said that the Rajputs of Chitor who once ruled over almost all the principalities of Nepal had a major influence over the indigenous inhabitants of the country. On the other hand, the Gurungs and the Tamangs are themselves descendants of the imperial Tibetan armies that were once posted on the Tibetan frontiers with Nepal.

Furthermore, their role in the Indian and British armies and the 2nd World War have had a decisive influence on their settlement across the entire length and breadth of India and even as far as Burma and beyond. The exact Nepalese population in India is not ascertainable, but it is generally known that in a more or less continuous belt from Himachal to the eastern most hill state of India where there is a concentration of their population, the number is close to 10 million. With the facility of free movement in India, their number is rising rapidly to the consternation of those with whom they are competing for land and jobs.. 3. Population Explosion: Much like Bhutan, Nepal is a mountainous country. Most human settlements are situated on the steep slopes of the mountains. The delicate balance between man and nature is visibly and alarmingly pronounced. Unless the mutuality of dependence is appreciated and the balance maintained, man and mountain stand to destroy each other. In Nepal, this delicate equilibrium has been disturbed. The reproductive capacity of man has overtaken the productive capacity of the land. With one of the highest growth rate in the world, Nepal has seen its population quite literally, explode.

Twenty years ago, Christopher Haimendorf wrote in his introductory note in the report (SOAS) on the conference on 'The Anthropology Of Nepal' that between 1930 and 1961, the population of the kingdom grew from 5.532 -million to 9.753 million. Going by the present growth rate of approximately half a million per annum which is almost equivalent to the entire Population of Bhutan, his projection of 25 million by the end of the century appears to be falling short especially if the out-migration figures are to be included. He further adds that 'even today many thousands of villagers ... migrate every winter in search of work, and while most of them return ... it is not unusual for men to stay for a year or more in India'. Nepalese are compelled to search for economic opportunities of both short term and long term nature outside their country.

The Nepalese population now accounts for 20.1 million (Almanac, Asia week) with an annual growth rate exceeding 2.3% is most disturbing for both Nepal and her neighbours. Over eleven million Nepalese, constituting 60% of the total population live below poverty line.

Against the background of population explosion, which the country's economy cannot absorb even with the present high level of international assistance, the productive capacity and area of arable land itself is diminishing alarmingly. The reasons for this include excessive stress on the land and deforestation; the resultant depletion and denudation of the top soil caused by surface run of rain water; gully formation, sheet erosion and the flash floods that even affect the valley bottoms; and the occurrence of adverse micro-climatic changes. Even the forest belt in the terai which had provided a 'breathing space' has virtually disappeared. The farmer is thus squeezed out of the land that he has rendered infertile. While hopefully, the land may slowly cure itself, there is no other solution than for the more adventurous and the younger to seek a source of alternative livelihood outside his village.

III. WHERE AND HOW THE NEPALESE SETTLED IN BHUTAN

Upon Kazi Ugyen having been formally permitted to recruit Nepalese in the southern foothills, he initially recruited 'sardars' (contractors) whose function and responsibilities were to recruit and organize the Nepalese into groups of 'Tangyas' to conduct logging operations for sale of timber to neighbouring India. Once this was done, the more competent sardars were appointed as contractual landlords who were placed in charge of parceling the cleared forest into plots for allotment. They realized the land utilization fees as well as the return from sale of timber which continued to be harvested. These contractual landlords were given considerable latitude in the administration of their respective areas of control. Some emerged to enjoy the confidence of the Kazi and even that of the Paro Penlop who exercised administrative jurisdiction over Samchi. Because of the authority vested in them for various reasons, not the least of which may have been due to communication difficulty, they even interacted with their British counterparts across the border on behalf of the state.

After the recruitment in Samchi, except for minor lapses and for a good number of years, strict vigil was kept by the contractual landlords against illegal immigrants. It would appear that the inhospitable nature of the southern foothills (highly malaria prone with large herds of elephants) was in itself a major deterrent as observed by several British visitors including Eden and Rennie. In fact, this was one of the main reasons why until the 1950's no other parts of foothills were colonized except the malaria free hills of Chirang District.

Towards the early 1950's, the Nepalese began to acquire larger plots of land and encroached into the forest lands. From Samchi they began to spread westward and towards the north while those in Chirang began to push the indigenous people of Daga northwards, and spread southwards. It was around this time (1951-'54) that the Bhutan State Congress Party was formed under the leadership and as an extension of the Nepal Congress Party which had launched a successful rebellion against the Rana regime in Nepal. Fearing their spread into the interior parts of Bhutan and the helplessness of the government to wield effective control over them, the Government halted further northward spread.

After development programmes were initiated in 1961, education, health and other facilities began to be established in the two districts. The greatest impact of early development, both positive and negative, was to be realized from the establishment of a network of malaria eradication units along the southern belt which catered even to the tiny population of Nepalese in the Sarbhang area. While the positive impact was obvious, the eradication of malaria in the region invited further immigrants who were aggressive in their intent and action to 'colonize' the vast stretches of the fertile land. Gaylegphug or the entire Sarbhang Dzongkhag which until 1962 was known as Hathisa, meaning elephant land, soon became a target of the Nepalese immigrants. The once impregnable area of dense subtropical forest has now lost its verdant cover along with much of its fauna and like much of southern Bhutan, except for the protected wild life reserves and forest plantations, it has become an ecologically vulnerable area having undergone dramatic micro climatic changes.

Once the 5-year development programmes began to yield results, government effort to control immigration was thwarted by the earlier settlers who colluded with their ethnic kith and kin to prevent detection, falsify records and facilitate infiltration. Free education, free health services, employment opportunities, highly subsidized agriculture inputs, generous rural credit schemes, the security of a politically stable country were the main inducements that led to the influx of Nepalese immigrants in the 1960's and 1970's. In addition to the new arrivals, those who had come in legally as labourers for the many development schemes also began to infiltrate into the villages.

The encroachment on government protected forests by the Southern Bhutanese was a major problem encountered by the government often leading to confrontation with the migrants, until very recently. Even as the government embarked on a policy of conservation and afforestation, eco-environmental degradation became uncontrollable in the south. While taking full advantage of government leniency towards the southern Bhutanese they were capable of conceiving the most clever methods of undetectable encroachments. Presently, the legal average land holding among the southern Bhutanese is 8 acres while that of the northern Bhutanese is 2.3 acres.
Another peculiar observation among the settlers in the south is the interethnic exploitation that often comes to play. The pioneers among the Nepalese are usually the non-Bahuns who are more simple of mind and physically stronger. Once the forest is cleared via the slash and burn practice- and the land is tamed, the Bahun and the Thakuris follow with cash and guile. Before long, the pioneer is in debt and his mortgaged land has changed hands. The 'pioneers' are either rendered landless and termed 'Sukum-Basis' (landless people)or carve out, usually illegally, new plots. "ere the forest authorities are alert and assertive, the "Sukum" Basis" apply for "Kidu" (special dispensation) from the King which are either given individually on a case wise basis or in groups. The granting of "Kidu" land in groups has resulted in the establishment of new settlements specifically for the southern Bhutanese in recent years.

As much land as possible is generally colonized and managed through polygamous practice. A man may have several families each of which may live separately and look after separate properties often scattered in different blocks or dzongkhags (districts). The possessions of the farmers which include crop fields as well as orchards etc. are perceived commonly as a saleable wealth and are often sold for various reasons. This application of monetary value to the land and the comparative detachment of the farmer from it is uncharacteristic of the typical Asian farmer who is deeply and inextricably attached to the land.

Yet another peculiarity among the southern Bhutanese in general is to build very small and light structured temporary homes despite their comparatively higher income from the more intensive form of mixed farming systems. Their northern Bhutanese counterparts who on the average, own smaller land and hardly enjoy any income from cash crops, tend to build and live in much larger houses indicating a much higher sense of belonging and permanence. At the same time, the southern farmer, typically, does not invest his money in the bank or income generating fixed assets in the country. Invariably, their income is mainly converted to such highly liquid forms of asset as gold or silver which are usually buried in the ground.

These behavioral peculiarities of the southern Bhutanese farmers have often been seen as pointing to the transitory nature of their domicile in the country, reflecting a lack of attachment and sense of belonging to Bhutan. While the linkage with their adopted home and country thus appears tenuous they maintain a tenacious link with Nepal, their motherland. The suspicion that they did not in general sever their umbilical cord" with Nepal is further strengthened by the presence of the portrait of the Nepalese King and Queen while the Bhutanese King's portrait usually found no space in their homes. Added to this was the discovery that even senior government officials and prominent farmers visited Nepal to obtain Nepalese citizenship cards.
Often land disputes arose between the southern Bhutanese and their neighbours as a result of their northward incursions. Such disputes continue to take place since the foothills of the south were the winter grazing grounds of the Paropas of Paro, the Hapas of Ha and Dung Metaps of the Chukha Dzongkhags. These disputes which continue even today usually are resolved in favour of the southern Bhutanese. Consequently, the cattle herds of the northern Bhutanese and their dairy products have dwindled considerably over the years. Those who have lost a source of livelihood speak bitterly of government injustice. It is not uncommon even now for the remaining herders to find their shrunken pastures to have been converted to orange, cardamom, ginger and arecanut gardens or even paddy fields each winter.

The Doyas, who represent one of the oldest inhabitants of Bhutan and who, at one time occupied significant tracts of land in Samchi have also found themselves pushed out of the fertile land. Today, they are to be found in 3 main communities (two in Bhutan and one in India) confined to the marginally arable land in what was once their homeland. Inspite of there having been no effort on the part of the Government to provide any meaningful support, these communities have miraculously survived with their culture fairly intact simply by the act of evasion and escape from their new neighbours. It is felt that unless these communities are given special protection, they are now highly vulnerable to final extinction. Elsewhere in the country, namely the Dagana, Kheng, Martshala and Serthig-Lauri areas, similar encroachment and loss of traditional grazing grounds have, occurred.

It would be a matter of reasonable curiosity to inquire how this tiny nation survived as a sovereign state despite the Tibetan and Mongol invasions and its proximity to the British Colonial power in India. Of the many reasons attributable to this, the most important and popular one that the Bhutanese insist upon is their unique Drukpa identity which give it a distinctively separate form from any country or culture. It is this that, they believe, established an appreciable level of national homogeneity and cohesion among the various linguistic and ethnic groups in the country. They consider this to have engendered the will to survive, the genius to fashion the means and the strength to defend their nation state.

It was observed that many of the southern Bhutanese lacked a sense of belonging to the country.
This was particularly found wanting in terms of identity, patriotism and allegiance in relation to the country, the people and the institution of monarchy. A British colonel reporting on 7th December 1931 informed his government that the Nepalese constitute a population which did not owe allegiance to the Bhutanese King. There was in the south a growing population whose loyalty and allegiance lay outside their own country. On the other hand, the tenacity with which they held on to the elements of what constitute Nepalese national identity, except among few village communities, was very noticeable. At the same time, the prevalence of class and caste distinction which developed on the basis of sanskritization during the pre unification days of Nepal Was virtually unchallenged even in Bhutan giving cause for further concern. Government development agents, including low caste Southern Bhutanese, belonging mainly to health and teaching cadres, were often insulted by high caste behaviour during interaction with local southern population. Such sentiments and unfortunate circumstances appeared only to distance the population from the other Bhutanese.

Thus, the centrifugal implications on the Bhutanese polity arising particularly from the existence of two separate national identities could not be ignored. The government, therefore, launched a series of measures to counter this threat to national integrity under the national integration policy.

3. Development activities in the south were accelerated, intensified and expanded with the larger share of the development budgets being allocated to the southern Dzongkhags. The 4th, 5th and 6th five-year plan periods, covering the years 1976 to 1992, saw a dramatic rise in the number of schools, health facilities, agricultural extensions, communications infrastructure etc. in the south. In addition, the policy of the Royal Government to ensure equitable distribution of all national and regional facilities led to the establishment or upgradation of several educational, health and agricultural institutions in the south. Some of the largest development projects were also undertaken in the south. These include the Hill Irrigation Project of Chirang, the Gaylegphug Area Development Project, the resettlement projects of landless southern people etc.

4. Establishment of Royal Civil Service Commission (RCSC) by authority of a Royal Charter which established a merit based civil service by government with a clear set of criteria, rules and regulations for recruitment/ appointment, transfer and promotion including all career development opportunities: The Commission is also responsible for human resource development under which mandate it established merit based procedures for selection of students for higher education and training abroad.

With the emergence of the RCSC in 1982, guarantee of equal opportunities to employment with merit as the single criteria for all personnel action in government and corporations became established. The process toward this direction had already been initiated in 1977 under a Royal Command with the establishment of the Department of Manpower which later became the RCSC. In addition to the appointment of southern Bhutanese in the Commission, it was also ensured that certain key positions in the Secretariat were filled by southern Bhutanese. Thus the greatest beneficiaries, as intended, were the southern Bhutanese as all possibilities of discrimination etc. were totally eliminated. The percentage of civil servants in the government reached 38% in 1989 from less than 5% in the early 1970s.

IV. THE RATIONALE AND PROCESS OF INTEGRATION

The King has always been deeply committed to bringing the southern Bhutanese into the national mainstream. It is significant to note that even during his early childhood when he received his education in an exclusive school in Paro, he ensured the inclusion of southern Bhutanese children. While his late father had already initiated certain steps to integrate the southern people, it was during his reign that major efforts to achieve effective integration on a broader and deeper scale were undertaken to optimize the role of the southern Bhutanese in determining the destiny of the nation.

Although there was always the alternative choice to take measures that would marginalise and limit the role and sociopolitical capacity of the southern people, the government chose to frame a sincere well intentioned policy of genuine integration which was translated into a series of programmes covering all aspects of socioeconomic development. It was also reasoned that acceleration of development in the south to achieve an absolute parity in developmental benefits between the Nepalese people and the rest, would serve to make visibly clear the true intentions of the Royal Government. At the same time, it would enhance and ensure the capacity of the Nepalese to participate equally in the national mainstream via equal accessibility to education and employment opportunities. To this end, the government undertook a vigorous programme of integration of which the salient features include the following:

1. Introduction and usage of the term Lhotsampa in 1985-1986: The term simply means southern people on the basis of their regional location. Until this term was introduced, the southern people were referred to variously as Nepalese, paharias, and 'rintsam gi miser' (people of the borderland). The introduction of this term not only gave them a standard Bhutanese nomenclature but also implicit.in it was that country's acceptance and recognition of the Nepalese as a distinctly different cultural and linguistic unit in the ethnically diverse Bhutanese society. Anyone who referred to the southern people by the earlier terms was subjected to a fine of Nu.500/- on the spot under an executive circular Issued by the Home Ministry.

2. Lifting of restrictions against the entry and travel of southern Bhutanese as well as acquisition of land in interior Bhutan: This was an event of great significance which was immediately recognized by all.

3. Development activities in the south were accelerated, intensified and expanded with the larger share of the development budgets being allocated to the southern Dzongkhags. The 4th, 5th and 6th five-year plan periods, covering the years 1976 to 1992, saw a dramatic rise in the number of schools, health facilities, agricultural extensions, communications infrastructure etc. in the south. In addition, the policy of the Royal Government to ensure equitable distribution of all national and regional facilities led to the establishment or upgradation of several educational, health and agricultural institutions in the south. Some of the largest development projects were also undertaken in the south. These include the Hill Irrigation Project of Chirang, the Gaylegphug Area Development Project, the resettlement projects of landless southern people etc.

4. Establishment of Royal Civil Service Commission (RCSC) by authority of a Royal Charter which established a merit based civil service by government with a clear set of criteria, rules and regulations for recruitment/appointment, transfer and promotion including all career development opportunities: The Commission is also responsible for human resource development under which mandate it established merit based procedures for selection of students for higher education and training abroad.

With the emergence of the RCSC in 1982, guarantee of equal opportunities to employment with merit as the single criteria for all personnel action in government and corporations became established. The process toward this direction had already been initiated in 1977 under a Royal Command with the establishment of the Department of Manpower which later became the RCSC. In addition to the appointment of southern Bhutanese in the Commission, it was also ensured that certain key positions in the Secretariat were filled by southern Bhutanese34. Thus the greatest beneficiaries, as intended, were the southern Bhutanese as all possibilities of discrimination etc. were totally eliminated. The percentage of civil servants in the government reached 38% in 1989 from less than 5% in the early 1970s.

5. Recruitment of southern Bhutanese into the army and the police were also increased with special consideration given for officers training. In order to increase the number of southern officers, the RBA allotted 50% of the slots for officers training to the southern candidates for several years. The success of the policy both in intent and action was apparent since by 1989, their percentage in the Army and Police was beyond 25%.

6. Almost all major industries and commercial centres were established in the south on the basis of purely economic considerations as the main criteria. Under the integration policy, long term political implications were given little attention. While the southern towns of Samchi, Phuntsholing, Gaylegphug and Samdrupjongkhar are now the biggest commercial centres apart from Thimphu, all major industries are located in the southern districts whether they be hydro power generation, mineral or wood based industries.

Beyond these measures, the Royal Government initiated further steps to accelerate integration by providing special incentives and gestures. It is these steps which were seen as signs of weakness by the southern Bhutanese. These are listed below:

a. Certain key positions in the government were given to southern officers, some of whom had not been able to demonstrate any professional competence. This action which was aimed to increase the number of southern civil service officers among the policy makers had some negative impact on the credibility of the RCSC. It was at this time that civil servants openly passed such remarks as "to receive 'kidu' and rise rapidly in government, one must be born in southern Bhutan".

b. No legal action was taken against southern Bhutanese farmers for encroachment on government forests for their cash crop plantations or expansion of paddy and dry fields. The government initiated, some action only when Bhutanese farmers in other areas who, unable to escape severity of government action, began to question the uniform application of law. Even rural taxes were far lower for the southern citizens until 1980 when criticism from their compatriots impressed the southern representatives to request for uniformity during the 52nd session of the National Assembly.

c. It was a common perception among civil servants that while southern Bhutanese officers were likely to be exempted from severe forms of government action, others were less likely to be so privileged. This became apparent when certain high ranking district administrators were terminated from service and imprisoned for minor misuse and misappropriation of government property and funds. A southern counterpart escaped im 'prisonment because the government was unwilling to press charges of corruption. Likewise, the government did not initiate any legal proceedings against Teknath Rizal, even when it was established that he was guilty of treason for which the only punishment under the law of Bhutan is capital punishment (not imposed on any one since 1964). He was instead only questioned and released after two days of detention in the police officers' mess.

d. Five sanskrit pathshalas were patronized by the government. Full salaries of teachers were paid by the government and other forms of support were also given. At the same time, the government approved plans for the establishment of an apex sanskrit institution in the south where students from the various sanskrit pathshalas could obtain higher education. The only reason why it was not built was the dispute between the people of Dagapela and a strong lobby group led by Teknath Rizal who wanted it built on his land in Lamidara, Chirang. The purpose and intention behind government support for the pathshalas was to ensure that the Hindu culture among the southern Bhutanese Hindus is preserved, and that there would not be a dearth of pujaris (priests/religious functionaries). In addition to this, several students were sponsored by the government for higher studies in sanskrit at the Benaras Hindu University even after the government had stopped all scholarships for Buddhist studies in the 1980s.

e. In order to ensure that there would be no disparity in the standards of education and therefore, access to future job opportunities, all the village schools in the south which were run privately with no trained teachers or set curricula were taken over by the government and upgraded to full fledged primary schools. This was done in addition to the numerous government schools that were opened. A programme of integration through the education system was also initiated through student exchange. Southern and northern students were well distributed in the boarding facilities in each junior and high school thereby ensuring a mix of students. This was advantageous to the southern children since there were more primary schools in the south than any other region. More southern students therefore qualified for placement in the north.

f. Even against initial resistance from prominent farmers, the government undertook to eliminate the practice of exploitation of cash crop growers of southern Bhutan by middle men who were both southern Bhutanese as well as Indians. Soft loans were facilitated to the growers to buy back their land and to be released from the trap of perpetual indebtedness as well as to improve the plantations. This affirmative action taken by the government in the late '70's had a substantial impact in that, the high percentage of southern farmers who grow cash crop surpluses (orange, cardamom, ginger and fish), now obtain the full value of their produces. Furthermore, to maximize their income, the State Trading Corporation of Bhutan and the Food Corporation of Bhutan established and facilitated the direct accessibility of the produces to markets and major buyers in India and Bangladesh.

g. The King himself made considerable efforts to build a personal rapport with the southern Bhutanese. He undertook frequent visits to the southern villages and met the villagers and knew many village headmen and elders by name. During these visits, the problems and needs of the villages were discussed which resulted in many special projects for the south. Furthermore, the King always made it a point to take with him southern Bhutanese officials during these visits. Special meetings with the southern government officials were also held frequently.

h. Inter marriage between southern and northern Bhutanese were encouraged. Special cash incentives of Nu. 10,000/- were even paid to those who engaged in such inter marriages, irrespective of the gender of the claimant. It is sad to note, that these people are among the prime targets of the terrorists. Given the constant threats they are subjected to, such people are reluctant to work and live in the south.

i. The late King Jigme Dorji Wangchuck once told Father William Mackey, a prominent Jesuit educationist, that Bhutan is like a bird which can only fly with both wings. The two wings, he said, are the ancient religions of Buddhism and Hinduism. Based on the fact that Buddhism, as practised in Bhutan, has the entire pantheon of Hindu Gods well ensconced in Mahayana Buddhism and its rituals, the government promoted the theme of compatibility between the two religions. Even new temples built in southern Bhutan emphasize this with both Hindu and Buddhist shrines in the same temple. The King himself and the royal family participate regularly in the Hindu Tika Ceremony with southern citizens each year and, Dassai, the biggest Nepalese festival was declared a national holiday in 1980.

The above policies and actions were the deliberate results of a genuine political commitment of the government to integrate the southern people into the national mainstream. These were all in keeping with the spirit of the National Assembly resolution of 1958, according to which, Nepalese immigrants resident in Bhutan until 31 December 1958 were granted citizenship by registration. Each successive amendment to the Citizenship Act of 1958 is less restrictive and more liberal, demonstrating the continuing concessions the National Assembly was willing to make to the people in the south.

The policy of integration has been condemned by the dissidents as a deliberate policy of the government to undermine the Nepalese culture and language. The particular element of the integration policy that has been criticized as violation of human rights has been excluded from the above list to be discussed separately. This pertains to the enforcement of Driglam Namzhag by the Royal Bhutan Police and District authorities. The other subject of criticism concerning the exclusion of the Nepali language in the curriculum of the primary education system is not an element of the integration policy. Nevertheless, it too warrants some discussion.

Unless one has an intimate understanding of the Bhutanese culture, history and ethos and is sensitive to the continuing relevance of the role of the Drukpa identity in shaping Bhutan's history and destiny, the importance of 'Driglam Namzhag' may not be fully understood. As in all cultures, there are nuances and inexplicable behavioral patterns which even the most perceptive anthropologist cannot honestly claim to understand except by imbibing them through birth or long term association as a member of the community. Driglam Namzhag is one such aspect, the nuances of which find expression both in form and spirit.

Shabdrung Ngawang Namgyal the visionary patron Lama and ruler of Bhutan, who gave to Bhutan unity and the Drukpa identity spent much time and labour on the subject of Driglam Namzhag which he promoted. Literally, it means traditional values and etiquette. Carried beyond its immediate connotations, it represents the very essence and soul of the vast cultural heritage which today rests alone in this Himalayan kingdom. "Driglarn Namzhag" is the fountain of all the common social values and traditions of the Bhutanese society. Such virtues as respect for the teacher, the sovereign, parent and elder; the institution of marriage and family; civic duties and behaviour that keep together the strands of the Bhutanese social fabric, emanate from this source.

If, in the collective wisdom of the highest elected law making body" the National Assembly, which after due deliberations in the villages and districts, found it relevant and necessary to continue its practice, then that is the will of the nation and it must prevail. And if, in the pronouncement and enactment of that will, certain groups with vested interest find reason to disagree, it is no cause for concern. But when the selfish will of such groups prevail upon those who were, consciously and willingly, an instrument in the formation of that majority will, then there is cause enough for sadness, more than anything else. This unfortunately, is the story of the 'southern' opposition to Driglam Namzhag.

In their opposition to this policy component of the integration policy, the dissidents have demonstrated a lack of their understanding of the country's heritage. Further, it is even being alleged that they have perhaps, unwittingly voiced their innermost feeling of unwillingness to identify with Bhutan and accept the national identity. This unfortunate position has been seen to articulate further, the unreasonable attitude of the dissidents as well as their failure to appreciate the complexity of the culture and values of the people whose homeland they share and to whose country they too belong. While they have not been in any way motivated by the national integration policy actions to become "Bhutanese" in spirit, it is thus understandable that their demand for political change is not viewed as being inspired by any sense of noble patriotism or respect for Bhutan's ethnic diversity.

Although the dissidents appear to have only seen or understood the element of form (dress code) in Driglam Namshag, it appears that even the importance of form alone has now gained some acceptance among the dissidents upon hind-sight. As with any man, the true beauty of one's distant home and the colours of ' the land are seen only upon reflection from the soil of another land. It is more plausible, however, that upon discovery that one's claims for human rights must begin by respecting those of others, that they have changed their position on this subject on which they had spoken with much vehemence. In fact this was a main cause for their uprising. (During the uprising, they had denigrated the national flag by trampling upon it, burning it and raising their own flag in its place. They had also stripped naked those wearing the traditional attire). Having now seen legitimacy in the preservation of the Bhutanese identity, the dissidents speak of their acceptance of 'gho' and 'kira' by the southern people even before the Driglam Namzhag policy was introduced. They now support the government explanation that there was some fault in the provocative manner in which it was implemented by overzealous functionaries. One would then conclude that, with the recent adoption of more popular demands by the dissidents, the issue of Driglam Namzhag is put to rest.

The issue of language has been raised on the ground that teaching of Nepali was stopped in the government primary schools. Until 1988, Nepali was being taught upto grade 5 in all the primary 5 schools in. the south as a third language and not as a medium of instruction (The medium of instruction in all government schools from Year one is English). The decision to exclude the language as a separate subject was taken on several technical grounds after prolonged years of debate among education policy makers which included international educationists as well.
Their main reasons for recommending the policy change were the following:

1. Since English Language has been adopted as the medium of instruction since 1961 and as Dzongkha is taught as a second language, the inclusion of a third language, Nepali, puts the child in southern Bhutan at a considerable disadvantage given the heavy curriculum. The introduction of New Approach to Primary Education (NAPE) in 1985 and the consequent review and consensus for a need to reduce the number of subjects led to the decision to drop Nepali from the formal curriculum in the southern schools. Furthermore, there is a common examination that every primary school child must sit in order to qualify for admission into the junior high school system. Students from the south had to sit for an extra subject. Many of the government officials did not allow their children to take the extra subject. For those who are genuinely interested in studying the language, there is no restriction on private tuition or joining the sanskrit pathshalas.

2. There are many southern Bhutanese children in the northern schools where Nepali was never taught.

3. There was growing criticism from the other language groups that their languages were not being taught in schools while Nepali, seen by many as a foreign language, was being taught.

4. It was reasoned that Nepali is the national language and lingua franca of another country and that, in southern, Bhutan, there existed many ethnic groups from Nepal alone who have their own ethnic languages. Under the circumstance that the languages of the Gurung, Newari, Sherpa, Tamang, Limbu etc. cannot be taught, the continuation of Nepali teaching was considered discriminatory and supportive of another country's suppressive policy to undermine other linguistic cultures. Furthermore, the Nepali language was only serving to accentuate the dichotomy of two distinctive national cultures in Bhutan. This is opposed to the Royal Government policy to promote national cohesion and integration under a 'national culture' which is based on the recognition of the diversity of ethnic, religious and linguistic cultures in Bhutan and the commitment to respect and promote them equitably.

Nepali is still recognized as one of the national languages of Bhutan. It is one of the two officially recognized languages used in the National Assembly, the other being Dzongkha. It is widely used in the courts of law and government offices in the south. It is also used by government media and at all important gatherings at national and local levels. All important government documents are translated and circulated in this language. Furthermore, the news media in Bhutan print or broadcast Nepali editions and programmes.

The argument that the government suddenly changed its attitude does not stand to reason. Had Bhutan been politically unstable, where a change in government could have taken place, then it is plausible that policies could also have changed. But in Bhutan, there is a stable government, where the same leadership that so earnestly framed the integration policy still continues.
It is thus fair to state that, no other country has done as much as Bhutan to respect, accept and integrate an immigrant culture and race. While the recent uprising must be seen as a pointer to the failure of the policy, it's impact on development in the south and special privileges for the citizens of Nepalese origin had attracted large numbers of illegal immigrants. It was therefore, inevitable that the integration policy which was counter productive in so far as it caused greater and highly visible Nepalese infiltration, called for an accurate and thorough census.

V. THE ISSUE OF CENSUS

Demographic data is the most basic information that a state is required to maintain for the purpose of fulfilling its obligations to the people. In the case of Bhutan, the critical importance of conducting census accurately and frequently has been adequately established in the preceding sections. How the census is actually conducted is something that is most likely to differ from country to country as per the multiplicity of uses for which the information is intended. In the advanced societies, technology is a great asset that simplifies the process of gathering and verifying, the data. In a mountainous country like Bhutan, with very limited communication infrastructure, limited trained manpower and a high illiteracy rate, the business of conducting census is not a simple task inspite of the small population. This has been complicated by the long and porous southern border of approximately 720 Km. The fact that the country is situated among some of the most populous states in Asia does not help. In fact, it is in relation to the illegal immigrants from Nepal that the census activities of the government has aroused undue interest.

Bhutan is not the only country which is faced with immigration problems. The whole of Western Europe, the USA and most countries which are contiguous to less developed or politically unstable countries are faced with this problem. Where it becomes a serious problem is when illegal immigrants assume an aggressive stance and threaten to destabilize the country and seize power.

Illegal immigration into Bhutan is being politicized with the support of certain sections of the southern Bhutanese and Nepalese in the region across the border. Under the guise of human rights and. political discontent the perfectly legitimate action taken by the state is being questioned and condemned. The immigration problem faced by the industrialized countries fades into insignificance when compared with that of Bhutan. Yet a prominent European leader was so concerned that he likened his country's immigration problem to an invasion. When one takes into account the singular source and 'race' of the economic migrants, the nature of the threat becomes even more alarming. In Bhutan, the survival of the indigenous race and a rich cultural heritage is at stake.

The few groups of Nepalese who were initially brought into southern Bhutan as 'tangyas' and those who followed them were granted citizenship by an Act of the National Assembly in 1958. Although there were only two districts where they were settled at the time, they quickly spread throughout the southern territory converting the hitherto vast and impregnable forest including Hathisa (elephant land) into rice and maize fields. Scattered among five Dzongkhags with millions of their ethnic kin across the border, they began making claims of majority over the Bhutanese population. In 1952, when their population was far below 15%, they claimed to represent 64% and called for political change. There is something strangely identical about the recent uprising and the earlier movement.

While the Bhutan State Congress was organized by the current Prime Minister of Nepal in 1951 by his own public admission, there are reasons to believe that there exists a strong political nexus between the dissident parties and political groups in Nepal. Their claims and demands have changed somewhat, but the long term goal has remained the same. Here it is significant to note that the Nepali Congress Party also organized the party in Darjeeling, India at the same time. While the southern population is now larger, they share the same weakness of not having any support from the Drukpas. Unmindful of this weakness, they staged a rebellion during which they even desecrated the national flag and raised their own "national flag". Whatever their stated demands, the main cause that triggered the violent demonstration was the conducting of a comprehensive census by the Department of Census and Immigration. The Department had carried the mandate that all illegal immigrants should be identified as per the provisions of the National Citizenship Act of 1958 and the 1977 and 1985 resolutions of the National Assembly.
The results of the census revealed exactly what was suspected and which could not be explained by any demographic extrapolations. Planned and systematic infiltration by the immigrant Nepalese had been taking place. While they took advantage of the social, cultural and linguistic affinities with the southern Bhutanese, the latter found themselves divided between the desire to keep on the right side of the law while being pleaded upon, coerced, threatened and morally obliged to co-operate. There were those too, who were willing to collude voluntarily, seeing economic and political advantages of immediate and long term nature. Since census is traditionally conducted by local authorities which in turn leave the actual enumeration to the village authorities, the illegal immigrants had managed to escape detection and find a place in the records. Following methods of infiltration were discovered which gave cause to suspect the planned and deliberate nature of infiltration for the dual purpose of achieving demographic changes and overcoming chronic labour shortage given the large land and plantation holdings in the south:

1. Entry-by matrimony: A very popular method of infiltration into the country is by marrying Nepalese outside Bhutan44. As polygamy is very common among the Southern Bhutanese, multiple wives are invariably followed by their close and distant relatives establishing a consequent web of matrimonial alliances both within and outside the country. Contrary to their cultural traditions, the brides bring in their husbands often to be accompanied by relatives. Land would be acquired or given to such relatives and the co-operating village headman would be obliged to authenticate their claims for registration for a fee or favour.

2. Entry by "reverse adoption": Adoption of foreigners (age no bar) is commonly practiced. Entire families are 'adopted' by individuals or families who are already established in the country. Such adoptions range from domestic servants and share croppers to total strangers with economic means. One case 1 came across was in Bhangtar when the head of the family (a soldier) did not want to emigrate while members of his extended family wanted to leave. Finally, it emerged that his family members who wanted to leave had been adopted by him and as they themselves claimed not to be citizens, wished to sell their property and depart for Nepal where they claimed arrangements had been made for purchase of land and property.

3. Entry by acquisition of land and house: This method required direct collusion of the village authorities and the people's representative in the National Assembly. Since one criteria for granting citizenship was the possession of'land and a house, before which a photo had to be taken, immigrants would hire or purchase plots large enough for a hut, then build a hut and acquire a plot number.

4. Entry as orange, cardamom porters, farm hands etc: Large numbers of porters to transport the cash crops used to be recruited from Nepal each year. Many never returned. When this was discovered, the matter was deliberated upon in the National Assembly and the practice discouraged since 1986. To overcome undue hardships to the farmers, soft loans were given to purchase mules and ponies. At the same time, the local village authorities were asked to encourage local farmers to transport the orange crop since the season does not conflict with their normal agricultural activities.

5. Entry by falsification of documents: In collusion with the village and local authorities, outright falsification of documents took place. Through this practice, some illegal immigrants were even elected to the National Assembly45. 6. Entry by displacement: Since registered land and house were the most reliable criteria, purchase of registered land and house by immigrants was used as a full proof means. Often the seller thus displaced acquired new plots or claimed to be a "Sukum Basi", who, having no difficulty in establishing his citizenship was eligible for "Kidu" land as discussed in an earlier section. Sometime the sellers returned to Nepal where they acquired property and settled permanently.

7. Entry by 'resurrection': A peculiarity among the southern Bhutanese is reported to be their unwillingness and continued resistance to the govemment's policy of compulsory rural life insurance, which is most popular among northern Bhutanese farmers. It was later discovered that the minimal occurrence of death in Southern Bhutan was due to the sale of identity of deceased person.

8. Entry by enrollment in schools :Migrant Nepalese residing across the border obtained admission in Government schools which were usually run by expatriate teachers. These unsuspecting school authorities gave admission and certificates which were then used by the parents as proof of their citizenship. Through this process many illegal immigrants not only entered Bhutan but acquired government scholarship for further studies in India and abroad and enabled them to infiltrate into the civil service and the army to acquire very high positions.

9. Entry by intimidation, bribery, force etc: This happened frequently. Paradoxically, such methods are now being used by the dissidents to compel the people to join the camps.
In addition to those who entered through the above described means, many labourers recruited directly from Nepal for various development projects such as road construction, diffused among the southern population.

These methods of infiltration were mainly discovered or proven during the census of 1988. They explain why the unsuspecting Government failed to detect illegal immigration. The systematic manner in which they were carried out lend a degree of validity to the use of the term "silent invasion". It has now been established that beyond the simple social and economic reasons, the large scale undetected infiltration was conceived to overcome the demographic strength of an unsuspecting people. They also help explain why the government had to go beyond the normal procedures of enumeration and verification during census. This in essence, meant the conducting of census under the direct supervision of central authorities which had hitherto been a local responsibility discharged mainly by the village headmen. Until then, records were maintained in the Dzongkhags and sub-divisional offices allowing easy tampering.

VI. REASONS FOR RETURN MIGRATION

It was considered natural for the illegal immigrants to leave the country especially under the generous terms and conditions offered by the government. The were fully compensated (as per prevailing rates) for the land which they had illegally occupied and on which they had established themselves. The government, on the other hand, was perplexed by the number of Bhutanese citizens who too have left their country after having established their antecedents as bonafide Bhutanese citizens. Upon a closer examination of the causes for their departure from Bhutan, following reasons help explain their choice to return to Nepal.

1. Upon being discovered, the illegal immigrants, usually decide to leave. In as much as the southern Bhutanese have aided in, the infiltration and concealing of the immigrants, many southern Bhutanese express solidarity with those leaving for reasons, which among others, include the close emotional and family bonds that have been developed and exist among them.

2. Unlike the northern Bhutanese who are highly individualistic, the Nepalese are found to be susceptible to group influence. This has been well written and s oken of and is attributed as one reason for their continuing value as mercenaries who will willingly sacrifice their life in battles with the slightest concern for the cause. It has been observed that this plays a significant role in the decision of the Nepalese and southern Bhutanese to leave the country. Far removed from Nepal, and in the absence of political leaders, they have tended to look up to southern personalities who enjoy rank and status with the Government. Hence,the leadership image enjoydd by Rizal, Basnet and Subba who were close to the King. When these 'leaders' left the country, it had a telling impact on the simple farmers. Here it may be mentioned that while Rizal had left the country for purely political reasons, the Royal Audit Authority has levelled charges of misappropriating considerable sums of government funds against Basnet and Subba. Whether such embezzlements were motivated by personal greed or political reason (party funds) cannot be established.

3. The dissidents use two forms of persuasion to attract southern Bhutanese. One involves the use of disinformation flavoured with the promise of a quick return in triumph. Meanwhile, they are enticed with information about the privileged conditions under which they will be accorded 'international hospitality at the camps in Nepal. They are told about free shelter, food and clothing, amenities and daily allowance of $8 per person (not family) for the short duration that they stay there. To the innocent and illiterate farmer, this has proved to be a very effective means of persuasion.

The second and more powerful means of persuasion is the use of threat in all manner of form, the most well known being the threat to "make you six inches shorter" Those southern Bhutanese who have resisted all forms of persuasion and threats, are being targeted as victims of terrorist acts.

4. The dissident leaders have politicized the problem. By so doing, there is a mutuality of interest between the southern Bhutanese. dissidents and the illegal immigrants that they intend to fulfill. On one side, number is seen as the most powerful tool to convince the international audience of 'the mass support enjoyed by the dissidents so that international pressure can be brought to bear upon Bhutan. On the other side, the invitation to join the camps is tempting when the leaders promise that their illegal immigration to Bhutan will be legitimized along with grant of citizenship.

5. A number of people who had participated in the violent demonstrations did not return after having run away from the country to escape -legal action. The families of these people are among those who leave to join them.

6. Since the first dissident movement was begun by the present Prime Minister Nepal and as he has openly supported the current uprising, the dissident leaders are seen to represent him and the Nepalese government. Given the origin and the racial, cultural, emotional and family ties that many southern Bhutanese maintain with Nepal, the slightest provocation is enough for many to leave their homes in Bhutan. It has been recently confirmed that the dissident leaders are now recruiting "refugees" from among the ethnic Bhutanese living in the North Eastern States of India. There are those in Bhutan.who, unable to understand why so many southern Bhutanese who enjoyed equal and more privileges as citizens and have prospered under the government's integration programme, believe that certain powerful elements in Nepal are involved. In the ultimate analysis, the southern Bhutanese who leave are exercising the. freedom of choice which is afforded to them by the law of the nation.

VII. HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM

It is normal human instinct to sympathize with the weaker, the older and the lessor. This basic instinct is often a barrier to reason, and the voice of truth to the real victim can sometimes appear never to be heard. In the problem that Bhutan is presently grappling with, it seems inevitable that the state is branded the villain and the dissidents the victims.
The majority of the Bhutanese which include the southern Bhutanese in the country think they are the victims and, in their every day life, they feel the loss of civil liberties, they experience deprivation and a pervasive sense of fear and insecurity as a result-of the terrorism perpetrated by the dissidents. Among the villagers in' the south, every day is a nightmare. But their voice is not heard by the media, and their human rights appear not to be of any importance. Explanations by the Government are dismissed as propaganda and plain untruths. Even concrete evidence is seen as fabrications,.

In a recent article on Bhutan by an Asian journalist, the story begins with a girl whose face is scarred by security people who allegedly "poured boiling water" on her. Whether this is the result of an accident is immaterial. The important thing was that it proyided a vivid personification to the theme of the story that he wished to tell. On the other hand, BBC recently aired a report on the "World Today". It was reported that a woman speaking 'non-stop' in Nepali at a Jhapa Camp claimed having been raped. The interpreter was the camp health worker. A more faithful interpretation in London revealed that the woman in fact was expressing denial of having been a rape victim. The weaker, the lessor and the poor do lie - more perhaps, than the state for he is not accountable and is motivated solely by a purpose only he or, as in this case, the camp leader, will know. In the case of the "Bhutanese refugee", that purpose does not appear to be survival.

The expulsion of such a large number of people as has been claimed cannot happen in a country so easily when the country does not have the means, militarily or in any other form. The fact that there is an absence of any resistance but eagerness and willingness to leave one's land and home must in itself convey a story. This is particularly poignant when considering the martial characteristics and the capacity of the Nepalese to include extreme hardships. The claims of dissidents for human rights is paradoxical. Their call for human rights is accompanied by acts of terrorism which trample the human rights of innocent villagers in the south. The Bhutanese Government has caught and released numerous Nepalese and southern Bhutanese who were arrested for direct or indirect committal of various crimes including terrorism. The psychological and mental trauma and physical deprivations that the dissidents speak of are the results of the actions that they themselves have been perpetrating on the Southern Bhutanese. Today, the inability of the Government security forces to give adequate security coverage to the southern Bhutanese has resulted in the organization of self protection volunteers on a village (only southern Bhutan) wise basis. It is these volunteers who have become fairly effective in preventing a greater level of terrorism. The dissidents krpow that without the villagers to join them, there will be no camps without w ic their movement cannot survive. The greater numbers would strengthen their position. The innocent farmers of the South are thus vict . ims who are manipulated, raped and tortured.

The adoption of uman Rights is a convenient banner that the dissidents and tiie Nepalese supporters have raised before the international community. But their greater aim is to generate international sympathy for the dissident cause which is to grab political power. But the Bhutanese people see no legitimacy in this demand. They are happy with the prevalent political arrangement. They. believe that the legitimacy of demand for any manner of political change can only come through the voice of true majority of the Bhutanese people. As admitted by the dissidents and as 'was the weakness of the Bhutan state Congress, the dissident parties do not have any sup'ort base beside a small section of misguided southern Bhutanese and the illegal immigrants.

While the human rights violations by the dissidents have not been questioned. thus -far, Bhutan has made every effort to respond to international concern and to abide by the spirit of her own commitment to human rights. Confident of her innocence against the allegations made by the dissidents, and eager to accept new ideas, the Amnesty International and ICRC were invited to study and appraise the human rights situation in the country and the specific conditions of the detainees. Amnesty International.'s report which has already been released gives a clearer picture of the actual human rights situation in the country & dismisses the false allegations.
In the ultimate analysis, the relevance of human rights in the context of the developing world, and in particular, that of Bhutan must be considered. To the people of Bhutan, what is most important is the process of development, the means by which the collective needs of the society can be met expeditiously in a fair and equitable manner. To this end, health care, education, transportation and above all, hope for a better and more secure future are more important than anything else. Individual freedom and liberty on which western concept of human rights is founded has little relevance to these basic aspirations. If the will of the majority is that these can be obtained through the prevailing political arrangements, then that will must prevail.

VIII. BHUTAN'S PERCEPTION OF THE PROBLEM AND THE FUTURE.

There is anguish among the people for the attempt of a minority immigrant group to bring about political change in collusion with illegal immigrants and Nepalese beyond the border. The Bhutanese feel that they have been betrayed by a people they had welcomed, in whom they had placed their trust and with whom they were willing to share a common destiny. But the general attitude of the Bhutanese toward their southern compatriots do not indicate any rancour.
There is a strong condemnation of the misguided action that the dissidents have perpetrated on the people and the government. The audacity with which the dissidents have undermined the rights and will of the majority, and attempted to 'take over' the country by bringing political changes which in effect would have resulted in a Nepalese (foreign) rule will probably never be forgotten. That they could have become a minority in their own country with a 'majority' population who showed no love or respect for their culture and traditions will always remain a haunting nightmare. But the Buddhist spirit of compassion and forgiveness is already visible in Thimphu. There is not the slightest sign of ethnic animosity. There are no pointing fingers. People know that the majority of the Southern Bhutanese do not identify with the dissidents and that they are Bhutanese as they always will be.

This is particularly striking for anyone who saw and. experienced the tension that gripped the capital city after the announcement of the threat of a gorkha take over in late 1990. Foreigners who visit Thimphu socially and officially see in both the worlds not only a calmness but a heartening casualness in the relationship between the northern Bhutanese and their southern compatriots. There is no ethnic strife in the capital which is now a sanctuary for the southern Bhutanese fleeing the 'anti-national terrorists of Jhapa'. The majority of the people of Bhutan are not oblivious to the thousands who have deserted their homeland at the call of the dissidents. They are aware that inspite of the attention that these people receive from various international and local agencies, there is always greater happiness, comfort and privacy in the humblest home that one can call one's own. Understandably, greater sympathy go to those who are clearly victims of disinformation and are beguiled by those who see in their swelling numbers growing prospects for their vested interests. At the same time, both the government and people are aware that the traditions and laws of the land give every citizen the freedom to renounce the citizenship and to emigrate to another country.

The congregation of such a large body of homeless people in Nepal, if indeed all are such, is disturbing. That people are dying of sickness and disease is a cause for even greater concern. But what makes it a human tragedy is that there are no reasons that are compelling enough to cause this unfortunate situation. Collectively, the dissidents and their followers have betrayed the trust of their country. It is ironic that the process by which they abandoned their homes, was in itself their first encounter with the hollowness of freedom and the exploitation of the innocent masses that democracy is often synonymous with in the developing world.

Yet there is moral respite for the Bhutanese, however misplaced it might seem, in the common knowledge that the camps with all their alarming numbers are not host to only people from Bhutan but from both within Nepal as well as from the region48. The naivety with which the government went about printing the Citizenship Identity Cards without any concern for security aspects speak further of the alternative origins of many of the cards with which the camp members claim their identity (These were printed in Calcutta at the Caxton Press in 1981 at a cost of Rs. 1.60 or US $ 0.6 per card). Then again, there is the well known fact that a prime target of every raid launched by members of the camps are the identity cards of the southern Bhutanese whose homes are no longer safe. Not so incredible are the rumours that many Nepalese from the poor and disadvantaged areas in Nepal find the camps a haven (the standard of living in the camp is higher and more comfortable than in the villages). The claim that all those in the camps are Bhutanese therefore arouse strong suspicion.

To the more discerning eye, there are in the dissident literature, photographs of 'starving' children in the laps of healthy and well fed mothers that make a mockery of the tragedy that a single frame of the camera conveys on the plight of the Somalians or the starving Ethiopians. There are reports brought back by foreign journalists who visit the camps that very few male adults and youth are visible in the camps. This has caused the people to suspect that perhaps, the rumours of the return migrants using the camps as convenient training grounds for terrorists may be true. Recently for the first time, in light of overwhelming evidence produced by the government of Bhutan the dissidents admitted to the committal of terrorism against the southern Bhutanese who refuse to leave the country and join the camps. Recently, Kuensel printed the photographs of several terrorists caught by southern Bhutanese villagers on separate occasions after they had committed artned robbery, rape of a seventeen year old girl and cold blooded murder of a woman in Sarbhang. They were from the Tinmai and Bedangi camps in Nepal and revealed the names of the camp officials who had given the orders. One of them was from Sikkim who admitted to having been registered as a Bhutanese 'refugee' with 'proper' identification documents. The government is making as much effort as possible within its means to halt the people from leaving the country. Whatever their reasons or sources of inspiration, the government considers it its responsibility to convince the people not to abandon their home and country. The King himself has repeatedly called upon the southern people not to abandon their country during these difficult times. He also went several times to personally meet those who had applied for emigration to call upon them to withdraw their application. In addition, as a gesture of special concern the southern people were exempted from all rural taxes and labour contribution for one year. Despite all these moves, most preferred to go.

Although the security situation in the south is still not conducive and inspite of the resistance of civil servants and teachers to accept postings in the south, the government has begun repairing the service facilities that were destroyed or damaged during the uprising. Many schools, health facilities and other social and communication infrastructures have started to function optimally. It is hoped that all service facilities will resume normal operations in the very near future. The people and the government are hopeful that the madness which led the dissidents to cause such unrest in the country will give place to sanity and that the people in the south will be left alone in peace to resume a normal life.

While it is obvious that all civil servants should continue to enjoy the same rank and status as in the past, even the close relatives of the dissident leaders continue to occupy high positions in the government without any hindrance or loss of personal status.
For those who have left the country and those who still intend to leave regardless. of the government's effort to dissuade them. there appears little else that can be done for them by the Bhutanese government. One can only hope that the freedom of choice that they have exercised will lead them to a safe and secure life in what they consider their homeland. It is also hoped that the Nepalese government will allow the returnmigrants to re-establish themselves by lifting the restrictions of movement imposed on them. It is only fair that the people in the camps irrespective of where they come from, if indeed they are destitute and refugees, should be afforded the basic human right of free movement and right to earn a living.

It is understandable that the displaced persons in Nepal should receive international attention and sympathy. It is hoped that the organizations involved in giving relief to them regardless of where they come from, will continue with their humanitarian work. But Bhutan is no less deserving of international understanding and sympathy. Her very survival as a nation state is threatened by a dissident group which has been able to politicize and blur the issue of illegal immigration with demands for human rights and political change. The nation which had accepted as her own an alien population is now the victim of her own generosity. A section of these people who have rejected everything that is Bhutanese including national identity, language and political traditions, threaten to take over the country with the support of ethnic kins who comprise the largest and the most aggressive trans-national migrant people in the region.
The rich and splendorous culture of the Great Wheel of Buddhism (Mahayana) which once flourished in Sikkim, Tibet and Ladakh is well on the path to extinction. Today, Bhutan, the last bastion of this rich cultural heritage is in a state of siege.

On December 10, 1992, the General Assembly of the United Nations declared this year "The International Year For The World's Indigenous People." Surely, the legitimate rights of the indigenous people of Bhutan who are faced with a real threat to their very sumval as a distinct culture and political entity will find a prominent place on the international agenda.

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Journals

1. Kuensel, Kuensel Corporation, Thimphu. 2. Himal, Himal Association, May/June 1992 and July/August 1992 issues. 3. The Darjeeling Guide, Samuel Smiths Co. Ltd., Calcutta, 1845. 4. The Bhutan Review, Vol. I, No. 1 Kathmandu, Nepal.